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PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
Luckily, we never really know what another person thinks.  
At a time when Orwell’s 1984 is suddenly back on the bestsellers lists because of the 
way it speaks to the political climate of 2017, we may find some comfort in that 
thought. After all, there is still no Thought Police. Die Gedanken sind frei! 
Sometimes, however, we still wish we could read someone’s mind.  
This is particularly true if that someone has the power to make decisions with enor-
mous consequences for our lives. Such as a central banker! Over the past few decades, 
central bankers across the developed world gained astonishing degrees of independ-
ence from the political process – from us – and then, as the world suffered the worst 
economic crisis for generations, increased their powers even further. They became the 
new ‘masters of the universe’. 
To be fair, central bankers often did not seek these powers themselves. Many were 
uncomfortable with the responsibility that came with them – and what it might do to 
their treasured independence if they failed to live up to this enormous responsibility. 
But for now this is the world we live in; one in which independent technocrats make 
far-reaching decisions autonomously. In order to better understand why these powerful 
individuals do what they do, wouldn’t it be nice to know a bit more about how they 
think?  
It was with these thoughts in mind that I started the doctoral program at the European 
University Institute (EUI) in late 2013. More specifically, I intended to survey central 
bankers on their economic thinking in a way that would allow me to quantify their be-
liefs. During interviews for spots in doctoral programs I almost always received more 
or less the same response from the professors in those juries. It was a neat idea, yes, 
but it surely wasn’t going to happen. If I tried to approach central bankers with my 
survey, they would most likely never respond. And if they did, they would probably all 
say the same thing. So I was under no illusion that this would be quite a journey. 
I could have never embarked on this journey, let alone finished it, without the kind 
support of a large number of people. Among the many, two certainly stand out.  
First is my supervisor, Sven Steinmo, who encouraged me to try what everybody told 
me wouldn’t work – while making sure I had fallback options in case it turned out eve-
rybody was right. He understood that it was really this idea of quantifying central 
bankers’ beliefs which motivated me to pursue this particular project and told me to go 
ahead with it even though this research strategy seemed likely to fail. Thankfully, Sven 
also urged me to spend much more time than I had originally planned interviewing 
central bankers in person and reading their speeches.  
 
 
Both has helped me a great deal in understanding the inner workings of the European 
System of Central Banks and the world of central banking more generally, and much 
of what fills the following pages stems from this experience. However, this better 
knowledge of European monetary policymaking in practice – plus the contacts to cen-
tral bank economists my interviews facilitated – were also crucial when it came to in-
terpreting the survey data, once it had turned out that central bank economists were 
more open to be surveyed on their economic beliefs than most skeptical academics had 
imagined, myself included.  
The survey idea would most likely have ended in failure if not for the help of Richard 
Portes. I was starting to plan my empirical strategy in earnest at the beginning of my 
second year at the EUI, when it was announced that Richard Portes would become the 
inaugural holder of the Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa Chair in European Economic and 
Monetary Integration at the EUI’s Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies. I 
knew having the support of someone like Portes, with his glowing name in central 
banking circles would lend my survey much needed credibility. The only problem? 
Based out of London, and with no ties to my department, Richard was under no obli-
gation whatsoever to help.  
Yet, he did much more than simply helping me. Not only did he work with me to im-
prove my survey questionnaire, and invited me to join his Research Group; he was so 
kind to write a Letter of Support I could use to address potential survey respondents. 
There can be no doubt that this letter was absolutely instrumental in prompting many 
central bank economists to participate in my study. One of my interviewees at the 
German Bundesbank later estimated that probably half of my 422 respondents would 
not have participated in the study without Richard’s letter – I believe this number to be 
even higher. In short: Richard did not need to help me, but he did, and this dissertation 
would not exist in its current form without him. For this I shall be eternally grateful! 
Finally, I also owe thanks to Ben Rosamond for the great course on ‘Ideas in Political 
Analysis and International Relations’ he taught at the University of Copenhagen in the 
spring of 2012. This was not only the best university course I ever attended (by a mar-
gin), it also introduced me to the key ingredients of what would later become this dis-
sertation: Mark Blyth’s Great Transformations and Kathleen McNamara’s Currency 
of Ideas. Through the discussion of those two great books, I learned a great deal about 
Knightian Uncertainty and the role of ideas in central banking. Finally, we also dis-
cussed an article by Colin Hay and Nicola Jo-Anne Smith (2010) which made a strong 
case for surveying policymakers. Unknowingly, Ben Rosamond gave me the perfect 
script to follow throughout my time in Florence.  
During those almost four years I have also benefited greatly from a number of profes-
sors at the Department for Political and Social Sciences, who always kept their doors 
open and were happy to discuss my research plans with me. This goes for Pepper Cul-
 
 
pepper in particular, whose skepticism and tough questions did a lot to motivate me. 
But I also received great advice from Adrienne Héritier, Diego Gambetta, Fabrizio 
Bernardi, Hanspeter Kriesi, Laszlo Bruszt, and Philipp Genschel.  
The same goes for a number of people I had the honor to meet at panels of several con-
ferences, most importantly the ECPR Joint Sessions in Pisa 2016, a Central Banking 
Workshop at the University of British Columbia and the EUSA Biennial Conference in 
Miami 2017. On those occasions I received very helpful comments from, Michele 
Chang, Juliet Johnson, David Howarth, Eleni Tsingou, Cheryl Schonhardt-Bailey, 
Benjamin Braun, Sebastian Diessner, Alessandro Giovannini, Sven Hilgers, Manolis 
Kalaitzake, Sebastian Heidebrecht, Arie Krampf, Hjalte Lokdam, Andrew Baker, and 
others.  
One of the great perks of doing a PhD at the EUI is the seemingly unstoppable flow of 
great scholars who come to visit San Domenico on a regular basis. A preferred choice 
for sabbaticals, EUI researchers are blessed to meet very busy academics when they, 
for once, have some time on their hands. Over the years, this has allowed me to dis-
cuss my work with Alan Jacobs, Andrew Bennett, Cornel Ban, David Coen, Manuela 
Moschella, Patrick Leblond, and Peter Dietsch, who were so kind to provide me with 
ideas on how to improve this thesis. This has helped me immensely, especially in the 
early stages of the PhD.  
At the later stages I benefited greatly from the help of Lukas Haffert, Björn Bremer, 
Niels Selling, and Pierre Schlosser – my kind and frighteningly intelligent friends and 
colleagues, who carefully read earlier drafts of this thesis and provided me with a long 
list of suggestions as to how to improve it. I have tried my best to honor the time you 
spent with my thesis by taking on your comments the best way I could!  
Other friends in Florence did not suffer so much from reading my stuff but from my 
inability to shut up about central bankers. I have more than once bored the hell out of 
Mikkel Munthe Jensen, Katharina Wolf, Rutger Birnie, Benedikt Dengler, Agnieszka 
Smolenska, Martina Selmi, Martijn van den Brink, and Mariana Spratley. Thank you 
for listening patiently – and for still considering me your friend (that’s what I hope, at 
least). 
Then there are a number of people I would like to thank but cannot. Those are the 
economists who work inside the Eurosystem institutions and devoted considerable 
time to a young PhD student at a time when they could not have been busier. Thanks 
to my hours and hours of discussions with them, I have learned more about Europe and 
central banking than I ever though I would – and it almost pains me to honor their an-
onymity by not thanking them individually for their time and kindness.  
Towards the end of this project, Kurt Hübner was so kind to provide me with the per-
fect environment to finish writing this dissertation at the University of British Colum-
bia’s Institute for European Studies in Vancouver. In early 2017, Kurt also organized a 
 
 
workshop on the ‘brave new world of central banking’ with me – a perfect opportunity 
for me to test my arguments before submitting this thesis. 
Finally, I thank my wonderful editor and partner, Francesca Bianco. You not only 
made my writing a lot better, but pretty much everything else, too.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
“There was a time, not too long ago, when central banking was considered  
to be a rather boring and unexciting occupation. […]  
I can confidently say that this time has passed.”  
Mario Draghi, 15 Apr 2013 
If the tragic and seemingly endless Eurozone crisis knows one ‘winner’, it certainly is 
the European Central Bank (ECB). Since the crisis began, the ECB has greatly in-
creased its powers and has eventually become the dominant actor in European eco-
nomic governance. In the eyes of many, it is the only institution left with the capability 
to act. Compared to other European institutions, which are seemingly paralyzed by 
divergent national interests and their intergovernmental decision-making mode, the 
highly autonomous ECB has proven that it can make and implement policies quickly. 
However, the ECB has often not actively pursued new powers, due to concerns about 
its independence. It has merely accepted them, often rather reluctantly. Nevertheless, it 
has ended up with ever more responsibilities, facing ever higher expectations. 
Still, the ECB remains a poorly understood institution. For all its powers, we know 
remarkably little about how – and why – it makes the decisions it does. Shrouded in 
mystery, the world’s most independent central bank is, at the same time, the least 
transparent. Deciding behind closed doors and refraining from issuing detailed minutes 
or voting records of its meetings, the ECB often leaves observers puzzled. Analysts 
and the financial press are left with no other option than to engage in guesswork when 
trying to understand why the ECB does what it does. 
This lacuna obviously constrains our understanding of the ECB’s relatively conserva-
tive behavior during the crisis. 1 While central banks around the world were “reversing 
the orthodoxy of the past several decades” (Davies 2013) and tried to counter the 
‘Great Recession’ by increasing the money supply through a variety of mechanisms, 
the ECB took a much more cautious approach. Despite record-high unemployment and 
low inflation rates, it has long been hesitant to adopt the expansionary policies its 
peers pursued. Or, to state it more bluntly: while others reacted to the crisis by fighting 
unemployment, the ECB continued to fight inflation. Why did the ECB choose not to 
do more? Given the criticism this received, why did the ECB not do more to support 
the Eurozone economy? 
Institutionalist explanations correctly point out that other central banks such as the 
Federal Reserve (Fed) or the Bank of England (BoE) follow different mandates which 
arguably render it easier to pursue expansionist policies. This cannot explain, however, 
why the ECB did not choose to control inflation in a more growth-friendly way in line 
with its mandate. For most of the pre-crisis years, the ECB missed its inflation target 
                                              
1 Following Rogoff (1985), I understand monetary conservatism as policies which focus on inflation-fighting 
more than is suggested by societal preferences. 
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by undershooting, rather than overshooting it. At the same time, sky-rocketing unem-
ployment numbers left the ECB vulnerable to criticism from many sides. Why it chose 
to go down this much-criticized path cannot be explained with the ECB’s mandate 
alone. 
Importantly, the ECB has recently undergone a remarkable policy shift while follow-
ing exactly the same mandate. After years of caution, the ECB under Mario Draghi has 
accepted its function as a lender of last resort to governments (by promising to do 
‘whatever it takes’ to keep them in the currency union) and, finally, adopted the quan-
titative easing (QE) policies the Fed had introduced a full seven years earlier. This un-
derscores how the Maastricht Treaty allows for very different interpretations of the 
ECB’s role, which makes the act of interpreting the mandate a crucial determinant of 
policy. In more theoretical terms, this lack of strict institutional constraints opens the 
door for agency. 
Interest-based approaches, on the other hand, expect monetary policy choices to reflect 
the interests and relative power of EMU member states. Despite the ECB’s praised 
independence, many perceive its policies as disproportionally reflecting the interests of 
the Eurozone’s biggest economies; most notably France and Germany. Such accounts, 
however, have problems explaining why German officials were overruled in the 
ECB’s most momentous decisions, while they remained in the driving seat at other 
times. After all, the ECB follows a decision rule of ‘one head, one vote’ and the Ger-
man Bundesbank thus enjoys officially just as much voting power as Malta or Cyprus. 
Why, then, does the majority of national governors follow Germany’s stance most of 
the time, if its economies actually need different policies? If ECB officials voted on 
policies according to their domestic needs, we would have certainly seen much more 
accommodative policies than the ones the ECB actually pursued.  
This is why I offer an alternative perspective which focuses on policymakers’ beliefs 
about the economy. If we are to understand why ECB officials do what they do, I 
claim, we need to better understand their thinking and how it influences their policy 
preferences. This does not imply that national economic interests and institutional fac-
tors have no role to play in ECB policymaking. They certainly do. But recent ECB 
policies neither reflect the preferences of dominant economic actors all the time, nor 
are they fully determined by institutionalized rules. A full account of how the ECB 
makes choices within the constraints it faces must therefore examine how central 
bankers perceive economic problems and solutions. 
1.1 The puzzling persistence of ECB conservatism 
A rough comparison of key economic indicators in the United States (US), the United 
Kingdom (UK), and the Eurozone shows that the financial crisis of 2007/08 initially 
affected economic output in similar ways. All currency areas experienced sharp in-
creases in unemployment and a dramatic decline of growth rates. Since 2010, howev-
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er, the situation has continued to worsen only in the Eurozone. Due to the European 
sovereign debt crisis, the ECB faced more severe output losses, with unemployment 
rising to unprecedented levels. During the same period, consumer prices also followed 
roughly similar trajectories in these regions. On average, however, inflation rates re-
mained lower in the Eurozone (1.6%) than in the UK (2.5%) and the US (1.8%). 
 
Fig 1.1: Growth (a), unemployment (b) and inflation rates (c), 2007-16  
(Sources: World Bank; OECD; Eurostat; U.S. Department of Commerce) 
If all three currency areas were governed by the same institutions, one would expect 
the Eurozone to experience the most accommodative monetary policy. However, the 
reverse is true. Even though the Eurozone produced the lowest numbers for growth 
and inflation and, at the same time, faced the worst unemployment problems (see fig-
ure 1.1), its central bank did less than others to stimulate the economy. And this has 
attracted stark criticism both within and outside of the Eurozone. For instance, Adam 
Posen of the Petersen Institute for International Economics and former member of the 
Bank of England’s policy committee, criticized the ECB’s response to the crisis as 
“excessively and destructive counter-inflationary extremism”.2 
Already in the early days of the crisis, both the Fed and the BoE lowered interest rates 
below 1%. The Fed set it to 0.25% in October 2008 and the BoE to 0.5% in March 
2009; and both left them unchanged at these record-lows for more than seven years. 
                                              
2 “As I warned in 1993, when the ECB structure was first proposed, having an unaccountable central bank with 
no parliament above it, its independence protected by essentially inviolable international treaty, was a recipe for 
excessively and destructive counter-inflationary extremism. This is indeed what has happened in response to the 
crisis.” – Adam S. Posen: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Monetary Policy and Trade of the Committee on 
Financial Services, U.S. House of Representatives, 13 November 2013. 
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The ECB, to the contrary, first raised rates in 2008 before joining an internationally 
coordinated rate reduction. Once it reached 1%, however, it hesitated to go any lower 
until July 2012 (see figure 1.2). The differences between the ECB and its peers became 
most visible when it famously hiked rates twice in April and July 2011 – in the middle 
of the Euro crisis. This suggested to critics that “the ECB bowed to Germany's anti-
inflation fetish” 3 and effectively made the ECB the only major central bank to raise 
rates in the crisis apart from the Swedish Riksbank. And just like the Riksbank, it 
quickly had to reverse course. During 2012 and 2013, the ECB finally reacted to the 
continuously rising unemployment and falling inflation rates by gradually lowering 
rates again until it finally hit zero in March 2016.  
 
Fig. 1.2: Interest rates in the Eurozone, the US and the UK, 2007-2016  
(Sources: ECB, Fed, BoE) 
Timing is of crucial importance for the impact of a central bank’s interest rate deci-
sions. It is therefore worth noting that it took the ECB almost four years longer than 
the Fed to bring interest rates below 1 percent. As Kang et al. (2015) show in their 
analysis of market reactions to rate decisions by the Fed and the ECB, the proactive 
and radical Fed moves had stimulating effects on stock markets. The ECB’s later rate 
cuts, on the contrary, were merely perceived as reactions to deteriorating conditions 
and accordingly failed to affect financial conditions in a similar way. In fact, these late 
decisions combined with musings about inflation risks even led to negative market 
reactions (see Kang et al. 2015: 6). 
                                              
3 “Draghi must end German ECB influence”, Sunday Independent, 11 Sep 2011. 
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Fig. 1.3: Changes in central banks’ balance sheets since 2007 (2007 = 100) 
(Sources: ECB, Fed, BoE) 
Comparing central banks’ unconventional policies is somewhat more difficult because 
their strategies and instruments differ. However, it is possible to state that the ECB 
refrained from using its balance as massively as the Fed or the BoE did – up until 
2015. Between 2012 and 2014, the ECB’s balance sheet even shrunk (because Europe-
an banks repaid earlier ECB loans), whereas both the BoE and the Fed continued to 
increase the supply of base money. In this period the ECB chose not to increase base 
money despite confronting both record-high unemployment and, perhaps more im-
portantly, the threat of deflation. It only started doing so again with the QE program of 
2015. As ECB QE came almost seven years later than in the US, however, it was again 
judged as coming too late and being much less effective (e.g. Feldstein 2016). 
Despite coming late, the QE decision signaled a remarkable metamorphosis of the 
ECB. Under the leadership of Mario Draghi, the ECB also introduced negative rates 
for deposits and a host of other measures to improve financial conditions throughout 
2015 and 2016. As Gavyn Davies (2015) put it in November 2015, “showing all the 
zeal of a late convert, the Governing Council is now playing catch up, with a venge-
ance.” In this light it may be more appropriate to ask not why the ECB was doing so 
little but rather why it took so long to adopt the policies of its peers. These considera-
tions lead the central question this study addresses: Why did monetary conservatism 
at the ECB remain so strong for so long? 
100
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Of course, we may also turn this question on its head and ask: why did the Federal 
Reserve and the Bank of England reject orthodoxy so quickly?4 Since central bankers 
are normally assumed to be slow-moving, hyper-cautious individuals, rapid and radical 
change of central bank policy could be argued to pose a much bigger puzzle than the 
absence of it. In this view, the ECB is not the outlier that needs to be explained. It 
simply did what was to be expected, while everybody else tore up their instruction 
sheets overnight. In my view, these two questions are each other’s mirror image. The 
decade following the financial meltdown in 2007 lacks historical parallels, and what it 
means to be conservative in this ‘brave new world of central banking’ is very much in 
the eye of the beholder. Monetary conservatism in these times is therefore necessarily 
relative, and this analysis zeroes in on the relatively conservative ECB for two reasons. 
First, compared to the Fed and the BoE, studies of ECB policymaking are in short 
supply. This mirrors the restricted flow of information about decision-making in the 
Governing Council, and this thesis tries to work its way around these constraints by 
approaching ECB decision-making from a novel angle. 
Second, and more importantly, there is an emerging consensus that the ECB made 
several policy mistakes by being more conservative than its peers. While this verdict is 
certainly contested, most economists now hold the view that central banks’ extraordi-
narily loose policies in the aftermath of the crisis were warranted and an important 
factor to stabilize their economies – and they find the Eurozone lacking in this respect. 
Crucially, this view is not confined to the ECB’s critics on the political left or Anglo-
Saxon central bankers who feel vindicated; it is shared by key ECB policymakers, too. 
In a recent opinion piece for the Financial Times Lorenzo Bini Smaghi, member of the 
ECB’s Executive Board from 2005 to 2011, admitted mistake:  
“Looking at the last decade, the evidence seems to suggest that the 
ECB had a tendency to time the turning points of its monetary policy in 
a rather asymmetric way: it has generally tightened too early and eased 
too late. In other words, it had a rather restrictive bias. […]  
With the benefit of hindsight, the ECB should probably not have 
raised rates in 2008 and in 2011 and should have eased much more 
quickly and adopted non-conventional policies such as QE sooner.” 
(Bini Smaghi 2017) 
This is as clear a mea culpa as you will ever get from a top-level ECB official. And it 
begs the question: if even one of the key decision-makers admits (with the benefit of 
hindsight) that he and his colleagues were in the wrong, why did they do what they 
did? This is why this thesis focuses on the ECB’s relative conservatism rather than the 
relative revisionism elsewhere. 
                                              
4 I thank Mark Blyth for drawing my attention to this point. 
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1.2 The conventional explanation: Germany! 
Many explain the ECB’s relative conservatism simply with one word: Germany. A 
popular narrative holds that European policymakers are constrained by a peculiar 
German obsession with the dangers of inflation, usually explained with the Weimar 
Republic’s traumatic experience of hyperinflation (see Issing 2005: 334; Ehrmann & 
Tzamourani 2009). Implicitly, this perspective assumes that the ECB cannot ignore the 
preferences of the Eurozone’s biggest economy because size matters. As David Marsh 
(2015) states it, “in the shadowy world of European Central Bank decision-making, all 
central banks are equal – but some are more equal than others”. Yet, even if we believe 
this to be true, it is not clear how and why German inflation-aversion should constrain 
the choices of what is usually seen as the world’s most independent central bank.  
Two variants of the ‘Germany argument’ can be distinguished: one focusing on the 
ECB’s Bundesbank-style mandate, the other on the influence of German politics more 
directly. The institutional variant of the explanation claims that the ECB is constrained 
by a mandate which reflects German inflation-aversion. Thanks to the Bundesbank’s 
good track record in the 1970s, German negotiators succeeded in making Bundesbank 
principles the blueprint for the Eurozone’s institutional structure and the ECB’s nar-
row price stability mandate in particular (McNamara 1998). Institutionalists therefore 
explain differences in policy by pointing out that the Fed’s and the BoE’s mandates 
make it easier to pursue expansionist policies. Nevertheless, this fails to recognize the 
nature of the Maastricht Treaty as an incomplete contract as well as the flexibility of 
central bank mandates more generally. I argue below that the Maastricht Treaty indeed 
is “full of artful compromises and deliberate obfuscations” (Cohen 2008: 53) and that 
this gives ECB officials considerable room for maneuver. 
The interest-based variant of the argument assumes a more direct influence of politics 
and public opinion. It expects ECB policies to reflect the interests and relative power 
of EMU member states – with big states usually getting their way (see Hayo & Méon 
2013). Yet, this perspective is at odds with the ECB’s praised independence, its formal 
decision rules of ‘one head one vote’, and some of its most prominent recent decisions. 
Even if we discard central bank independence as an illusion, we must consider that the 
German Bundesbank has as much formal voting power in the ECB Governing Council 
as any member state’s central bank. Consequently, it has been overruled in decisive 
moments, including the key decisions on QE and the OMT (Outright Monetary Trans-
action) program. This begs the question: why do ECB decisions follow (assumed) 
German preferences at some times but not at others? I argue that we have to go be-
yond static notions of national interests and institutional constraints if we are to under-
stand the complex interplay of factors influencing ECB decision-making. The follow-
ing two sections shall demonstrate the shortcomings of institutions- and interest-based 
arguments in order to make the case for a different approach which takes policymak-
ers, their beliefs and preferences seriously. 
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1.3 Institutions: The incomplete contract of Maastricht 
ECB officials mention their mandate again and again. It is a frequent point of refer-
ence in their speeches, press conferences, and the interviews they give. The message is 
usually simple: ‘We are only doing what we are supposed to do! It’s all in the treaty!’ 
Yet, recent controversies have unearthed sharply differing views on what this mandate 
actually consists of, what the ECB’s objectives are, and which tools it may legitimate-
ly employ to pursue them. I therefore begin this discussion by examining what the 
ECB mandate states and what is doesn’t. The Treaty on the Functioning of the Euro-
pean Union (TFEU) specifies the ECB’s objectives as follows: “The primary objective 
of the European System of Central Banks (hereinafter referred to as ‘the ESCB’) shall 
be to maintain price stability. Without prejudice to the objective of price stability, the 
ESCB shall support the general economic policies in the Union […]”  
Two aspects are worth noting: first, while the treaty establishes the primacy of price 
stability, it does not constitute a ‘single mandate’. Given that price stability prevails, 
the ECB is also mandated to support the ‘general economic policies in the Union’. A 
second aspect has been famously pointed out by the ECB’s first president, Wim Dui-
senberg (2001): “The Treaty […] only says that the ECB should ensure that price sta-
bility prevails, but it has not defined what is to be understood by price stability. We did 
that ourselves you might say.” 
What does price stability mean? 
Briefly before launching the Euro, the ECB Governing Council defined price stability 
as an inflation rate of below 2 percent over the medium-term.5 Crucially, this specified 
a ceiling but not a floor. According to the ECB’s influential first chief economist, Ot-
mar Issing, the ECB Governing Council initially interpreted its target asymmetrically 
and therefore “radically anti-inflationary” (James 2012: 390). In Issing’s words: “an 
overshooting of the 2 percent level was to be clearly understood as out of line with the 
objective, while a lower rate of inflation was regarded as being quite compatible with 
it” (Issing 2008: 103). Following a review in 2003, however, the ECB restated the def-
inition as below, but close to, 2 percent, underlining its willingness “to guard against 
the risks of deflation” (ECB 2003).  
Despite this clarification, views still differ significantly regarding just how close to 2 
percent is close enough. Consequently, ECB officials facing the same data can and do 
differ on policy. The controversies since 2013 bear witness to this fact: since inflation 
rates dipped farther and farther below the 2 percent ceiling, policymakers have hotly 
debated whether this warrants further monetary loosening or not. It shows that policy-
makers disagree on two matters: How far may inflation stay below 2 percent? And for 
how long? While both Draghi and Peter Praet have repeatedly voiced their concerns 
                                              
5 referring to the year-on-year increase in the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) 
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about a long period of very low inflation and stressed the goal of raising inflation “as 
soon as possible”, other Governing Council members appeared rather unimpressed by 
inflation rates below 1 percent.  
This suggests that different policymakers interpret the ECB’s inflation mandate differ-
ently. And if this is the case, claims that the Governing Council unanimously sees “no 
limits to how far we are willing to deploy our instruments within our mandate” 
(Draghi 2016a) surely do not tell the whole story (Münchau 2016). 
Does the Treaty rule out unconventional policies? 
The disputes about the ECB’s objectives may have been hot, but they pale in compari-
son to the conflicts about its unconventional tools. Once their traditional interest rate 
instrument was exhausted, crisis-fighting central bankers around the world entered a 
period of experimentation. In the Eurozone this experimentation gave birth to instru-
ments such as the Securities Markets Program (SMP) in 2010, the Outright Monetary 
Transmission (OMT) program in 2012, and the Asset Purchase Program (APP) or 
Quantitative Easing (QE) in 2015. All these policies have led to sharp conflicts in the 
Governing Council, conflicts wherein both sides (monetary hawks and doves) con-
stantly referred to the Maastricht treaty. While critics repeatedly claimed that such 
programs go beyond the ECB’s mandate, Mario Draghi (2012) held that “fulfilling our 
mandate sometimes requires us to go beyond standard monetary policy tools.”  
The issue of ‘monetary financing’ became the focal point of these disputes. Article 
123(1) of the TFEU prohibits the ECB from directly purchasing governments’ debt 
instruments to finance their budgets. Whether or not the proposed policies constituted 
such a form of prohibited fiscal policy in terms of the treaty thus became the key ques-
tion – a question to which different actors, including courts, gave very different an-
swers. The OMT, in particular, has become the subject of legal probes at both the 
German Constitutional Court and the European Court of Justice (ECJ). The German 
court claimed that soaring prices for government bonds in Europe’s periphery reflected 
underlying economic fundamentals – too much debt – and the ECB had therefore no 
right to correct the markets (de Grauwe & Ji 2015: 743).  
The ECJ, however, subscribed to the ECB’s view that markets were driven by un-
founded fears of a Eurozone breakup. In this view, the skyrocketing prices of periph-
eral government debt constituted a speculative impairment of the monetary transmis-
sion mechanism – and correcting these developments via the OMT was therefore a 
legitimate monetary policy operation. The contrasting court opinions demonstrate just 
how different the ECB’s mandate can be understood. They underscore that the Maas-
tricht provisions are vague enough to be neither verifiable nor enforceable. As a result, 
old and unsettled conflicts have reemerged. 
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Broadening the mandate? 
Both the OMT and the QE decision are considered crucial turning points of ECB poli-
cy. First, the OMT de facto transformed the ECB into a lender of last resort (LOLR) to 
governments (de Grauwe 2013). The Maastricht treaty makes no explicit reference to 
the role of the ECB as a LOLR (see Eijffinger 2005: 475) – a role that some experts 
view as a central bank’s main reason d’être (Goodhart 1988). This gap remained until 
the crisis struck and Mario Draghi’s ‘whatever it takes’ assumed this function. Second, 
the adoption of a large-scale bond-purchasing program in 2015 implies that the current 
ECB management increasingly differs from its predecessors in how it interprets its 
price stability mandate. Instead of being rather unconcerned with very low levels of 
inflation, it now takes the threat of deflation very seriously. What is more, it stresses 
the risks of not expanding the money supply for “jobs and growth and, eventually, for 
the future of our monetary union” (Draghi 2016b). In other words, it shows concerns 
not only for price stability but for the ‘general economic policies in the Union’ as well. 
Thus, both OMT and QE represent significant changes which the Maastricht treaty 
neither denies nor demands. Rather than strictly constraining central bankers, the trea-
ty’s incompleteness leaves ECB leaders ample room for maneuver. It is perhaps stat-
ing the obvious that law requires interpretation. For all the talk about the ECB’s man-
date, however, it is worth repeating that “Maastricht does not come with an instruction 
sheet” (Schulz & Tesche 2016). Furthermore, the implicit broadening of its mandate 
during the crisis is by no means a peculiarity of the ECB (see Orphanides 2013; Davig 
& Gürkaynak 2015). According to Ben Bernanke (2011: 2) “virtually all inflation-
targeting central banks interpret their mandate flexibly”. Due to this flexibility, it is 
crucial how ECB leaders interpret their role. In this respect, I argue that recent changes 
at the top coincide with an altered understanding of the ECB’s mission and corre-
sponding changes of its monetary policy stance. All this suggests that policymakers 
matter because the Maastricht Treaty is not the hard constraint many believe it is. 
1.4 National interests in a world of radical uncertainty 
Governments and interest groups certainly have pronounced interests regarding how 
monetary policy is conducted. Fierce criticism of the ECB from both the German 
banking sector and Germany’s Minister of Finance recently reminded us of this in an 
unusually open fashion.6 Even the most independent central bank would be ill-advised 
to continuously ignore such voices. Generally, “an ‘independent’ central bank will still 
need to maintain its elective and political supports by ensuring that a sufficient propor-
tion of the population understands and accepts its objectives and actions” (Goodhart 
1992: 31). This need to stay politically sensitive despite being independent has proba-
bly been most famously pointed out by the Fed’s former chairman, Paul Volcker: “the 
congress created us and the congress can uncreate us” (cited in Greider 1987: 473).  
                                              
6 “Mario Bothers: Germany Takes Aim at the European Central Bank”, Spiegel Online, 8 Apr 2016. 
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The ECB is a special case in this regard as well. As the world’s one and only suprana-
tional central bank, the ECB gained its independence not by national law but through 
an international treaty which is extremely difficult to modify.7 Not least because of the 
high institutional hurdles to touch the ECB’s independence, it is often called ‘the 
world’s most independent central bank’. The US Congress, for instance, has between 
1947 and 2014 introduced 879 bills with the aim of changing the power, structure, or 
governance of the Federal Reserve (Binder & Spindel 2016), while there has been no 
single serious attempt to change the legal foundations of the ECB.  
What is more, the ECB does not have a clear principal equivalent to the US Congress 
(in the sense of one actor that could theoretically try to ‘uncreate’ it). In the absence of 
an economic government for the Eurozone, several institutions could with some justi-
fication be considered as principals of the ECB, be it the European Parliament, the Eu-
rogroup, the Council of Ministers, or governments of powerful member states. Due to 
this plethora of actors and their often informal links to each other and the ECB, how-
ever, these relationships are very difficult to conceptualize – particularly regarding 
their relevance for monetary policy decisions which the ECB Governing Council is 
supposed to make autonomously. Furthermore, it is hard to argue that ECB policy dis-
proportionally reflects the preferences of bigger countries, when its decisions are in 
line with German interests in some instances but not in others. 
Those focusing on the role of national interests in the Euro crisis often frame it as a 
battle between creditor and debtor states. This goes in particular for debates about fis-
cal austerity and the economic reform packages in the so-called program countries. 
Applying the same logic to monetary policy would lead us to assume that creditor 
states (such as Germany) prefer low inflation rates because they increase the real value 
of nominal debt. Debtors, conversely, can be thought to prefer higher rates on infla-
tion, which would reduce the real value of what they owe.  
As Brunnermeier et al. (2016) point out, however, two considerations make this argu-
ment appear overly simplistic. First, the very notion of creditor and debtor states builds 
on the sum of net flows between country’s citizens. “However, net flows mask much 
larger gross flows and an accumulation of a wide variety of personal and institutional 
positions: there may be powerful and substantial debtors in the net creditor countries” 
(ibid: 3). Second, a German creditor might be in favor of monetary stimulus for his 
debtors’ countries if she perceives this as increasing chances of debt repayment. If aus-
terity and tight credit conditions – not to even speak of a breakup of the Eurozone – 
make defaults in Europe’s south more likely, their creditors (in Germany and beyond) 
have a lot to lose from overly orthodox monetary policy. 
                                              
7 As ECB monetary policies are likely to create winners as well as losers among the signatories of the Maastricht 
Treaty, it is hard to imagine a unanimous initiative for treaty change. 
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A second reason why I emphasize the role of legally autonomous policymakers con-
cerns the particular environment of post-2007 monetary policy. It is well understood 
that monetary policymaking generally involves a high degree of uncertainty because 
our knowledge about the economy and the monetary transmission mechanism is lim-
ited (Greenspan 2003).8 While uncertainty is a chronic condition plaguing monetary 
policymakers, the breakdown of traditional economic relationships after 2007 has 
made central bankers emphasize a very different and acute kind of uncertainty. This 
radical uncertainty (or Knightian uncertainty), describes a situation which is in “a high 
degree unique” (Knight 1921: 233).9 Because of this uniqueness it is “impossible to 
represent the future in terms of a knowable and exhaustive list of outcomes to which 
we can attach probabilities” (King 2016, see also Beckert 1996: 804). In other words, 
we cannot possibly know the likely consequences of a decision, and it is therefore hard 
to know which choice serves our (perceived) interests best. What this implies for deci-
sion-making in a monetary policy committee has been aptly described by the Fed’s 
Charles Plosser (2015):  
“So this is a period of uncertainty and so you have good people sitting 
in that room, smart people, trying to figure it out. And it shouldn’t be 
surprising at all that all of these smart people have different ways of 
thinking about this.” 
If other central banks are confronted with radical uncertainty, this is arguably all the 
more true for the ECB as a young, supranational institution. For instance, the Fed’s 
ability to draw on history lessons are limited by the profound changes of the financial 
system since the Great Depression, which make monetary policymaking today very 
different from the 1930s. Consequently, they could only very cautiously draw on past 
experience. Compared to the uncertainties the ECB faces, however, this is an almost 
comfortable situation. No supranational central bank managing a large and heteroge-
neous currency area like the Eurozone has ever existed before. Consequently, the ECB 
can draw on no history lessons whatsoever. It finds itself in truly uncharted waters, 
even more so than its peers. Following the notion of radical uncertainty thus implies 
that neither the interests of actors (inside and outside of the Governing Council) them-
selves, nor their link to ECB choices are self-evident. What, then, guides policy-
choices in hard times? Or, as Akerlof & Shiller (2010: 3) put it: if actors are so uncer-
tain, how are decisions made? 
 
                                              
8 “Uncertainty is not just an important feature of the monetary policy landscape; it is the defining characteristic 
of that landscape” (Greenspan 2003) 
9 According to Knight (1921: 259), uncertainty stems mainly from errors in predicting the future. Others define 
the incommensurable nature of knowledge about the past and the present as another source of uncertainty. Am-
biguity – understood as the capability of being understood in more than one way (Best 2008) – thus adds to the 
uncertainties policymakers face. 
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1.5 The argument in brief: taking policymakers’ ideas seriously 
When a crisis occurs, one of the most influential monetary economists of all times 
wrote, “the actions that are taken depend on the ideas that are lying around” (Friedman 
& Friedman 1982: viii). During his lifetime, Milton Friedman himself witnessed huge 
swings in opinion about what monetary policy can and should do– and how this 
changed the policies central bankers pursued. These different ways of thinking about 
the economy seemed to lose significance during the Great Moderation, when the puz-
zle of monetary policy seemed resolved and central bankers credited themselves with 
providing the backdrop for both low inflation and stable growth. As the financial crisis 
of 2007 abruptly and definitely ended this golden age of simple, straightforward and 
mostly conflict-free monetary policymaking, sharply different views among central 
bankers quickly resurfaced.  
Yet, these different ideas are not simply lying around, as Friedman suggested. Rather, 
I argue, they are carried by professional economists and policymakers who have inter-
nalized a particular view of the economy through experience. Central bankers thus 
hold specific causal beliefs, which may be influenced by their upbringing, their educa-
tion or the formative years of their professional careers. Most importantly, these be-
liefs provide them with an account of how the economy works. As such, monetary 
theories – understood as probabilistic arguments connecting causes and effects – offer 
central bankers guidance in uncharted waters. They provide them with an interpretive 
framework, allowing for reducing uncertainty and thus making collective action possi-
ble (Blyth 2002: 35-39). As causal beliefs help central bankers to make sense of uncer-
tain situations, they greatly influence the policies they adopt when fighting a crisis. 
This is why my approach to ECB policymaking in the crisis focuses on the economic 
beliefs central bankers hold. 
My argument that central bankers’ beliefs about the economy critically influence their 
policy choices is rooted in four key assumptions:  
1. Autonomy: central bankers are shielded from direct political pressure 
2. Flexibility: central banks’ mandates give them considerable room for maneuver 
3. Interpretation: the absence of clear cause-and-effect relationships in monetary 
affairs allows central bankers to interpret economic problems and solutions very 
differently (e.g. when dealing with the dilemma of inflation-prevention versus 
recession-fighting in the current crisis) 
4. (Knightian) Uncertainty: all of the above is of particular significance in a cri-
sis, understood as a unique situation that does not allow agents to draw on past 
experience.  
I introduce a novel measure of economic beliefs based on a survey I conducted among 
422 central bank economists in 2016. My survey data shows a) that economic beliefs 
matter for individuals’ policy preferences and b) that both beliefs and preferences are 
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unevenly distributed among different central banks. In particular, the ECB leans more 
towards orthodox beliefs and hawkish inflation preferences than the US Fed and the 
Bank of England. It is significantly more conservative. Figure 1.4 below shows that 
ECB economists are more likely than their Anglo-Saxon counterparts to believe that 
money is neutral (in the sense that it cannot have a lasting impact on growth or em-
ployment). As they are more skeptical about the contribution monetary policy can 
make to stabilize the economy, they are also more opposed to higher inflation targets. 
Here, respondents’ beliefs about what monetary policy can do influence their opinion 
about what it should do. Stated more generally, “the belief about what is possible criti-
cally shapes what is desirable” (Steinmo 2003: 209). 
 
Fig. 1.4: Linear regression for preferences for higher inflation targets (Y) on the belief 
in the Neutrality of Money (X), means per institution 
Within the Eurosystem, national central banks are clustered regarding both beliefs and 
preferences. Interestingly, the pattern suggests a dividing line in economic philosophy 
between core and periphery. This, I argue, shows that the frequently surfacing con-
flicts inside the ECB’s Governing Council are better understood in terms of different 
ways of economic thinking than in terms of the conflicting interests of creditor and 
debtor states. And as debates about ECB conservatism often focus on the role played 
by Germany, my analysis suggests that it is worth reconsidering what ‘German influ-
ence’ actually means. I argue that it is German ideas rather than German politics, 
which effectively constrain the ECB. If anything, monetary orthodoxy prevails, not 
‘Germany’. And while monetary orthodoxy is routinely ascribed to German politicians 
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and central bankers, it is by no means confined to them. I thus argue that orthodox 
economic beliefs matter precisely because they are shared by others, too. And this in-
cludes, most importantly, central bankers in other institutions. My data suggests that 
economists in most northern European central banks – within as well as outside of the 
Eurosystem – share orthodox economic beliefs often associated with Germany. The 
central banks of Austria, Belgium or Luxembourg, for instance, may not find them-
selves covered in the media as openly clashing with ECB policies because they do not 
pursue a similarly aggressive communication policy as the German Bundesbank. Be-
hind closed doors, however, their central bank governors can be expected to often side 
with German positions because they are likely to perceive economic problems and so-
lutions similarly.  
This interpretation of the dynamics of ECB decision-making corresponds with the pol-
icies it has adopted since 2007. The most prominent moves – the OMT announcement 
in 2012 and the QE program of 2015 – were taken despite vocal protests by German 
central bankers and politicians, clearly showing that neither the Bundesbank nor the 
German government can ultimately stop the ECB from pursuing policies they oppose. 
ECB policymakers can and do outvote German officials. However, they often choose 
not to do so. This is, I argue, because German positions are often shared by others. A 
consensus-oriented decision-making mode, which aims at finding common ground 
through open debates rather than majority voting, may exacerbate the influence of 
German positions further, given that the Bundesbank enjoys a particularly strong repu-
tation in central banking circles. I argue that all this makes the ECB unlikely to go 
against German positions. And this is why ECB monetary policy remained remarkably 
conservative for a very long time. 
1.6 Gaps in the literature 
By introducing a new measure of central bankers’ economic beliefs, this thesis ad-
dresses what I perceive as three shortcomings of the central banking literature. First, 
many studies focus excessively on formal central bank independence and ignore how 
central bankers make use of their autonomy. Second, preferences of central bankers 
are either neglected altogether or assumed to be merely a function of a single charac-
teristic. A third limitation is the focus on consensus, which risks downplaying existing 
divisions. 
The strange absence of agency 
Most monetary policy studies focus on central bank independence (CBI), its measure-
ment, sources, and effects (e.g. Eijffinger & de Haan 1996; Alesina & Summers 1993; 
Acemoglu et al. 2008). This emphasis stems from the assumption that a legally man-
dated independent central bank will consistently deliver lower inflation than govern-
ments. This is because governments tend to stimulate the economy with expansionary 
monetary policies in order to increase their chances of re-election, which leads to per-
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manently higher levels of inflation. According to this view, democracy has an infla-
tionary bias (see Kydland & Prescott 1977). Based on this strong assumption, the CBI 
literature focuses on the question of which institutional setting best guarantees inde-
pendence – and thereby low inflation. Consequently such studies give little attention to 
the roles central bankers themselves might play.10 
Delegating authority to autonomous central banks undoubtedly influences monetary 
outcomes in important ways. The excessive focus on institutional autonomy, however, 
runs the risk of ignoring other important factors. Institutions shape behavior and out-
comes (i.e. by constraining the range of possible choices), but they do not by them-
selves ultimately determine them (Steinmo 2008). For instance, almost all central 
banks follow a flexible inflation target, which allows them to accept some degree of 
deviations from the target in order to minimize output variability (Cukierman 2002). 
Whether they choose to do so or not, is not institutionally determined. Therefore, indi-
cators of CBI alone are necessarily insufficient to explain monetary policy. In order to 
understand how central bankers make use of their autonomy, we need to supplemented 
CBI measures with measures of policymakers’ preferences.  
Untested assumptions regarding actors’ preferences 
If policymakers’ choices do not simply reflect existing institutions, which other factors 
influence what they do? Christopher Adolph (2013) argues that central bankers’ previ-
ous work experiences strongly predict their policy choices, mainly distinguishing the 
‘financial type’ and the ‘government type’ of central banker. This implies that central 
bankers’ preferences reflect the primary interests of two sectors: governments have an 
electoral incentive to stabilize economic growth and employment, whereas financial 
firms are primarily concerned with inflation (Adolph 2013: 38). Consequently, central 
bankers with backgrounds in the financial sector should be more anti-inflation than 
career bureaucrats. 
Following these considerations, Adolph develops an easily quantifiable proxy of cen-
tral bankers’ preferences: the ratio of working years spent in either sector. This allows 
for elegant formal modeling. However, it also comes at the cost of questionable as-
sumptions. For instance, why are preferences determined by previous working patterns 
only? And do they really remain unchanged during their term in office? On the first 
question, Jeffrey Chwieroth’s (2007) study of IMF officials provides an alternative: he 
codes their professional training backgrounds according to the dominant economic 
ideas taught at the universities they attended. Regarding the latter question, it must be 
noted that Adolph studies monetary policy prior to 2000. Regarding the uncertain con-
                                              
10 Similarly, cultural and intergovernmental approaches tend to ignore the roles played by central bankers. They 
see them constrained by the societies within which they are embedded (Tognato 2012; Howarth & Rommerskir-
chen 2013; Issing 2006; Hayo 1998), or assume that the preferences of the Eurozone’s major economies define 
ECB policies (Talani 2004; Puetter 2001: 12). 
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ditions of the current crisis, he states that “the factors explaining monetary policy be-
havior in normal times may be much less reliable” (Adolph 2013: 102). 
Both Adolph and Chwieroth assume preferences to emerge at one point and remain 
unchanged ever after. Therefore, their measures are necessarily stable over time. They 
simply rule out the possibility that policymakers learn or adjust – no matter how dra-
matic the developments are they are confronting. Analyzing central bankers’ prefer-
ences in times of change, I argue, requires more flexible measures. My survey-based 
approach thus measures beliefs and preferences directly, instead of deducing them 
from policymakers’ career paths or educational affiliations.  
The overemphasis of consensus 
Many studies of economic ideas focus on moments of change and explain this with a 
shifting consensus among policymakers. Kathleen McNamara’s (1998) study on the 
emergence of EMU, for instance, argues that a neoliberal consensus emerged among 
policy elites in the mid-1970s and paved the way to European monetary cooperation. 
This consensus elevated the pursuit of low inflation over growth or employment and, 
thus, redefined state interests regarding cooperation. It became institutionalized in the 
ECB and persisted during the first decade of its existence (McNamara 2006a).  
But how does consensus emerge? McNamara partly turns to exogenous factors and 
argues that three aspects were crucial for transforming policymakers’ ideas: a per-
ceived policy failure (Keynesianism and stagflation), a policy paradigm innovation 
(monetarism), and the German model as real-world example of monetarism’s success. 
However, we can also explain consensus with endogenous factors. Seen this way, con-
sensus is rooted in agents’ shared characteristics. Regarding central bankers, Mar-
cussen (2006) finds striking similarities regarding gender, education and career trajec-
tories. Because they had many opportunities to be socialized in parallel ways, Mar-
cussen (2006: 191) claims, central bankers are likely “to look at and analyze the world 
in very similar ways”. 
This consensus view, however, does not go unchallenged. Jones (2013: 145), for in-
stance, argues that “the ideational consensus underpinning Europe's single currency 
was always more rhetoric than reality”. My survey data substantiates this view. It sug-
gests that there are important areas of disagreement and unspoken political divisions 
both within and between central banks. During good times, these divisions may not 
matter as much, since central bankers may be able to ignore their different views when 
monetary policymaking is a straightforward and conflict-free business (as it arguably 
was for most of the two decades leading up to the crisis). During hard times, however, 
different views about the economy matter a lot and can lead to sharp and open con-
flicts. In the new era of central banking, most experts expect that central banks’ new 
and controversial instruments are here to stay. This implies that divisions about the 
‘right’ way of doing monetary policy are likely to remain important, too. I therefore 
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expect central bankers’ economic beliefs to remain a crucial factor for EU economic 
policy in the future. 
1.7 Plan of the dissertation 
This dissertation is divided in three parts:  
 The first part offers some historical (chapter 2) and organizational background 
information (chapter 3) on ECB policymaking. 
 The second part focuses on economic beliefs, by analyzing what central bankers 
can (chapter 4) and do disagree about (chapter 5). 
 The final part shows how these different views about the economy influenced 
ECB monetary policy after 2007 (chapter 6).  
I begin by offering a brief history of the ECB in chapter 2. Here, I work out which ide-
as and interests gave birth to the world’s only supranational central bank and shaped 
its conduct of monetary policy during the first decade. Chapter 3 then zeroes in on the 
question of how ECB decisions are actually made. It documents both formal and in-
formal decision-making principles and describes which actors have access to the deci-
sion-making process at which point. Crucially, it focuses on the role of Eurosystem 
staff and how they interact with ECB officials when preparing decisions. Together, the 
first two chapters provide essential background information about the ECB as an insti-
tution, with an emphasis on what role individuals and their ideas play in ECB policy-
making.  
Against this background, I start my discussion of economic beliefs and their signifi-
cance for central bank decisions. I first show what central bankers potentially can dis-
agree about (chapter 4) and second, where they actually do differ – and why (chapter 
5). Based on the assumption that actors’ positive beliefs (what is or what is possible) 
crucially influence their normative beliefs (what should be or what is desirable), chap-
ter 4 first traces how monetary thought has evolved historically. By showing what 
monetary economists have disagreed about in the past, it introduces macroeconomic 
paradigms which influence how central bankers evaluate the risks and benefits of their 
policies. Chapter 5 then reports how 422 central bank economists and policymakers 
evaluated these monetary theories in a survey carried out in 2016. Here I show that 
central bankers continue to disagree about fundamental aspects of monetary policy-
making – and that these different economic beliefs crucially influence their policy 
preferences. Most importantly, the distribution of economic beliefs among different 
Eurosystem institutions is non-random: orthodox economic ideas are most widely held 
in core countries’ central banks, whereas southern European institutions tend to be 
much more revisionist regarding their beliefs about the economy. 
Chapter 6 documents how these conflicting beliefs influenced the ECB’s post-crisis 
decisions, by giving a detailed account of ECB policy after the financial crisis (2007-
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2015). This narrative reflects the debates surrounding all important decisions and the 
positions key actors inside and outside of the ECB fought for. Crucially, I do not only 
aim to offer a narrative of what was done; equally important, I reconstruct the paths 
the ECB chose not to take. By doing so I intend to show that very different outcomes 
were conceivable, if different actors with different economic beliefs had been able to 
determine the ECB’s path rather than those who actually did.  
The concluding chapter 7 offers a summary of my findings and a discussion of what 
they imply for studying ideas and the future of Europe’s common currency.  
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2. HOW DID WE GET HERE? 
THE ROAD TO EMU AND THE FIRST DECADE 
“In short, non-German monetary policymakers do not like the present situation and would 
prefer an arrangement whereby the perspective of monetary policymaking would  
not be purely German, even if it imposed exactly the same monetary discipline.” 
Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa, 29 June 1995 
Among the world’s central banks the ECB is a curiosity, an institution of the extremes. 
It oversees the world’s largest economy and is, at the same time, the youngest member 
of the venerable club of central banks. It is known as the most independent monetary 
institution the world has ever seen and, perhaps most curiously, it is the only central 
bank without a state. As such it does not have a fiscal counterpart in terms of a Euro-
zone Treasury, which makes the ECB’s relationship with its member states a particular 
concern – and much has been made of its relationship with its biggest member state, 
Germany.  
In many ways, the ECB was created as a German institution. Located in Frankfurt, it 
was modelled after the neighboring Bundesbank’s principles and practices. Its inde-
pendence, its mandate, and its administrative structure all reflect the Bundesbank 
blueprint, as does the ECB’s unique two-pillar monetary policy strategy. The latter 
was established under the leadership of Otmar Issing, the ECB’s influential first chief 
economist, who had previously served a similar function at the Bundesbank. Through 
this continuity in terms of both institutional rules and leading personnel, the newly-
founded ECB hoped to inherit the Bundesbank’s credibility and reputation as a re-
spected and autonomous inflation fighter. Thus, it has been argued that German poli-
cymakers succeeded in enshrining their ideas in the Maastricht treaty (McNamara 
1998) as well as the ECB’s monetary policy strategy (Kaltenthaler 1998).  
This is not to suggest that these decisions about the ECB’s design and policy orienta-
tion were not contentious. The opposite is true. As one might expect given what was at 
stake, the political negotiations in the run-up to Maastricht were highly controversial. 
Many of these controversies have recently resurfaced as the crisis forced politicians 
and policymakers to revisit the Maastricht decisions and examine whether fundamental 
‘design flaws’ are the underlying reasons for EMU’s current troubles. Consequently 
today’s bones of contention and lines of conflict resemble those at the pre-Maastricht 
discussions to an astonishing degree. This is why I begin this dissertation with a brief 
account of how the ECB was created, sketching out which actors and ideas were criti-
cal for EMU and the ECB to take shape in its current form.  
2.1 The Road to Maastricht 
The idea of monetary integration in Europe goes a long way back. The creation of the 
currency union, kicked off by the creation of the Delors Committee in 1988, was cer-
tainly not the first European attempt at monetary cooperation. Already in the late 
1960s mounting tensions in the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates spurred 
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first steps in this direction (Dyson & Featherstone 1999: 1), even though they eventu-
ally failed because of divergent economic and monetary policies among the prospec-
tive member states. Therefore, the first real attempt at stabilizing exchange rates 
among members of the European Community (EC) after Bretton Woods, called the 
‘currency snake’, was a rather short-lived and unsuccessful experiment. Its first year 
was already fraught with currency crises, which led Britain and Denmark to quickly 
abandon the agreement and let their currencies float. With the second exit of France in 
1974, the snake had in effect become a ‘D-mark zone’ consisting of Germany, Bel-
gium, and the Netherlands only (McNamara 1998: 107f.). Overall, this first attempt 
was marked by high degrees of disagreement, and consequently “the mid-1970s 
marked the low point in European monetary integration” (Gros & Thygesen 1992: 20). 
The European Monetary System: paving the way to EMU 
A second attempt fared much better, and its success paved the way to full monetary 
integration. The European Monetary System (EMS), started in 1979, managed to both 
maintain its initial membership and reduce exchange rate variability among its mem-
bers (McNamara 1998: 20-22). After the ‘snake’ disaster, it was rather surprising that 
a new initiative for monetary integration was to follow so quickly. And the initiative 
was indeed of political, rather than economic, nature (Gros & Thygesen 1992: 34). 
With French President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing and Helmut Schmidt as German 
Chancellor, a strong Franco-German axis was at the heart of the EMS initiative, and 
this proved to be crucial for its success. Motivated by the prospect of greater inde-
pendence from the United States, the collapse of the US dollar in 1977-78 gave an im-
petus to shield Europe from its effects through greater coordination (Dyson & Feather-
stone 1999: 2). Initially, this new attempt included concessions to weaker currencies of 
other states in the European Community (EC) in order to make the EMS more attrac-
tive. For instance, a GDP-weighted currency basket (European Currency Unit – ECU) 
should serve as the anchor of the system instead of the Deutsche Mark (DM), which 
had proved to be too strong under the failed Snake system. Due to German domestic 
opposition (most notably from the Bundesbank and business groups) against any step 
that could potentially undermine the country’s price stability, however, these changes 
were largely cosmetic. The EMS agreement thus left the ‘Snake’ regime largely un-
changed, with the DM acting as its de facto anchor (McNamara & Jones 1996: 9).  
But even though the EMS closely resembled the ‘snake’ institutionally, it functioned 
surprisingly well. Many observers explain this with “a process of voluntary emulation 
of the German model” (Dyson & Featherstone 1999: 2), which caused monetary poli-
cies to convergence in the 1980s. In her seminal book, The Currency of Ideas, Kath-
leen McNamara (1998) characterizes the success of the German model as a crucial 
precondition for EMU. She argues that the process of monetary integration required 
first and foremost a convergence of beliefs about monetary policy. Over the course of 
the late 1970s and early 1980s, a new neoliberal policy consensus about the goals and 
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instruments of monetary policy emerged which included three elements: the perceived 
failure of Keynesian policies, monetarism offering a coherent alternative, and Germa-
ny’s success as a persuasive example of the merits of pragmatic monetarism. There-
fore, many EC countries which had followed (often failed) Keynesian policies and 
consequently abandoned the path of the DM under the ‘Snake’, now stayed closely 
aligned. Most importantly, the French “became proponents of a franc fort philosophy 
that appeared much closer to the German hard-currency policies than to their former 
exchange rate strategies” (McNamara & Jones 1996: 10). They therefore stayed on the 
inside this time, leaving the Franco-German axis intact. 
Despite its successes, the EMS did not entirely impede tensions. It did – after a turbu-
lent start in the years 1979-1983 – effectively coordinate exchange rates and promote a 
convergence in inflation and interest rates. At the same time, however, policymakers 
outside of Germany started to object to German dominance and the asymmetrical dis-
tribution of responsibilities to take corrective action favoring the Germans (Kaltenthal-
er 2006: 19). Both the success and the asymmetry of the EMS then led to the impres-
sion that the only practical alternative to German dominance would be the move to-
wards full monetary union (Gros & Thygesen 1992: 157).  
In January 1988, the French finance minister Edouard Balladur presented a first pro-
posal which included the idea of a European central bank – followed by a similar 
memo from his Italian counterpart, Giuliano Amato (ibid: 311-313). Unsurprisingly, 
these moves were initially met with caution by the German ministry of finance, bank-
ing and industry associations, and, of course, the Bundesbank. However, the country’s 
political leaders, Chancellor Helmut Kohl and Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich 
Genscher took a different stance. They endorsed EMU as a political project bringing 
security to Europe because it had the potential to overcome the tensions in Franco-
German relations the EMS had often provoked. In a memorandum Genscher explicitly 
favored EMU – a crucial “turning point in the relaunch of EMU” (Dyson 1999: 102) 
which took many by surprise. In order to overcome domestic opposition, however, the 
Genscher Memorandum stated that a European central bank should be modeled on the 
Bundesbank and that its creation should be conditional on substantial economic con-
vergence (Genscher 1988). The German Chancellor threw his weight behind the idea, 
too, and initiated the creation the so-called Delors Committee.  
The Delors committee effectively co-opted the central banking community to design 
the blueprint for the currency union. Next to Commission president Jacques Delors 
and three independent experts, it included the central bank governors of all EC coun-
tries, which gave the committee legitimacy. What is more, by binding in central bank-
ers, potential future opposition from monetary experts – and especially the Bundes-
bank – was effectively preempted. As virtually all recommendations of the Delors Re-
port of April 1989 found their way into the Maastricht Treaty (Verdun 1999), the 
committee’s work and set-up deserves further attention.  
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It was not a committee of equals. The dominant figure was Bundesbank president 
Karl-Otto Pöhl, who took the initiative by issuing his proposal for the design of EMU 
and the ECB (Dyson 1994: 129-30; Kaltenthaler 2006: 22; Verdun 1999: 319-20). 
This, unsurprisingly, was closely in line with the Bundesbank’s own model. Other cen-
tral bankers within the committee agreed that the Bundesbank provided a useful blue-
print the ECB’s mandate, internal structure and external relations. Taking into account 
the Bundesbank’s enormous autonomy in monetary policy formulation and implemen-
tation, it is hardly surprising that central bankers would find this model appealing 
(Gros & Thygesen 1992: 320). Consequently, the Delors Report, which proved to be 
so authoritative, incorporated the main principles of the German proposals. Tommaso 
Padoa-Schioppa, member of the Delors Committee, thus characterized the fundamen-
tal compromise of EMU as such: “we do the currency union, but we do it the German 
way”.11 
High politics: negotiating a new treaty while the Soviet world collapses 
In the meantime, the world changed radically. The collapse of the Soviet Union and 
the fall of the Berlin Wall in the fall of 1989 brought the prospect of German re-
unification on the agenda, which had repercussions for negotiations on EMU, too. 
Spurring fears of an all-too-powerful Germany in both France and Britain, these de-
velopments created an even stronger impulse to bind in Germany at the European lev-
el. Thus, an important element of the French strategy towards the issue of German re-
unification was to pressure the Kohl government to agree to EMU creation as fast as 
possible (Kaltenthaler 2006: 23). The reservations signaled by Paris and London posed 
a real threat to Kohl’s goal of quickly re-unifying Germany. This has even led to spec-
ulations that France openly demanded the creation of EMU in return for agreeing to a 
reunified Germany in a high-level backroom deal.12 Consequently, giving up the DM 
is often portrayed as the price of re-unification, even though German and French lead-
ers repeatedly denied this claim. To frame it more positively, however, a strong com-
mitment to EMU was an opportunity for the German government “to prove that a larg-
er Germany would remain a good European citizen” (Sandholtz 1993: 38). 
However we explain the German commitment, once it was secured the negotiations 
progressed rapidly. An intergovernmental conference was held in Rome in December 
1990 to negotiate the exact nature of European monetary integration and the result was 
agreed upon at the Maastricht summit only one year later. German negotiators suc-
ceeded in maintaining the Bundesbank’s core principles: policy autonomy and a man-
date focused solely on fighting inflation. Thus, the provisions of the Maastricht Treaty 
were almost identical to those proposed by the Delors Committee – and therefore cru-
cially shaped by Bundesbank President Pöhl. On the other hand, Germany gave ground 
on other issues, most notably by accepting the beginning of 1999 as the latest date for 
                                              
11 “Die Dolchstoßlegende”, Die Zeit, 20/1998 (7 May 1998) 
12 see “The Price of Unity: Was the Deutsche Mark Sacrificed for Reunification?”, Der Spiegel, 30 Sep 2010 
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introducing the Euro. This, however, would only occur if countries met a number of 
criteria for economic convergence first.  
In this way, the treaty represents a compromise between two contradictory beliefs 
about how monetary integration can be achieved (see Mongelli 2008: 9f.). The ‘mone-
tarist’ perspective – championed by the French – assumed that monetary integration, 
once established, would by itself drive economic convergence among member states. 
Thus the most promising road seemed to start EMU as early as possible. The ‘econo-
mist’ view, on the other hand, held that economic convergence had to happen first as it 
was a precondition for a functioning monetary union. This view was supported by the 
Germans, who managed to make countries’ access to EMU conditional on achieving a 
rather demanding set of economic convergence criteria for public debt, budget deficits, 
inflation and interest rates (Kaltenthaler 2006: 26).13 
It is almost universally accepted that the way EMU took shape in Maastricht was 
largely determined by French and German preferences (see e.g. Moravcsik 1998; 
Loedel 1999; Heisenberg 1999). Even those studies which focus on the role played by 
smaller countries do not challenge the decisive role of the Franco-German axis (see 
Maes & Verdun 2005). But how are we to understand both countries’ preferences re-
garding EMU? The French rationale for pushing EMU was arguably rather straight-
forward: to replace German domination by a system in which Germany and France 
vote as equals. Within the EMS, France as well as all other countries had effectively 
followed German policies without having a say in the decision-making process. Wim 
Duisenberg, in his hearing as candidate for the ECB presidency with the European Par-
liament, summarized this experience from the perspective of the Netherlands:  
“I have no hesitation in admitting that our monetary policy was more 
or less dictated by German monetary policy, but at least it was the 
monetary policy of the country with a track record of stability and low 
inflation. We imported low inflation from Germany by that means. […]  
One of the prices we paid was that as one of the smaller economies we 
more or less had to shadow the monetary policy of the big brother, of 
the Bundesbank. In the future we will not shadow but will co-decide. 
We have got our voice back.” (Duisenberg 1998) 
Germany’s motives to join the Euro, however, were more difficult to understand. The 
vision of its leaders that EMU would safeguard peace and security in Europe may be 
one factor, especially if we link EMU to the issue of German re-unification. Moving 
beyond these specific, and disputed, circumstances, many point to the positive effects 
                                              
13 The treaty defined these convergence criteria as follows: (1) the inflation rate had to remain within 1.5% of the 
three best performing states; (2) the government deficit could not exceed 3% of GDP; (3) the level of public debt 
had remain below 60% of GDP; (4) interest rates had to remain within 2% of the three best performing states, 
and (5) countries had to refrain from devaluating their currency within the common exchange rate mechanism 
for at least two years before joining EMU (see Dyson & Featherstone 1999: 7). 
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on trade and investment. As an export-led economy with close economic links to its 
European neighbors, Germany had presumably clear incentives to stabilize exchange 
rates – even though the evidence on the economic costs and benefits of doing so re-
mains inconclusive (Kaelberer 1996: 32). Despite such economic incentives, opinion 
polls showed that an overwhelming majority of German voters opposed participation 
in EMU and the Bundesbank remained an outspoken critic. However, Germany’s po-
litical elite was almost entirely in favor of the Euro (Feldstein 1997: 31). This goes for 
Chancellor Kohl in particular, who saw the fall of the Berlin Wall as a window of op-
portunity to override domestic opposition and turn his pro-European convictions into 
reality (van Esch 2012). Adopting a two-level game perspective (Putnam 1988), one 
might then argue that domestic opposition contributed to the success of German repre-
sentatives in EMU negotiations: by credibly tying their hands at home, German offi-
cials largely succeeded in dictating the terms of monetary cooperation. Thus, they 
could secure the benefits of monetary cooperation without having to compromise do-
mestic priorities. As the Treaty made the Frankfurt-based ECB seemingly work like 
the Bundesbank, Germany could hope to continue dominating European monetary pol-
icy in the future (Feldstein 1997: 29).  
Summing up the road to Maastricht, European monetary integration has always been a 
political project, rather than one driven solely by economic considerations. And even 
though Germany has been the dominant player in this process, its influence does not 
necessary mirror the country’s political power – understood as power in decision-
making, or ‘first face of power’ in the typology proposed by Steven Lukes (2004). 
Much progress towards monetary integration followed from other European countries’ 
“voluntary emulation of the German model” (Dyson & Featherstone 1999: 2). In this 
sense, it was the Bundesbank’s ‘third face of power’, the power to shape perceptions, 
cognitions and preferences (see Lukes 2004: 28), that helped bring about EMU. The 
impressive track record of the Bundesbank during the 1970s lent German negotiators 
much political clout. Due to their favorable bargaining position, the Germans largely 
succeeded in enshrining the Bundesbank’s principles in the ECB’s mandate. Conse-
quently, the replacement of the Bundesbank by the ECB as the continent’s most im-
portant central bank does not simply imply a loss of German power. Rather, the ECB 
represents “a unique extension of [the Bundesbank’s] structural power over the terms 
of debate through institutionalization of the ECB on the basis of Bundesbank ideas and 
practices” (Dyson 2009: 131).  
2.2 Who joins the club? 
While the signing of the Maastricht treaty certainly cleared the highest hurdle, it was 
still a long way to go until the ECB was established in 1998. And despite the agree-
ment on what EMU should look like, it long remained unclear whether monetary union 
would occur or not – and who would be allowed to be part of it. These questions, of 
course, were not free of conflict either. Sharp disagreements continued to threaten the 
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ultimate objective of a common currency for another five years. Another continuing 
feature was Franco-German dominance: as Martin Feldstein wrote in 1997, “it is the 
French and Germans who will now determine whether or not monetary union will oc-
cur” (Feldstein 1997: 28). 
Before the progress of prospective EMU members towards meeting the convergence 
criteria became the dominant topic in the second half of the 1990s, the project had to 
overcome several challenges. First, the ratification of the treaty proved more difficult 
than integrationists had hoped, which became clear when a Danish referendum on the 
treaty failed in June 1992. This blow was soon amplified by a second shock caused by 
the Bundesbank’s attempts to counter the inflationary implications of German re-
unification. The Bundesbank’s high interest rates put enormous stress on other mem-
bers of the ERM. Finally, the ERM was further threatened by intense currency specu-
lation which forced the British Pound and the Italian Lira to leave the ERM in the fall 
of 1992 – and almost did the same to the French Franc one year later. The ERM could 
only be saved by radically increasing the fluctuation band (from 2.25 to 15%).  
Against this backdrop, the Maastricht euphoria faded quickly. However, the idea of 
EMU was kept alive despite these difficulties and the second stage of monetary inte-
gration began as planned in January 1994 with the creation of the European Monetary 
Institute (EMI). The EMI, thought to be the predecessor of a future ECB, had the task 
of preparing the third and final stage, the introduction of the common currency. After 
the ERM had survived its most severe crises (by a narrow margin), the attention turned 
to the question of when the third and final stage of EMU would be started – and who 
should be part of it. The treaty had envisaged two possible ways of transitioning to the 
Euro: if sufficient economic convergence was achieved by 1996, the EU could decide 
to start EMU already then. Alternatively, a start in 1999 was the latest date possible. 
As it was very clear that an earlier date would not be possible, the EU heads of state 
had to decide by July 1998 to start EMU in 1999 – and vote by qualified majority on 
which prospective member states fulfilled the convergence criteria (Dyson & Feather-
stone 1999: 7).  
Although it was the driving force behind applying tough criteria for accession, neither 
Germany itself nor any other country would have qualified for EMU in 1994 (James 
2012: 321). At that time, joining the first wave seemed virtually impossible for states 
like Greece and Portugal, and severely challenging for others, such as Italy (Sandholtz 
1993: 18). Up until 1997, only very few states met the accession criteria, but as the 
beginning of EMU became an ever more realistic prospect, a real race began. Outside 
of Great Britain and Denmark, governments did not want to find themselves on the 
sidelines in case the Euro would indeed become a reality in 1999. This prospect 
spurred astonishing appetite for reform, for instance among Italian political leaders 
who “became obsessed with gaining entry to stage 3” (Dyson & Featherstone 1999: 8). 
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In addition to the reform efforts made, the time to make the crucial decision coincided 
with good times in the global economy. Therefore, the political climate changed to-
wards making EMU more inclusive, rather than an exclusive club (ibid: 9). Due to a 
correspondingly flexible interpretation of the Maastricht convergence criteria, every-
body but Greece and Sweden made the cut in the end (the UK and Denmark had al-
ready opted out before). The remaining 11 of 15 EU members were to introduce the 
Euro by 1999 – and the Greeks pledged to join two years later. 
A useful tool to illustrate individual country’s progress towards joining EMU is by 
looking at their government bond yields in relation to the German benchmark. The 
closer a country found itself to meeting the requirements, the closer yields moved to-
wards the German standard. For example, figure 2.1 below shows the different path of 
long-term government bonds in Italy and Greece. Those two were the most controver-
sial among the candidate countries, and therefore did not converge to the benchmark of 
the German Bunds as quickly as other prospective members, including Spain and Por-
tugal. The graph shows that bond yields quickly absorbed news affecting the likeli-
hood of joining EMU, with ‘positive’ news generally working to move yields closer to 
those of Germany and other core countries.  
Figure 2.1 does not only illustrate the Italian and Greek paths to joining the Euro. It 
also directs our attention to a phenomenon which would later become a crucial aspect 
of the Euro crisis as well as its (temporary) resolve through Draghi’s promise to do 
‘whatever it takes’. The graph shows that news events suggesting steps towards EMU 
membership resulted in dramatically lower borrowing costs for Southern European 
governments. The more certain membership became, the closer yields moved to those 
of German bunds – even though their levels of public debt levels remained high. But 
“why was the different degree of fiscal solidity (or the lack thereof) not ‘priced in’ in 
government bond prices”, as the ECB’s Benoît Cœuré (2012) would ask decades later? 
After all, the notorious no-bailout clause of the Maastricht Treaty states that EMU 
members “shall not be liable for or assume the commitments of” another member. One 
common suspicion is that markets never believed this rule to be credible (e.g. see Pisa-
ni-Ferry 2014: 81). According to this hypothesis, markets stopped worrying about the 
creditworthiness of individual EMU member states once they adopted the euro, assum-
ing that member states would stand in for each other in hard times. Therefore, it was 
only the creditworthiness of the Euro area as a whole that they concerned themselves 
with. 
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Fig. 2.1: Long-term sovereign bond yields (10 year maturity), 1996-2001 
(Source: Eurostat) 
02/1997:  “Italian chances of joining the first wave of euro entrants in 1999 were boosted on Friday when 
Eurostat […] cleared Rome's controversial euro tax which will help bring its 1997 deficit towards 
the allowable 3 percent”14 
04/1997: The European Commission predicts that Italy and Greece are the only “two of the EU's 15 member- 
countries that won't make the grade”15 
11/1997: “Barring a political crisis, Italy is expected to meet the European Commission's requirements for 
the euro by the 1999 start-up date.”16 
03/1998: “most European analysts predict that Italy, too, will end up in the initial Euro wave”17 
Greek Government decides to take the drachma into the European exchange rate mechanism 
05/1998:  Council decision (98/317/EC): 11 Member States met the convergence criteria and thus formed the 
first wave of entrants, Sweden and Greece did not fulfill the criteria 
“Greek leaders put on a brave face […] and pledged to become members by 2001”18 
02/1999: “the Greek government's target for EMU entry by January 2001 is now seen as achievable […]“The 
consensus in the market is that Greece is the next Italy”19 
03/2000: Greece requests that the derogation be repealed on 9 March 2000. 
06/2000: Council Decision (2000/427/EC) on including Greece by 1 January 2001 
  
                                              
14 “Italy, Spain move towards EU goal”, Australian Financial Review, 24 Feb 1997, p. 18. 
15 “Lurching toward Maastricht”, Journal of Commerce, 29 Apr 1997, p. 5A. 
16 “Italy eager to shift to common currency”, The Philadelphia Inquirer, 17 Nov 1997, p. A01. 
17 “Italy's brave push for EMU”, Journal of Commerce, 3 Mar 1998, p. 9A. 
18 “Greece left out of euro launch”, The Globe and Mail, 4 May 1998, p. B6. 
19 “Italy's success may pave the way for Greece to join EMU”, The Evening Standard, 12 Feb 1999, p. 43. 
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2.3 The ECB’s birth and happy childhood (1999-2007) 
Before such problems surfaced, however, the Euro had a much more successful start 
than its many critics had thought possible. Blessed with being born during an econom-
ic expansion, the ECB was able to control inflation and build credibility as a dedicated 
inflation fighter, while simultaneously keeping an eye on growth. The ECB’s early 
years were characterized by “a historically benign conjunction of factors” (Dyson 
2008: 13) such as high rates of global growth driven by rising US consumption and 
technology-driven innovations. At the same time, the entry of India and China brought 
about a marked increase in cheap labor, producing downward pressures on prices. 
In such a benevolent environment, the ECB managed to keep inflation close to its tar-
get and still adopt a growth-accommodating monetary policy stance. Like other central 
banks at the time it was able to deliver historically low real interest rates, while signal-
ing inflation hawkishness in its communications in order to build credibility. As Kool 
(2006: 95) points out: “contrary to popular belief and frequent ECB statements, the 
ECB has not acted as an obsessed inflation fighter. […] In terms of actual policy, if 
anything, the ECB has been on the loose side, especially since 2001”. The ECB com-
bined hawkish words with dovish deeds. In hindsight, this has even been confirmed by 
former ECB policymakers such as Jürgen Stark. Without explicitly mentioning the 
Eurosystem, he claimed that “insufficient medium-term orientation in the monetary 
policy frameworks led to too loose a monetary policy stance in many advanced econ-
omies and contributed […] to exacerbating pre-crisis financial excesses (Stark 2011). 
Particularly after 2001, interest rates were too low from the perspective of almost all 
Euro Area countries, particularly in the southern periphery. “The actual EUEONIA has 
been at the right level only for Germany” (Kool 2006: 90). Germany, then considered 
‘the sick man of Europe’, benefited particularly from low interest rates, while they 
fueled credit-based property booms elsewhere, most notably in Spain. Yet, despite be-
ing so loose, the ECB recorded an average of 2.05% annual inflation between 1999 
and 2006, and successfully anchored medium-term inflation expectations in line with 
its target.  
Whether the ECB’s happy-go-lucky childhood days are to be characterized as a suc-
cess, then, depends very much on what you look at. Apart from (almost) meeting its 
inflation target and managing a remarkably smooth transition when introducing the 
Euro, the common currency also significantly fostered trade among members. By re-
moving exchange-rate risks, lowering transaction costs, and enhancing price transpar-
ency, the Euro effectively promoted cross-border business activities. While the exact 
numbers are disputed, very substantial trade effects between 5 and 15% were reported 
for the first decade (Dyson 2008: 24). The Euro also attracted new countries and 
membership grew from 11 to 16 during the first decade, even though Denmark, Swe-
den, and the United Kingdom remained on the outside.  
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Fig. 2.2: Nominal unit labor costs (total economy, 2000=100), 1999-2014  
(Source: European Commission, AMECO database) 
Yet other developments cast a shadow over the ECB’s childhood, even though they 
went largely unnoticed at the time. With the benefit of hindsight, the ECB’s loose pol-
icy has been blamed for having contributed to asset-price bubbles in the currency ar-
ea’s periphery. In many areas, the common currency did not bring about the economic 
convergence the ‘monetarist’ camp had hoped for. Countries in the Euro area contin-
ued to display marked differences regarding growth, inflation, and labor productivity. 
Figure 2.2 above indicates that the Euro even caused divergence rather than harmoni-
zation in labor unit costs – a development that would prove painful in the crisis years 
to come. German competitive disinflation through wage restraint (dubbed ‘internal 
devaluation’) coexisted with credit expansion and consumer-led growth in peripheral 
countries (Dyson 2008: 33). In this sense, the ECB’s single monetary policy produced 
asymmetric impulses for different member states (Scharpf 2011). 
While all these problems that would come to haunt the ECB later are common 
knowledge now, they remained largely under the radar back then. And this goes not 
only for monetary policymakers, but for financial markets as well. The ECB seemingly 
focused on averages across the currency area instead of the situations of individual 
countries. Specifically, it neglected the inflation of housing and other asset prices in 
some peripheral countries (such as Ireland and Spain), because the ECB, like other 
monetary institutions, targets consumer price inflation. Investors did not appear con-
cerned either, failing to exert market discipline during the Euro’s early years. Figure 
2.3 shows that divergent developments in different Eurozone countries – including 
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variables closely related to creditworthiness such as budget deficits and levels of pub-
lic debt – were not reflected in these countries’ borrowing costs between 2000 and 
2008 at all. 
Fig. 2.3: Long-term sovereign bond yields (10 year maturity), 1994-2015 
(Source: Eurostat) 
This all changed, of course, when the crisis struck and the Euro’s happy childhood was 
superseded by particularly challenging teenage years (Enderlein & Verdun 2009). The 
financial crisis following the collapse of Lehman Brothers first forced the ECB to pre-
vent a complete financial meltdown through liquidity operations of unforeseen scale, 
and then to confront the deep recession the crisis caused. The ‘Great Recession’ saw 
the ECB leap into the unknown, when interest rates approached zero and new instru-
ments had to be invented to prevent the recession from worsening and a deflationary 
spiral from inflicting even more harm. The ECB was not alone in confronting these 
challenges, but rather one of many central banks struggling with the ‘new normal’ in 
monetary policy. What made the ECB’s situation particularly dire was the fact that 
markets woke up to the Eurozone’s specific problems they had ignored for so long. 
When the incoming Greek government announced in 2009 that the budget deficit it 
inherited was much worse than the previous government had claimed (at a staggering 
15.7 instead of 6 percent), it set an avalanche in motion. Within the timespan of only a 
few months, investors’ fears about the sustainability of governments’ finances spread 
from one Eurozone country to another, threatening their access to bond markets. Thus, 
the ECB found itself not only fighting a recession of historic dimensions with new and 
untested instruments; it also had to confront the very real prospect of a disintegrating 
Eurozone.  
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I provide a detailed analysis of how the ECB responded to this grim situation in chap-
ter 6, discussing the policies it adopted and, crucially, what it chose not to do. Before I 
turn to empirical detail, however, the following chapter 3 offers important background 
information as to how the ECB arrives at policy decisions and which individuals inside 
the Eurosystem can influence this process. Chapters 4 and 5 follow to develop my the-
oretical approach to central bank decision-making which emphasizes policymakers’ 
economic beliefs, before I return to the question of how these beliefs shaped the deci-
sions the ECB actually took. 
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3. POLICYMAKING INSIDE THE ECB: WHO GOVERNS? 
“We do not disclose the details of our work. It is up to you to guess.”  
Mario Draghi, 6 Sep 2012 
If we are to understand how policymakers influence ECB decisions, we need to under-
stand these decisions are made first. Apart from some core principles, however, our 
knowledge of the ECB’s decision-making process is surprisingly limited. The two 
most important of these principles arguably are ‘one head, one vote’ and ‘centralized 
decision-making, decentralized implementation’. As one might expect, both principles 
do not tell the whole story. What is more, they are not entirely accurate. Not only are 
the decentralized units (national central banks) involved in preparing ECB’s decisions; 
nobody believes every member of the ECB’s Governing Council (GC) to be equally 
influential either. In order to paint a more realistic picture of how the ECB arrives at 
decisions, I thus contrast its formal and informal decision rules below. While the sec-
tion of formal rules relies mostly on official documentation, the section on informal 
rules is informed by academics’ and journalists’ accounts as well as a number of semi-
structured expert interviews I conducted between 2014 and 2017. 
3.1 Formal and informal decision rules 
Until German policymakers publicly voiced their opposition to some particularly con-
troversial decisions in 2012, ECB officials claimed they always reached decisions by 
consensus. In ECB-speak: as a “collegial body”, the GC “practices consensus voting” 
(Moutot et al. 2008: 40). According to insiders, ‘consensus voting’ means that no for-
mal votes are taken. Yet this does not imply perfect agreement. Rather, it becomes 
clear during discussions whether ‘consensus’ means unanimity, a comfortable or only 
a small majority. It is also possible that individual policymakers state their divergent 
preferences but accept the ‘consensus view’ nevertheless.20 In short, consensus can 
mean many things. But since votes are not formally taken, the ECB is simply unable to 
publish detailed voting records like many other central banks. The exact composition 
of preferences in the GC is therefore likely to remain in the dark even when the 30-
year publishing ban of GC minutes expires. What is clear, however, is that the ECB 
statute explicitly envisages a voting scheme.  
On paper, the decision-making procedures of the ECB resemble those of many other 
central banks. Monetary policy is set by a committee (the GC) in which the six mem-
bers of the ECB’s Executive Board (EB) as well as all national central bank (NCB) 
governors of Eurosystem countries have a seat (Jung et al. 2010). Very much like the 
Federal Reserve System in the US, the Eurosystem’s main decision-making body 
combines supranational with intergovernmental elements. Before I turn to the division 
of labor between these two elements, the official decision rule of the GC deserves 
closer inspection. 
                                              
20 Interview (20) with senior ECB staff in Frankfurt, 25 Sep 2015. 
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3.1.1 Governing Council Decisions: one head, one vote? 
Since its inception, the ECB’s formal decision rule has been simple majority voting 
under the principle of ‘one head, one vote’. The idea behind granting France and Ger-
many the same voting power as Luxemburg and Finland was to increase the independ-
ence of national representatives. As one of the Euro’s architects explained this reason-
ing: “If you have as many votes as your GDP, you are not independent, but represent 
your GDP, your country” (Padoa-Schioppa 1996: 7). However, the fact that the bigger 
member states accepted this egalitarian voting scheme, Padoa-Schioppa admitted, 
“verges on the miraculous” (ibid). Possibly, this miracle reflects that nobody assumed 
the French and the Maltese central bank governor to actually be equally influential in 
practice. If no formal votes are taken and policies are developed through deliberation 
(as ‘consensus voting’ suggests), some voices may find more attentive ears than oth-
ers. ECB expert David Marsh (2015) pokes at this discrepancy between formal rules 
and actual practices by stating that “in the shadowy world of European Central Bank 
decision-making, all central banks are equal — but some are more equal than others.” 
Members of the Governing Council can enjoy outsize influence because of the econo-
my they represent (as Marsh seems to suggest), but also by virtue of their individual 
profiles. Eurozone governments are arguably well advised to appoint a governor who 
is highly respected within central banking circles, if they wish to have an influential 
voice inside the GC. Arguably, this is the most immediate way of exerting influence. 
For instance, Athanasios Orphanides as central bank governor of Cyprus represented 
one of the Eurozone’s smallest members. Yet he played “an influential role on the 
ECB’s 22-strong governing council because he worked previously at the US Federal 
Reserve where he became an expert on the 1930s Great Depression and Japan’s expe-
rience of deflation in the 1990s,”21 as the Financial Times pointed out. In the world of 
central banking, such credentials serve as important reputational resources.  
The formal rule of ‘one head, one vote’ has recently been slightly amended, too. With 
the accession of Lithuania as the Eurozone’s nineteenth member in 2015, a rotation 
scheme has been put in place, which gives different groups of countries slightly differ-
ent voting frequencies. In every monetary policy meeting, four NCB governors will 
not be allowed to cast a formal vote. Those include one out of the five largest countries 
in terms of the ECB’s capital key (Germany, France, Italy, Spain, and the Netherlands) 
and three of the remaining 14 governors (see ECB 2009).22 The six members of the 
ECB’s executive board, to the contrary, retain their permanent vote.  
                                              
21 “ECB should hold course on rates, says Orphanides”, Financial Times, 21 Dec 2009.  
22 This implies a voting frequency of 80% for the five biggest members comprising Group 1 and a voting fre-
quency of 79% for the other countries in Group 2 in a setting with 19 national governors. Should the number of 
national governors increase in the future, however, only the voting frequency of Group 2 will decrease further 
(ECB 2009: 92). If EMU membership should exceed 21 countries in the future, there will be three different 
groups of members with varying voting frequencies, further complicating the formal decision rule.  
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Originally the rotating scheme should have come into force much earlier, when the 
sixteenth member joined EMU (Slovakia in 2009). However, the GC decided in 2008 
to delay the implementation. Whether the scheme fundamentally changes how the 
ECB makes decisions is doubtful. After all, every member will continue to participate 
in all meetings and will retain the right to speak. If ECB decisions are indeed mostly 
determined through deliberation rather than voting, then the change should be fairly 
meaningless. However, both the decision to delay the implementation of the rotation 
scheme in 2008 and to finally start implementing it in 2014 were hotly debated, cast-
ing doubt on the presumably deliberative and consensual nature of ECB decision-
making. 
How could we know? Insights from other central banks 
Since the ECB refrains from publishing voting records, it is impossible to establish 
empirically whether ‘one head, one vote’ applies in practice or whether the preferences 
of particular policymakers’ carry disproportionate weight. Skepticism about the ab-
sence of national bias in ECB decision-making has inspired numerous studies which 
model ECB decisions based on theoretical assumptions (see e.g. Heinemann & 
Huefner 2004; Kool 2006; Hayo & Méon 2013). However, such studies suffer from 
the absence of reliable data. While the ECB has begun to publish ‘accounts’ summa-
rizing monetary policy meetings in 2015, analysts still cannot access detailed minutes. 
Furthermore, these ‘accounts’ contain neither individual statements nor votes. The ra-
tionale behind this is to protect ECB officials and (most importantly) national central 
bank governors from scrutiny,23 which presumably makes it easier for them to adopt a 
pan-European perspective instead of representing their domestic constituencies.24 
Therefore it remains impossible to know with certainty which GC members argued 
and voted for which policy and why.  
Academics interested in voting behavior within central bank committees have there-
fore looked for insights elsewhere. Central banks offering extensive minutes and vot-
ing records for analysis include, among others, the US Federal Reserve, the Bank of 
England, the Bank of Japan, the National Bank of Poland and the Swedish Riksbank. 
These institutions have provided a wealth of data, making analyses of individual poli-
cy preferences and voting patterns in monetary policy committees possible. As the in-
sights of such studies may apply to ECB’s decision-making as well, I summarize their 
most important findings below.  
First, monetary policy deliberations and voting are “characterized by considerable het-
erogeneity among policymakers” (Jung 2013: 146). The Bank of England’s monetary 
policy committee (MPC), for instance, “has been divided about two-thirds of the time” 
                                              
23 “New ECB minutes to provide detail on QE debate, but no names”, Reuters, 18 Feb 2015.  
24 Adolph (2013) provides support for this view, suggesting that central bankers may be more tempted to signal 
their ‘usefulness’ to constituencies and ‘shadow principals’ (past and potential future employers), when their 
individual votes and deliberations are made public. 
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(Hix et al. 2010: 731) since 1997. When confronted with the same information about 
the state of the British economy, why do members of the MPC disagree on the appro-
priate interest rate so much? Hix et al. (2010) and most other studies focus on inflation 
preference differentials (i.e. the classic dichotomy between ‘hawks’ and ‘doves’) as 
drivers or voting behavior. However, Hansen et al. (2013) show that voting are also 
driven by heterogeneous assessments of the economy. This implies that even central 
bankers with similar preferences may vote differently because they differ about how 
they perceive the state of the economy.  
Second, policymakers’ origins matter. This is suggested by studies of the Fed’s Open 
Market Committee (FOMC). Like the Eurosystem, the Federal Reserve System is a 
hybrid organization designed to represent both national (supranational) and regional 
(national) concerns. In their classic study of the FOMC, Meade and Sheets (1995) 
show that individual Fed policymakers disproportionally take unemployment devel-
opments of their home states into account. Somewhat surprisingly, this effect is even 
stronger for national Board members than for the presidents of the regional Reserve 
Banks – suggesting that home bias is not so much a matter of institutional representa-
tion but rather related to policymakers’ regional identities (see Meade & Sheets 1995: 
662). 
In sum, policymakers vote differently because they differ in several aspects: their ori-
gins, their perception of economic conditions, and their preferred inflation hawkish-
ness. If this is true elsewhere, we may expect similar dynamics to be at play in the 
ECB’s policy committee. Indeed, as ECB policymakers serve a supranational central 
bank which governs a very heterogeneous currency union, one might expect them to 
differ even more. After all, the Eurozone consists of heterogeneous countries, with dif-
ferent business cycles and different economic problems. Yet, in the absence of voting 
records or minutes revealing the views of individual policymakers, how are we to 
know? 
Assumptions about ECB politics: does size matter? 
One way of coping with the lack of reliable data is proposed in Hayo & Méon (2013). 
Attempting to identify a decision rule that best simulates the ECB’s actual interest rate 
decisions between 1999 and 2006, the authors simulate five different scenarios. They 
find that the scenario which resembles actual decisions most closely is one “in which 
individual members of the Governing Council follow national objectives, bargain over 
the interest rate, and their weights are based on their country’s share of the zone’s 
GDP” (Hayo & Méon 2013: 135). This suggests that ECB’s policymakers take the 
needs of its bigger members – most notably France and Germany – disproportionally 
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into account (for similar arguments see Kool 2006; von Hagen & Brückner 2003).25 In 
this light, Padoa-Schioppa’s vision of ECB decisions being taken independent of na-
tional interests may account to little more than wishful thinking.  
To sum up the key findings from studies of other central banks as well as assumptions-
based models of ECB decision-making, two insights are of particular relevance for my 
argument: 
1. ‘One head one vote’ does in all likelihood not represent a realistic model of ac-
tual ECB decision-making. 
2. Policymakers’ origins and identities matter – and this holds true not only for the 
governors of national central banks, but for members of the ECB’s executive 
board as well. 
3.1.2 The agenda-setting power of the Executive Board 
The six-head Executive Board (EB) is undoubtedly the power center of the Eurosys-
tem. It consists of the ECB President, the Vice-President and four other members, all 
of which are appointed for one non-renewable term of eight years by the European 
Council. And while all six EB members have only one vote in the GC, they have con-
siderable agenda-setting power because they prepare and manage GC meetings 
(McNamara 2006b: 177). This goes for two individuals in particular: the President 
who chairs the meetings, and the chief economist who presents an assessment of the 
Eurozone economy, projections of future developments, and – crucially - tables the 
policy options to be discussed by the committee. 
Fig. 3.1: ECB Executive Board members and their terms in office (Source: ECB) 
Mirroring the EB’s central role in the ECB’s decision-making process, the appoint-
ment process of board members has become more politicized over time. Of course, 
this is particularly true for the selection of the ECB President. However, the nomina-
                                              
25 Yet it needs to be considered that the ECB bases its decisions on Eurozone averages, and economic develop-
ments in, say, France or Spain logically impact these averages more than data from smaller economies such as 
Cyprus would. In this light, the findings of Hayo & Méon (2013) seem less surprising.  
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tion of other board members has led to diplomatic tensions between European gov-
ernments as well, usually mirroring conflicts about national representation. While a 
strict application of the formal ‘one person, one vote’-rule would imply that small 
countries are too powerful within the ECB (see Berger & De Haan 2002) there is an 
informal rule about national representation in the EB which seems to counter such 
concerns: four out of the six positions at the EB are always occupied by the four big-
gest member states, namely Germany, France, Italy, and Spain (see figure 3.1 above).  
This informal rule can lead to ugly rows. A case in point is the conflict between the 
French President Nicolas Sarkozy and the Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi in 
2011. After Mario Draghi had been confirmed as Trichet’s successor, a situation 
loomed in which two out of six seats were taken by Italian citizens – Mario Draghi and 
Lorenzo Bini Smaghi – whereas France would walk away empty-handed. Needless to 
say, this was not what Sarkozy wanted. He insisted that “there is an unwritten rule that 
everyone knows well, which is that among the six members of the ECB board, it’s in 
the ECB’s interest that all big countries are represented” – adding that “two Italians on 
the six-member board is not a very European solution.”26 Berlusconi had reportedly 
promised Sarkozy that Bini Smaghi would resign and make room for a French re-
placement in exchange for Sarkozy’s support of Draghi’s presidency. Bini Smaghi, 
however, had different plans. He initially insisted on the ECB’s statutory independ-
ence according to which ECB board members must not take orders from politicians. 
Yet his resistance would not last long. After a few months of diplomatic tensions be-
tween Paris and Rome, Bini Smaghi gave up his post and made way for Frenchman 
Benoît Coeuré in November 2011 – a move which restored diplomatic ties but called 
the political independence of ECB policymakers into question.27 
The six members of the executive board divide among themselves the responsibilities 
for managing the ECB’s various departments, called Directorates-General (DGs). Tra-
ditionally, the most relevant units for the formation of monetary policy are DG-
Economics, DG-Research, and DG-International & European Relations (Issing 2008). 
As a consequence of the financial crisis and the adoption of unconventional policies, 
DG-Macroprudential Policy and Financial Stability and, in particular, DG-Market Op-
erations have also gained importance.28 While all these DGs have their role to play in 
the preparation of ECB decisions, DG-Economics is the monetary policy powerhouse 
– both in terms of its size and its prominent role in the decision-making process.29 The 
member of the EB who is responsible for DG-Economics, currently Peter Praet, is 
therefore often called the ECB’s “chief economist”. Officially, this position does not 
exist. The financial press awarded the title of ‘chief economist’ informally to Otmar 
                                              
26 “Draghi ECB Succession Deal Pressures Bini Smaghi to Resign”, Bloomberg, 17 June 2011. 
27 “Bini Smaghi quits ECB after French pressure”, Financial Times, 10 Nov 2011.  
28 Interview (20) with senior ECB staff in Frankfurt, 25 Sep 2015. 
29 Interview (23) with ECB manager in Frankfurt, 30 Sep 2015. 
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Issing in the ECB’s first years because Issing’s portfolio included “much of [the 
ECB’s] intellectual firepower”,30 namely both DG-Economics and DG-Research (see 
Ch. 3.2). And even though both his successors in heading the Economics department, 
Jürgen Stark and Peter Praet, did not receive the same powerful portfolio combination, 
the term continues to be used. 
3.1.3 The role of staff 
The independent influence of Eurosystem staff on specific decisions of the Governing 
Council is difficult to assess. What is possible, however, is to identify how staff input 
is channeled into the decision-making process. The main mechanisms here are: eco-
nomic forecasts, policy notes, EB briefings, and research output. The most visible staff 
input clearly are the quarterly forecasts prepared by ECB staff (called Macroeconomic 
Projections), which describe the economic outlook for the euro area for the following 
three years.31 In particular, they include numerical forecasts of GDP and inflation, 
which are widely reported in the media and extensively discussed in the context of 
ECB press conferences.  
Staff presentations for the Executive Board represent another important channel of 
influence. The briefings usually take place two days ahead of monetary policy meet-
ings and are typically given by the Heads of Division of the most policy-relevant divi-
sions of DG-Economics, DG-International, and DG-Research, albeit presentation time 
is occasionally shared with other senior staff.32 As I describe in greater detail below, 
however, the way ECB leaders engage with the analyses and arguments offered by 
Eurosystem staff depends on their leadership style, which has reportedly changed quite 
considerably between different presidencies.  
ECB employees can also leave their mark by preparing policy proposals, memos, and 
research notes. While such policy proposals and memos are often demanded by man-
agement, the way they are written might still have clear policy implications. Occasion-
ally, they are the result of staff initiatives, too. The final product is a typically a heavi-
ly edited group effort. However, there is some path dependency in these documents, 
implying that those writing the first draft are very likely to influence the final product 
through their decisions and priorities about the document’s scope and structure.33 In 
order to influence policy, then, a proposal has to be convincingly framed in terms of 
the ECB’s official goals. This means that a proposed policy needs to be framed as a 
means to achieve medium-term price stability across the Euro area – even if the policy 
                                              
30 “The ECB’s ‘chief economist’”, Financial Times, 12 Sep 2011. 
31 see https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/projections/html/index.en.html 
32 These divisions include in particular the Divisions for Fiscal Policy, Output and Demand, Prices and Costs, 
Capital Markets and Financial Structure as well as Monetary Analysis in DG-Economics. The two units provid-
ing input from the perspective of DG-International are the divisions for External Developments and International 
Policy Analysis. Interview (24) with ECB manager in Frankfurt, 2 Dec 2015.  
33 Interview (07) with ECB official in Frankfurt, 6 Jan 2015. 
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may be motivated by other objectives (e.g. unemployment problems in Portugal). No 
matter what the real motivations behind a proposal are, it has to be justified by a credi-
ble theory of how it contributes to price stability in the currency union.34 A cynical 
reading of this is that the ECB’s mandate may occasionally influence its rhetoric more 
than its actual policies. 
Finally, there is the ECB’s research output. ECB staff makes contributions to the state 
of the art in monetary economics through both in-house publications and peer-
reviewed academic articles. The impact of this ‘research channel’ is arguably even 
harder to gauge because it primarily aims at influencing broader academic debates and 
thus enhance the ECB’s credibility as a research powerhouse. Eventually, however, 
these broader debates may have an effect on the reasoning of officials in the Govern-
ing Council. In this way, the ECB’s in-house research may contribute to ECB policy-
making – albeit indirectly and with potentially long time lags.35 
National representation among ECB staff: still the European Bundesbank? 
Among the main reasons why the ECB has often been called ‘European Bundesbank’ 
is its location. Because the ECB was established in Frankfurt, where the German Bun-
desbank resides, it naturally attracted many applications from Bundesbank staff. This 
is not only due to proximity. Rules for compensation may have played a role as well. 
While pay at the ECB is very attractive from the perspective of a Bundesbank employ-
ee (Dyson 2009: 133), this is less the case for French central bankers, for instance.36 
Also, Bundesbank staff can join the ECB without losing their right to previously ac-
quired benefits in case they return to the Bundesbank at a later stage.37 In a way, then, 
the Bundesbank’s internal rules have made the transfer of its employees to the ECB an 
attractive career choice – and thus supported a strong presence of former Bundesbank 
employees inside the ECB.  
Due to all this Germany is overrepresented among ECB staff. While the ECB does not 
publish staff statistics by country of origin, the Official Directory of the European Un-
ion documents that Germans hold many key positions at the managerial level.38 In 
their systematic analysis of national representation at the ECB from 1999 to 2008, 
Badinger & Nitsch (2014) report a “disproportionately narrow spread of national rep-
resentation” in the ECB’s top-level management. And this matters beyond top-level 
management because ECB managers may tend to recruit from their personal net-
works.39 In line with this, Badinger & Nitsch (2014: 20) find “evidence that strong 
national representation at a particular management level is typically associated with 
                                              
34 Interview (07) 
35 Interview (23) 
36 Interview (13) with ECB official in Frankfurt, 9 Jan 2015. 
37 Interview (08) with former senior Bundesbank official in Frankfurt, 6 Jan 2015.  
38 see http://europa.eu/whoiswho/pdf/EUWhoiswho_10_EN.pdf [last accessed 27 Apr 2017] 
39 Interview (07) 
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similarly strong national presence at the subordinate management layer”. Regarding 
German representation, this is particularly the case at the ECB’s fiscal policy division 
in DG-Economics, where German citizens account for the largest share of employees 
by far.40  
Does nationality matter, however? When asked for determinants of divisions among 
ECB staff, some respondents held that disagreements about policy are better explained 
by intellectual diversity than by country of origin.41 For instance, German and Italian 
representatives are often closely aligned. Thus, Italian central bankers may be better 
understood in terms of their educational background – for example as economically 
conservative ‘Bocconi Boys’ (Helgadóttir 2016) – than in terms of a presumably loose 
monetary policy stance associated with Southern countries. Others, however, stress 
that a north/south divide exists within the ECB, particularly with regard to fiscal policy 
issues.42 In any case, it is very difficult to disentangle these factors, as categories of 
education and origin often overlap: a central banker from a creditor country with a pre-
sumably conservative ‘stability culture’ is likely to have received her professional 
training at a conservative department of economics, too. 
3.1.4 Channels of influence for national central banks 
A second famous Eurosystem principle – namely that of ‘centralized decision-making, 
decentralized implementation’ – deserves some scrutiny as well. While the principle 
generally describes the division of labor between the central hub (the ECB) and the 
decentralized spokes (the NCBs) well, it should not lead us to assume that participa-
tion in the GC is the only access point for NCBs in the decision-making process. Ra-
ther, decisions are prepared in close cooperation between ECB and NCB staff within 
technical committees and subcommittees (Jung et. al. 2010). The Eurosystem’s com-
mittee structure has evolved over time and by now mirrors the ECB’s organizational 
structure almost perfectly: most of the ECB’s DGs have a committee to chair (DG-
International: International Relation Committee (IRC); DG-Market Operations: Mar-
ket Operations Committee (MOC); DG-Statistics: Statistics Committee etc.). These 
subcommittees play an advisory role and should assist the Executive Board and the 
Governing Council in its decisions by providing expert opinions and technical advice. 
By far the most important and politicized among the committees is the Monetary Poli-
cy Committee (MPC).43 While other committees are better thought of as fora of ex-
change in which ECB and NCB staff work together cooperatively, this is less true for 
the MPC. Mirroring the tough choices the ECB had to make throughout the crisis, the 
                                              
40 ibid. 
41 Interviews (07), (13) 
42 Interviews (02), (08) 
43 The ECB’s MPC is a technical subcommittee and thus should not be confused with the Monetary Policy 
Committees of other central banks, which are the equivalents of the ECB’s Governing Council. 
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work in the MPC has become increasingly conflictual and even nurtured personal ani-
mosities.44 The influence of individual NCBs in the committee structure is a function 
of several aspects, among which one stands out: manpower. For instance, the Bundes-
bank’s sheer size45 allows its employees to specialize on selected aspects of monetary 
policy. Therefore they often become highly knowledgeable experts in those areas. As 
smaller NCBs often do not have the organizational capacity to develop such special-
ized expertise, the Bundesbank representatives often appear particularly well prepared 
in committee meetings, giving their arguments additional weight.46  
National central bank Capital key % Paid-up capital (€) 
Deutsche Bundesbank, Germany 18.0 1,948,208,997.34 
Banque de France 14.2 1,534,899,402.41 
Banca d'Italia, Italy 12.3 1,332,644,970.33 
Banco de España, Spain 8.8 957,028,050.02 
De Nederlandsche Bank, Netherlands 4.0 433,379,158.03 
Banque Nationale de Belgique, Belgium 2.5 268,222,025.17 
Bank of Greece 2.0 220,094,043.74 
Oesterreichische Nationalbank, Austria 2.0 212,505,713.78 
Banco de Portugal 1.7 188,723,173.25 
Suomen Pankki, Finland 1.3 136,005,388.82 
Central Bank of Ireland 1.2 125,645,857.06 
Národná banka Slovenska, Slovakia 0.8 83,623,179.61 
Lietuvos bankas, Lithuania 0.4 44,728,929.21 
Banka Slovenije, Slovenia 0.3 37,400,399.43 
Latvijas Banka, Latvia 0.3 30,537,344.94 
Banque centrale du Luxembourg 0.2 21,974,764.35 
Eesti Pank, Estonia 0.2 20,870,613.63 
Central Bank of Cyprus 0.2 16,378,235.70 
Central Bank of Malta 0.1 7,014,604.58 
Table 3.1: National contributions to the ECB’s capital key (Source: ECB) 
Beyond this, interviewed ECB staff suggested that German voices generally find more 
attentive ears than others, even at the working level. This may also be due to the con-
stituency they represent – implicitly speaking for the Euro area’s biggest economy 
with the largest share of the population and the biggest contribution to the ECB’s capi-
tal (see Table 3.1 above).47 Of course, adopting a Euro area-wide perspective actually 
requires ECB staff and policymakers to pay more attention to the economic situation 
of the currency area’s bigger countries. It is perhaps stating the obvious, but the simple 
                                              
44 Interview (14) with Bundesbank manager in Frankfurt, 21 Sep 2015. 
45 At the end of 2012, the Bundesbank had 10,825 employees, while the ECB employed a meagre 1,638. The 
other main NBCs of the Eurosystem reported a staff size of 13,012 (France), 6,982 (Italy), 2,684 (Spain), 1,930 
(Greece), and 1,672 (The Netherlands), see The Franklin Templeton Investments Central Bank Directory 2014 
(Horakova & Jordan 2014). 
46 Interview (08); Interview (14) 
47 Interview (02) with ECB official in Frankfurt, 19 Aug 2014. 
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fact that inflation and growth dynamics in Germany have a much bigger impact on 
Eurozone aggregates than developments in Estonia or Cyprus is easily overlooked. 
Beyond its manpower and the constituency it represents, there are further reasons to 
believe that the Bundesbank plays a particularly important role within Eurosystem 
committees, prestige and tradition being amongst them. In terms of monetary policy-
making the Bundesbank is de facto the ECB’s predecessor. Thanks to its dominating 
position in the European Monetary System (EMS), the German Bundesbank was re-
garded as “the bank that rules Europe” (Marsh 1992). This obviously changed with the 
creation of the Eurosystem. Yet generations of European central bankers were social-
ized while their institutions were shadowing the Bundesbank’s decisions and changed 
domestic policies following the German example. Even though the ECB “supplanted 
the Bundesbank as the leading central bank on the European continent” (Howarth 
2009: 87) almost two decades ago, its dominating position in the past may still lend 
Bundesbank arguments particular credibility within Eurosystem committees.  
Media Pressure: breaking the ranks  
National central banks may choose to influence ECB decisions not through internal 
committees but by creating pressure from outside. One way to do so that has arguably 
gained importance in the crisis is the attempt to influence public opinion through me-
dia interventions. While this was long seen as a violation of the ECB’s golden rule of 
collegial and consensual policymaking, this seems to have become the weapon of 
choice for the German Bundesbank – especially after the ECB started buying govern-
ment bonds (see Chapter 6). The Bundesbank’s strategic reorientation towards this 
channel is arguably the main reason why media reports have focused so much on ten-
sions between the ECB and the Bundesbank in their coverage of Eurosystem monetary 
policy. Another may be that it simply is a compelling story, given the Bundesbank’s 
status as implicit predecessor of the ECB and Germany’s notorious inflation fear. 
Therefore, other dissenting voices – from Estonia, Austria, the Netherlands, Finland, 
or Luxemburg – were all too easily overlooked.  
Yet it is true that the German Bundesbank actively seeks media attention. It is particu-
larly outspoken and consistent in its communication. While other NCBs known for a 
rather hawkish stance often share the German position, the Bundesbank’s communica-
tion strategy is focused on clear, simple and consistent messages. This is due to the 
strong institutional theoretical framework the Bundesbank has developed. While this 
well-established framework serves as a ‘moral construct’ and guideline to Bundesbank 
representatives,48 other NCBs don’t have such a strong theoretical framework. They 
are more flexible – or, to phrase it more negatively: less consistent – in their positions. 
Bundesbank officials also focus more on shaping public opinion, while governors of 
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other NCBs are not as eager to talk to the press.49 This focus on voice by Bundesbank 
officials can be seen as a strategic reorientation after EMU: having lost its autonomy to 
set monetary policy, the post-euro Bundesbank has focused on its special role as 
‘guardian’ of stability in Europe – notably through communication (Dyson 2009: 135). 
All this may explain why German opposition gains more media attention than, say, 
dissent from Estonia. 
3.2 The long legacy of Otmar Issing 
Yet criticism of the ECB’s policies during the crisis did not only come from the cor-
ners of active Bundesbank officials and German politicians. Among the voices calling 
for caution was one that probably carried more weight than any other, at least from the 
perspective of the ECB’s headquarters in Frankfurt: the voice of Otmar Issing, the in-
stitution’s first chief economist. It was without exaggeration that Mervyn King called 
Issing “the intellectual force behind the first decade of the European Central Bank” 
and Martin Wolf saw him as the “architect of the European Central Bank’s monetary 
policy”. Indeed, while serving as its chief economist, Otmar Issing had been the key 
figure in developing the ECB’s monetary policy strategy. 
Knowing about the challenging task of introducing a new, supranational currency, the 
Euro’s founding fathers were eager to borrow the Bundesbank’s credibility in order to 
help the Euro off to a smooth start. In light of this objective, it appeared a wise deci-
sion to highlight the continuities in European monetary policy regarding both institu-
tional design and leading personnel. Adopting the Bundesbank’s tradition of giving the 
chief economist a leading role and selecting Otmar Issing for this distinguished post 
seemed an obvious choices (Kaltenthaler 2006: 57). After a successful academic ca-
reer, Issing had been the Bundesbank’s chief economist between 1990 and 1994, 
where “the president was the public face of the central bank [while] the chief econo-
mist was actually much more important in charting the course of policy” (ibid: 56). To 
observers like Mervyn King and Martin Wolff this rings true for the Euro’s first years 
as well; Otmar Issing was the intellectual force behind the ECB’s monetary policy and 
“the powerful living symbol of the continuity between the most credible currency [the 
DM] and the Euro” (Trichet 2007a).  
Issing also ended up being the only original member of the Executive Board to serve 
the full eight-year term, from June 1998 to May 2006 (see Figure 3.1). During those 
years, Issing established many practices that shape the way the ECB makes monetary 
policy to this very day. Be it the exact formulation of the ECB’s price stability target 
and its re-formulation in 2003, the prominent role for monetary indicators under the 
Two Pillar Strategy he developed, the way ECB and NCBs cooperate in producing 
economic projections, the establishment of the ECB as a research powerhouse, or the 
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ECB’s communication strategy, including the design and publication intervals of the 
Monthly Bulletin50 as the ECB’s flagship publication – it all carried Issing’s signature. 
While all this is widely recognized, less is known about Issing’s legacy for the ECB’s 
everyday operations. Being responsible for both DG-Economics and DG-Research – 
the two areas which are “at the very centre of monetary policymaking” in any central 
bank (Issing 2008: 71) – he also left a mark on the Economists working in these units, 
the ECB managers of tomorrow. Due to his long policy experience and strong eco-
nomic background he left a lasting impression on the many young economists starting 
their career at the newly created central bank. As one ECB manager recounts, Issing 
had the unusual habit of holding personal meetings with every newcomer in the DGs 
for Economics and Research during their first days at the ECB. This alone may have 
been enough to impress a generation of ECB economists, but Issing continued having 
regular informal interactions with them (e.g. by frequently having group lunches with 
economists, where their managers would not be allowed to participate) and provided 
every one of his economists with direct and open feedback on the work they prepared 
for him.51 Former colleagues describe him as particularly approachable and integra-
tive, displaying a great willingness to engage in economic debate with missionary 
zeal.52 
The key to understanding how a single individual could become so influential arguably 
lies in a combination of personality and context. Issing’s background as a highly re-
garded academic economist, his long-standing policy experience within the central 
bank which had previously driven European monetary policy, as well as his “intellec-
tual curiosity and excellent interpersonal and management skills”53 would have proba-
bly made him a dominant figure on any monetary policy committee at any given time. 
However, these character traits were arguably even more important during the historic 
experiment of creating a new central bank and launching a new currency. Issing rec-
ognized this formidable challenge:  
“As a central banker directly involved in monetary policy-making, I 
have been dealing with uncertainty and its consequences for a large 
part of my professional life. From my experience as a member of the 
Board of the Bundesbank, I have vivid memories of the challenges 
posed by German reunification and the turbulence surrounding the 
ERM crises. But never have I felt the impact of uncertainty so acutely 
                                              
50 Termed ‘Economic Bulletin’ since January 2015. 
51 Interview (24). Otmar Issing confirmed these fairly unusual management practices in personal communica-
tions with the author, underlining how important it was to him to have direct interactions with each employee in 
DG-Economics and DG-Research.    
52 Interview (32) with Bundesbank manager in Frankfurt, 19 Jan 2017. 
53 Interview (24) 
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as in the weeks that preceded and followed the introduction of the euro 
and the birth of the single monetary policy.” (Issing 1999) 
In his 2008 account of The Birth of the Euro, Issing provides a detailed account of how 
he and his colleagues met this challenge. Regarding the collaboration with his staff – 
which he repeatedly praised as having been crucial for the successful changeover and 
to which he dedicated his book – he remarks: 
“There was no doubt whatsoever about the quality and motivation of 
the staff – quite the reverse: never before had I seen such enthusiastic, 
boundless commitment. There was, however, only a relatively small 
proportion of experienced economists, and very few were familiar with 
concrete issues of independent monetary policy. Success would depend 
on constant dialogue, the mingling of theoretical and empirical 
knowledge on the one hand, and monetary policy experience on the 
other.” (Issing 2008: 72) 
In other words: Issing led a very young team during the historic moment of establish-
ing the Euro – and he chose to do so in a particularly integrative and collaborative 
way, which contributed to creating a strong identity within the departments he led. 
Against this backdrop, Issing’s public criticism toward the ECB’s crisis-fighting poli-
cies really hurts. Since he retired from the ECB Executive Board, Issing has published 
numerous opinion pieces in various German and national news outlets, often striking a 
harsh tone. And while his concerns usually do not receive the same media attention as 
interventions by, say, Wolfgang Schäuble, we can expect them to carry particular 
weight within the institution. From the ECB’s perspective, being the whipping boy for 
politicians such as the German Finance Minister further complicates an already tricky 
task and is certainly not welcome; yet it comes from the outside and, given the contro-
versial nature of unconventional policies, may to a certain degree be expected. Issing’s 
disdain, however, is a different story. Coming from ‘the architect of the ECB’s mone-
tary policy’ who served as a mentor to many of the institutions’ economists, his disap-
proval is likely to strike close to home. 
3.3 ECB Presidents and their styles of leadership 
The ECB has so far witnessed three different presidencies – those of Wim Duisenberg 
(1998-2003), Jean-Claude Trichet (2003-11), and Mario Draghi (from 2011) – which 
were reportedly shaped by diverse personalities and correspondingly different styles of 
leadership. I briefly reflect on reports of the different ways of leading the ECB and the 
Governing Council below, because we can expect them to make a difference regarding 
the decision-making process, and the question of who gets to have a say and when. 
Furthermore, the below argues that the ECB’s leaders did not only differ in terms of 
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management styles; they also interpreted the ECB’s mandate and thus their role differ-
ently.  
Wim Duisenberg reportedly interpreted his role as ECB president as moderator rather 
than agenda-setter, chairing the Governing Council with an emphasis of building con-
sensus between the committee’s members. Even though his presidency had been “fa-
voured strongly by the German Bundesbank” (Dyson 2000: 65) to which he was “in-
tellectually close” (James 2012: 222), this did not significantly influence monetary 
policymaking during the ECB’s first years. After several years of his leadership, there-
fore, commentators asserted that “we don't know much about his monetary philoso-
phy” (Hübner 2002: 5). Duisenberg did not appear as all too interested in the details 
and specifics of the monetary policymaking process, which he left to a large degree in 
the hands of chief economist Otmar Issing. One ECB manager interviewed for this 
study even went so far as to say that, during the Duisenberg presidency, “monetary 
policy was essentially sourced out to Issing.”54  
Not only did Duisenberg entrust Issing with the task of developing the ECB’s unique 
two-pillar monetary policy strategy (Kaltenthaler 2006), the influential German was 
also the driving force behind turning strategy into action. Issing assumed considerable 
agenda-setting power by presenting the state of the Eurozone economy as well as pro-
jections of its future path and options for future policy to his colleagues at the Govern-
ing Council. He did so in close cooperation with his staff in DG-Economics and DG-
Research, as he recalled after his retirement from the post:   
“It has been a constant pleasure to work as a team with my staff of ex-
cellent economists […]. Hardly a day has gone by on which I could not 
learn from reading their contributions and discussing the reasoning 
behind them. It has been my privilege to present the results of this co-
operation to the decision-making bodies, thereby connecting economic 
analysis and research with policy. This process goes in two directions: 
input into the decision-making process and impulses from that process 
for further studies.” (Issing 2007: 83) 
The chief economist’s strong position as well as his openness to channeling staff input 
into top-level decision-making cannot be taken for granted, however. Both depend not 
only on personalities and leadership styles, but also on contextual factors. This is what 
Cecchetti and Schoenholtz (2008) point out in their analysis of how central bankers 
themselves perceived the first decade of the ECB. Based on 17 in-depth interviews 
with senior officials, they assert that “the decision-making process at the ECB allocat-
ed until recently a significant role to the Chief Economist in setting the stage for policy 
rate decisions. […] [This] “proposal power” inside the Governing Council may have 
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been of greatest importance in the early years of EMU, precisely when the shortage of 
data and forecast models was most acute” (Cecchetti and Schoenholtz 2008: 13; my 
emphasis). This suggests that, in the early days of the ECB, Otmar Issing and the de-
partments he led effectively held a monopoly over data and models of the Eurozone 
economy, which he and his staff were only developing at that time. It further suggests 
that the significance of the Chief Economist decreased in the second half of the first 
decade, when Eurozone data and models became more established – and Jean-Claude 
Trichet took over from Wim Duisenberg. 
Trichet was a very different leader, both adopting a more directive management style 
and being much more involved in the everyday operations of preparing monetary poli-
cy decisions. As a seasoned French civil servant, he had risen through the ranks of 
strongly hierarchical organizations which, according to news sources, rubbed off on 
his own leadership style.55 “Trichet forcefully steered, directed, and at times, dictated 
policy from above” during the crisis, according to an account by Richard Stillman 
(2016: 260). Even if such a characterization may be exaggerated regarding his role 
within the Governing Council, where he used his leadership skills to act more as pri-
mus inter pares (Verdun 2017: 217), Trichet surely played a much more active part in 
monetary policymaking than his predecessor. Thus his individual economic beliefs and 
preferences can be expected to have played a much more significant role for ECB pol-
icy than those of Duisenberg.  
Even Trichet’s nomination as ECB president had initially met substantial German-
Dutch opposition, he quickly established himself as a single-minded inflation-fighter 
and staunch defender of central bank independence after taking office in Frankfurt. 
“Once in the ECB, he was completely firm, and began to be seen as more German than 
the Germans” (James 2012: 394). In light of the positions Trichet (as official of the 
French treasury) had fought for in the negotiations leading up to the Maastricht agree-
ment, this surprised many. Not only had he rejected central bank independence as in-
compatible with French republican traditions; he had also “complained that the rec-
ommendation of the Delors Report was ‘too Germanic’” (ibid: 276). Hence the Ger-
man opposition to his presidency. Yet, when he put on the hat of the ECB president, 
German reservations proved unfounded. Trichet was said to speak “French with a 
German accent” (Irwin 2013: 115) to such an extent that a senior ECB economist re-
calls that “he was accused by those who were less focused on inflation that he was like 
a Taliban, an inflation Taliban” (as cited in Braun 2015: 377). 
There was also considerably more interaction between ECB staff and the Executive 
Board under Trichet. Originally, staff briefings before monetary policy meetings had 
been a matter between Chief Economist Issing and his team and the other members of 
the Executive Board were merely informed through written reports afterwards. Trichet 
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made staff briefings for the entire Executive Board a regular – and often lengthy – rou-
tine.56 These briefings usually take place two days ahead of monetary policy meetings 
and are typically given by the Heads of Division of the ECB’s most policy-relevant 
divisions within DG-Economics, DG-International, and DG-Research, albeit presenta-
tion time is occasionally shared with other senior staff.57 Trichet himself often inter-
rupted presentations to discuss detailed aspects with staff – “he wanted to know every-
thing.”58 At the same time, Trichet was not the only new arrival at the ECB’s top man-
agement who was more interested and involved in the minutiae of monetary policy-
making than his predecessor had been; the same can be said for other ‘second genera-
tion’ members of the Executive Board such as Lucas Papademos or Lorenzo Bini 
Smaghi.59 To sum up, staff presentations became an important forum for intense dis-
cussions of monetary policy between ECB economists and management – implying 
that the Executive Board (and the ECB president in particular) played a more im-
portant role for monetary policy decisions, which no longer were prepared by Chief 
Economist Issing (or his successor Stark) in relative autarchy.  
Decision-making procedures certainly changed during the crisis, when monetary poli-
cy became a much more politicized topic compared of the early years of ‘plain sail-
ing’, when members of the Governing Council found it much easier to adopt a Euro 
area rather than a national perspective.60 In addition, the ECB also witnessed another 
marked change regarding its internal leadership when Mario Draghi took over from 
Trichet at the end of 2011. Draghi’s attempts to keep meetings shorter and delegate 
more than his predecessor were reportedly regarded a welcome change in the begin-
ning. Yet as policy decisions became more and more contentious, he increasingly pre-
pared decisions only with a small group of confidants, while sidelining key heads of 
department inside the ECB and keeping national central banks in the dark.61 This al-
legedly secretive and autocratic style led to frustrations – particularly in Germany – 
and Reuters reported in 2014 that national central bank heads were even planning to 
challenge Draghi over his leadership style, according to insider sources.62 
Compared to Trichet, a veteran ECB insider is quoted, “Mario is more secretive... and 
less collegial. The national governors sometimes feel kept in the dark, out of the loop”. 
The same report cites another ECB sources as saying “Jean-Claude used to consult and 
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57 These divisions include in particular the Divisions for Fiscal Policy, Output and Demand, Prices and Costs, 
Capital Markets and Financial Structure as well as Monetary Analysis in DG-Economics. The two units provid-
ing input from the perspective of DG-International are the divisions for External Developments and International 
Policy Analysis. Interview (24) with ECB manager in Frankfurt, 2 Dec 2015.  
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61 “Insight - Mario Draghi's German problem”, Reuters, 23 Oct 2014. 
62 “Central bankers to challenge Draghi on ECB leadership style”, Reuters, 4 Nov 2014. 
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communicate more; he worked a lot to build consensus.”63 Jürgen Stark, Issing’s Ger-
man successor as ECB Chief Economist and vocal critic of the institution after his res-
ignation in 2011, seemed to confirm this openly by stating that “there is a lack of team 
playing going on in the Governing Council; the governance is changing.”64 But while 
Draghi seemed less focused on building consensus among European central bankers 
(presumably knowing well that unanimity would not be attainable in the case of con-
troversial ‘money-printing’ policies), he appeared as a gifted politician and convinced 
political circles outside of Frankfurt. Referring to his success in winning Merkel’s tacit 
consent, Daniel Gros states that Draghi “has carried the German political establish-
ment every step of the way” (as cited in Briançon 2015). In short: Draghi’s efforts may 
have been more geared towards securing external support than towards internal 
agreement. 
This change was also felt by ECB staff. Regarding the staff briefings prior to monetary 
policy meetings, the overall time reserved for the staff presentation has been cut by 50 
percent (from two to one hour in total) under Draghi. In particular, the new protocol 
imposes strict time-limits on individual contributions and, unlike before, there is no 
room for feedback or detailed questions and answers. As a consequence, there is much 
less debate between ECB staff and Executive Board officials under the Draghi presi-
dency65 – one particularly important channel of influence for ECB staff has been se-
verely compromised. This reminds us that informal procedures of decision-making 
cannot be taken for granted, as staff input into the decision-making process crucially 
depends on ECB officials’ willingness to engage with them. And this depends signifi-
cantly upon who leads the ECB and how. 
To conclude, the ECB’s leadership has undergone remarkable changes within the span 
of only eighteen years. In terms of monetary policymaking, the Duisenberg presidency 
was shaped by an influential Chief Economist, Otmar Issing, and his close cooperation 
with his teams in DG-Economics and DG-Research. Under Trichet, the preparation of 
monetary policy decisions moved closer to the ECB’s Executive Board and Trichet 
himself as well as other board members became more heavily involved in the process 
– all of them communicating intensely with staff. Draghi, finally, turned outward and 
relied more on external support than on internal consensus. All this has important im-
plications for ECB policies, as the way the decision-making process is organized criti-
cally influences which actors – and whose ideas – can play a role in determining the 
outcome.  
With this historical background and the specifics of the ECB’s decision-making pro-
cess in mind, I now turn to the importance of economic ideas. The above shows that 
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European monetary policy is largely determined by unelected technocrats – central 
bankers – whose influence in designing and managing EMU has inspired numerous 
studies. What is more, these central bankers are expected to act in a personal capacity 
rather than as representatives of their institutions or home countries. This goes for their 
work within the Delors Committee which provided the blueprint for EMU as well as 
for decision-making within the ECB Governing Council. Two famous anecdote under-
lines this: Jacques Delors was forced to withdraw a paper prepared for the Delors 
committee after it became clear that he had used Commission services when preparing 
it, rather than working on his own (see Dyson & Featherstone 1999: 346; Verdun 
2000b: 825). Similarly, when the ECB Governing Council came together for the first 
time in June 1998, Bundesbank president Hans Tietmeyer objected to the seating order 
as the nameplates had been arranged in order of central bankers’ home countries. To 
underline that policymakers are to act in their personal capacity, this was changed and 
all members are now seated in alphabetical order of their surnames instead (see Issing 
2008: 69; Brunnermeier et al. 2016: 316).  
This shows that there is a strong expectation within these committees that central 
bankers make policy independent not only of politics, but of their home institutions as 
well. They are supposed to act as economists. And the institutional rules of EMU are 
designed to come as close as possible to this ideal of technocratic, independent poli-
cymaking. According to indices of central bank independence, the ECB serves as an 
extreme example since it follows a particularly vague mandate, enshrined in an essen-
tially inviolable Treaty open for interpretation. As Otmar Issing (2008: 130) writes, 
“the Treaty left the ECB a good deal of latitude in developing an appropriate set of 
instruments with which to implement its monetary policy.” Against this backdrop, this 
thesis examines how ECB policymakers’ interpret their mandate in the context of the 
uncertainties of an existential crisis. 
Taking into account their high degree of autonomy and the radical uncertainty associ-
ated with monetary policymaking in the crisis, I argue that the ECB’s policy choices 
depend on how central bankers perceive of economic problems and solutions. And 
this, in turn, depends on the economic beliefs they hold.  
The remainder of this thesis thus zooms in on the following questions:  
 What ideas about the role of monetary policy exist (chapter 4)? 
 How can we empirically measure these ideas and how they actually influence 
policymakers’ preferences (chapter 5)? 
 And, finally, how did these ideas inform what the ECB did and didn’t do to 
fight the economic crises after 2007 (chapter 6)? 
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4. WHAT CAN CENTRAL BANKERS DO?  
CONTROVERSIES IN MONETARY THOUGHT 
“It is hard to realize how radical has been the change in professional opinion on the role of money. 
Hardly an economist today accepts views that were the common coin some two decades ago.”  
Milton Friedman, 1968 
The core question of this dissertation is why central bankers do what they do. And it is 
my hypothesis that what they do follows from what they believe they can do. For what 
we believe to be possible “critically shapes what is desirable” (Steinmo 2003: 209). 
And what is possible in monetary policymaking, we realize once again, is far from 
clear. In the calm decades before the crisis, the so-called ‘Great Moderation’, the puz-
zle of monetary policymaking seemed resolved, mirrored by a great deal of consensus 
in the academic literature on monetary policy. Old controversies were settled, funda-
mental questions no longer raised. But those days are over. Since the crisis challenged 
much of central bankers’ conventional wisdom, we are witnessing a great deal of un-
certainty and unusually harsh debates about which purposes monetary policy can 
serve. Therefore, I start my analysis of central bankers’ economic ideas by reviewing 
these controversies in monetary theory in an attempt to map existing paradigms. This 
map is then taken up in subsequent chapters to measure empirically what contempo-
rary central bankers actually do believe, and how this relates to their policy choices in 
the crisis. 
This exercise is necessarily backward-looking as it focuses on the history of economic 
thought. As such, this chapter may be read as something like a primer in monetary 
theory for non-economists. The first section offers basic definitions concerning what 
monetary policy actually is, why independent central banks are charged with the task, 
and what instruments are available for pursuing monetary policy objectives. It intro-
duces basic theories, traces their development over time, and highlights inconsistencies 
between concepts. The second section focuses on views as to what the ‘proper’ objec-
tives of monetary policy are. It shows how consensus about the ordering of objectives 
– price stability, output stability, or financial stability – has changed over time. Finally, 
section three focuses on discussions of monetary policy during economic crises. While 
the first two sections implicitly focus on monetary policy in times considered as ‘nor-
mal’, there are good reasons to believe that monetary policy works quite differently in 
a depressed economy. Standard mechanisms to influence economic development col-
lapse and central bankers have to resort to unconventional instruments to get the econ-
omy back on track. Section three therefore complements the previous sections in map-
ping the different ideas about how unconventional monetary policy works. This chap-
ters’ final section summarizes the different aspects of monetary theory and how they 
relate to established macroeconomic paradigms such as ‘Keynesianism’, ‘Neoclassical 
economics’, or ‘Ordoliberalism’, to prepare the empirical analyses to follow. 
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4.1 What is money, who creates it – and how? 
Central bankers are widely regarded as the watchmen of our currencies. This is their 
main task and most modern states have granted them astonishing degrees of independ-
ence to fulfil it, because this is widely believed to be the best arrangement to manage 
currencies. How to understand the nature of money itself, however, is much less clear. 
Consequently money has been defined differently at different times. Given what a 
basic aspect of our everyday lives the use of money is, the simple question of what 
money actually is sparks astonishing controversy and, even, mystery. As the legendary 
Walter Bagehot wrote: “Men of business in England do not like the currency question. 
They are perplexed to define accurately what money is: how to count they know, but 
what to count they do not know” (cited in Hall 2008: 14). 
There are, of course, well-defined dictionary definitions of money (e.g. see Black et al. 
2012). According to them, money helps overcoming the obvious limitations of barter 
exchange by serving three fundamental functions: it facilitates trade by providing an 
efficient medium of exchange; it allows resources to be saved for future use by acting 
as a store of value; and it helps us to compare the value of different goods and services 
by acting as a unit of account. These three functions of money can already be found in 
the writings of Aristotle, and they remain an integral part of modern-day textbooks on 
monetary economics (Karimzadi 2013: 119). 
It is immediately obvious that a system of barter exchange would be highly inefficient. 
In such a system, only goods are exchanged for goods. And therefore, only if a person 
offers you exactly what you want and herself wishes, in the very same moment, to take 
possession what you have, can the exchange happen. Of course, such a ‘double coinci-
dence of wants’ rarely happens. To overcome these inefficiencies, the story goes, cur-
rencies were invented to serve as a medium of exchange. Money thus facilitates ex-
change by drastically lowering transaction costs. But what is it?  
In principle any commodity can serve as currency, as long as is generally accepted. 
Adam Smith (1948: 25), for instance names cattle, salt, or a specific species of shells 
as examples for the range of commodities used as a medium of exchange in ancient 
societies. In practice, however, most economies have turned to precious metals and 
coinage to facilitate trade. Metal coins seem a particularly reasonable choice, since 
precious metals are scarce, durable and portable. They are easily transported and ex-
changed. Their durability makes them superior to cattle or salt when it comes to stor-
ing value for future use. Being easily measured, metal currencies are also particularly 
fit to serve as a generalized unit of account. While the use value of other commodities 
varies depending on time, place, and demand, money as metal coins offer a relatively 
invariant measure of value. 
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The conventional story of the origins of money is that it was invented to overcome the 
inefficiencies of barter exchange. This belief rings true, is easily comprehensible and 
therefore widespread. The only trouble is, as Felix Martin (2013: 9) bluntly states, it is 
“entirely false”. Despite decades of research efforts by economic historians, no proof 
of a barter system of production has been found – possibly because such a system “has 
never existed and is practically inconceivable” (Karimzadi 2013: 243). The conven-
tional story then features prominently in the history of economic thought not because 
of empirical observations, but because great thinkers from Aristotle to Adam Smith 
arrived at it based on deductive logic (Martin 2013: 9). The barter exchange system is 
thus better thought of as a hypothetical counterfactual than a historical fact. What his-
tory does provide us with, however, are examples of episodes in which money was not 
used as a commodity to serve as a medium of exchange.  
A particularly interesting example comes from Yap, an island in the western Pacific 
Ocean. Here, people used huge stone wheels, called ‘fei’, as money. The fascinating 
aspect about this ‘medium of exchange’ was that they often were not exchanged at all. 
Ownership of the fei shifted by agreement, and there was no need to move these heavy 
stone wheels (Tobin 2008). Fei did not even need to be visible to serve their social and 
economic functions. One family reportedly lost a fei in a shipwreck off the island’s 
coast; yet the family’s wealth remained undisputed (Martin 2013: 5). Milton Friedman 
(1991: 5) thus cites the example of Yap as a perfect illustration of “how important 
‘myth’, unquestioned belief, is in monetary matters”.  
Such invisible, or abstract, money may serve as an extreme example of our contempo-
rary systems of fiat money. Just like a sunken stone disk at the bottom of the ocean, 
money without any intrinsic value – a piece of paper or an electronic number – derives 
its exchange value from the fact that it is generally accepted. Thus, currency itself – 
the commodity which symbolizes money – is not what really defines money. Money is 
better understood as a generally accepted “system of credit accounts and their clearing 
that currency represents” (Martin 2013: 13). For a monetary system to function, it is 
therefore crucial that (a) two parties agree on a relationship of debt and credit, and that 
they can (b) trust that this will be accepted by third parties, too. Whatever commodity 
is used as a token to record the underlying system of credit accounts – cattle, salt, gold, 
or an inherently worthless banknote – must be transferable and accepted. This is cru-
cial: it is the expectation that third parties will now and in the future accept this specif-
ic form of credit which allows it to perform monetary functions. Money carries a 
promise of value, which is generally trusted. 
The nature of money as a social technology based on trust (or credibility) may well 
explain the emphasis that contemporary monetary policymaking puts on the role of 
expectations. Not only do central banks monitor expectations very closely, there is also 
a “well established theoretical argument that monetary policy mainly works through 
58 
 
expectations” (Qvigstad 2006). This idea is most famously stated by Michael Wood-
ford (2005: 3), who stresses that “not only do expectations about policy matter, but, at 
least under current conditions, very little else matters”. Before discussing the central 
role of expectations in monetary policy at length, however, I introduce the central ac-
tors conducting monetary policy and the instruments they have at their disposal.  
4.1.1 Who ‘makes’ monetary policy? 
Central banks are conventionally thought to be the institutions commanding the money 
printing press. Some even consider the 1844 act, which gave the Bank of England the 
monopoly of issuing banknotes, as the cradle of modern-day central banking (Davies 
& Green 2010: 11).66 Yet while issuing currency usually is the exclusive responsibility 
of central banks, does this not mean that they are the ones who ‘create money’? This 
false belief, again, is rooted in a conception of money as something physical, as the 
banknotes and coins the central bank issues. However, a non-trivial fact is that only 
this rather small fraction of the money we use is actually created by central banks.  
Commercial banks, not central banks, create the major part of money in the form of 
deposit liabilities.67 Commercial banks lend to firms and households a multiple of 
what they themselves hold. Therefore, the overall money supply is a multiple of the 
money issued by the central bank. When a commercial bank makes a loan, it creates 
money. Conversely, when this loan is paid back in full, money is ‘destroyed’ (as in the 
amount of money in the economy is reduced). Thus while all currency is money, not 
all money is currency. Over the course of the twentieth century, central banks have 
become increasingly accustomed to sharing the monopoly of money creation with 
commercial banks, when “deposits and their transfer via checks and giros became 
widely accepted” (Padoa-Schioppa 2000). Today we use central bank money (bank-
notes and coins) and commercial bank money (deposits) interchangeably.  
Of course, commercial banks cannot freely create money as they wish. If this was the 
case, central banks would have no leverage over the money supply whatsoever and no 
means to safeguard price stability. They therefore regulate the process of money crea-
tion by commercial banks by demanding them to hold the equivalent of a particular 
ratio of the credit they grant in their books. This was traditionally achieved by setting a 
level of minimum reserve requirements, that is, by demanding commercial banks to 
store away some fraction of its customers’ deposits in the form of central bank money 
                                              
66 Others point to 1870, when the Bank of England assumed the lender-of-last-resort function, as the beginning 
of central banking as we understand it today. While the oldest central banks, the Swedish Riksbank (1668) and 
the Bank of England (1694), were founded already in the 17th century, they were initially private banks without 
any of the features or functions that we associate with central banking today (Davies & Green 2010: 11). There-
fore, there is no unanimously agreed date which marks the “official” beginning of central banking.  
67 In Britain this amounts to 97 percent of all the money in the economy, according to the Positive Money reform 
movement, see http://positivemoney.org/how-money-works/how-banks-create-money/ 
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– the so-called reserves.68 It follows that central banks can potentially influence the 
overall money supply by changing the minimum reserve requirements they demand. In 
theory, they could even completely strip commercial banks of their power to create 
money by requiring reserve requirements of 100 percent. In this case, the central bank 
would indeed fully control the money supply. In practice, however, central banks rare-
ly raise the minimum reserve requirements, because doing so could cause serious li-
quidity problems in the banking sector. 
Common measures of the money supply include even more differentiations. The cen-
tral bank money, or base money, which consists of the reserves that commercial banks 
hold in their accounts at the central bank plus the overall amount of currency which 
circulates in the public, is often denoted as M0. M1, then, includes bank deposits 
which are immediately convertible into cash. It is generally assumed that a small in-
crease in the monetary base M0 (‘base money’) will cause a much bigger increase in 
M1 (‘broad money’), because the volume of loans banks are allowed to make due to 
the increase in M0 exceeds this initial increase (unless reserve requirements are set to 
100%). If these requirements are 1%, as in the euro area, an addition of 1 unit in the 
monetary base could therefore potentially increase M1 by 100 units – this ratio is 
called the money multiplier. Broader measures of money include less liquid assets, i.e. 
longer-term deposits at commercial banks that are not immediately convertible into 
cash. These measures, M2, M3 or M4, are differentiated by the degree of liquidity of 
the assets they include, but the exact classifications vary from country to country. Ta-
ble 4.1 below gives an overview of the definitions used in the euro area: 
Liabilities* M0 M1 M2 M3 
Currency in circulation X X X X 
Overnight deposits  X X X 
Deposits with an agreed maturity of up to 2 years  X X 
Deposits redeemable at notice of up to 3 months  X X 
Repurchase agreements  X 
Money market fund shares/units  X 
Debt securities issued with a maturity of up to 2 years  X 
Table 4.1: Definitions of Euro Area Monetary Aggregates  
* Monetary liabilities of MFIs and central government (post office, treasury) vis-à-vis non-MFI euro area  
residents excluding central government (Source: European Central Bank 2011: 50) 
The key take away from this is: even if central banks, which issue banknotes, can be 
said to ‘run the printing press,’ they do not directly control the money supply. Money 
as a quantity under direct control of the central bank thus amounts to little more than a 
                                              
68 There are other regulations limiting the amount of money that commercial banks may lend (create), e.g. the 
Capital Adequacy Requirements set by the Basel Accords of the Bank of International Settlements (BIS). Today, 
these standards are arguably more important to regulate commercial bank lending than traditional reserve re-
quirements; thus, some central banks have even abolished reserve requirements. 
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(widespread) folk-theoretical notion (Braun 2016). In practice, commercial banks play 
an important part in the creation of money. Therefore, central banks need to target the 
behavior of commercial banks (and shadow banks) to influence the money supply. 
4.1.2 Central bankers’ instruments 
If monetary policymaking does not imply that central banks create money, then which 
instruments do central bankers have at their disposal to influence price developments? 
Astonishingly few! As two former senior officials of the Bank of England put it: “the 
instruments at their disposal are quite limited and, in a sense, not very sophisticated” 
(Davies & Green 2010: 9-10). Because central banks function as ‘the bank of the 
banks,’ their main tool is their own balance sheet. Central bankers thus influence the 
economy mainly by buying and selling assets and liabilities. In doing so, they general-
ly seek to influence either the price of money or its quantity – and, by doing so, the 
performance of the economy as a whole (ibid: 25). 
The short-term interest rate is usually the single most important tool of a central bank-
er. It refers to the interbank market rates of interest on central bank money, which the 
central bank can influence in different ways. In simplistic terms, the US Fed influences 
short-term interest rates by buying and selling securities (usually US government 
bonds), while the ECB tries to achieve the same by granting banks loans (secured by 
collateral) at a particular rate of interest which then becomes the benchmark for inter-
est rates throughout the Eurozone.69 Despite their differences, both techniques aim at 
increasing or withdrawing reserves which affects the price of central bank money – the 
interest rate (see Rehbock 2013). In practice, direct interventions in interbank markets 
are often not even required, when market rates automatically converge in response to 
the central bank announcing the desired target interest rate (Asensio 2015: 265).  
Furthermore, it is often not the change (or non-change) of the short-term interest rate 
as such that matters. More important is the signal a central bank’s decision sends to 
market participants. Therefore, interest-rate decisions are complemented by suasion 
and guidance to markets. Since it has the ability to move financial markets, central 
bank communication has become a very powerful part of the central bank's toolkit 
(Blinder et al. 2008). This, however, is a rather recent development and greatly at odds 
with central bank practice before the 1990s. Conventional wisdom had long held that 
central bankers should say as little as possible, thereby creating a mythology that argu-
                                              
69 As the crisis has shown, the ability of these techniques to bring about the desired changes in interest rates 
crucially depends on the state of the financial system. A case in point is the new technique employed by the US 
Fed when it tried to raise interest rates at the end of 2015. As a consequence of its bond purchases in previous 
rounds of QE, the financial system was soaked with Fed money. This neutralized the Fed’s traditional tool to 
change rates, because selling bonds in ordinary proportions would have had little effect on a market awash with 
excess reserves. The Fed could not easily drain enough money from the system to discourage lending and thus 
invented a new technique which essentially amounted to paying banks not to lend more (see: “Retooling the Fed 
for Liftoff”,  New York Times, 13 Sep 2015, p. BU1). 
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ably helped central banks to defend their discretionary opportunities (Chant & Ache-
son 1973). Today, almost the reverse is true: central banks around the world have 
made it a priority to publicly explain their strategies and to clearly communicate how 
they assess financial and economic developments. Doing this is now seen as an oppor-
tunity to enable markets to form expectations “more efficiently and accurately” (ECB 
2011: 87) and to make the future path of central bank actions more predictable. 
These two essential tools – interest-rate decisions and the communication accompany-
ing them – may sometimes be backed by a central bank’s regulatory and supervisory 
functions. During economic downturns, however, these two conventional tools may be 
insufficient to deliver the desired outcomes. This may force central banks to employ 
other, less well-established, unconventional measures, as I describe in greater detail 
below (see chapter 4.3). A more fundamental issue needs to be discussed before, how-
ever. How are the interest-rate decisions and communications of central bankers 
thought to affect the behavior of economic agents and, thus, economic outcomes? How 
exactly are central bankers’ decisions thought to affect the economy?  
4.1.3 The transmission mechanism 
We know now that the link between a central bank’s decisions and the money supply 
is much weaker than assumed under the widespread, but false, folk theory of money 
(Braun 2016). Money creation depends in no minor part on the behavior of commer-
cial banks – and the expectations underlying their actions. In fact, one of the most un-
ambiguous lessons of the crisis years is that the transmission mechanisms of monetary 
policy depend very much on the state of the banking system (Beck et al. 2014).70 
However, as Dow (2014: 229) points out, even before the globalization of finance, 
“central banks could only influence the level of credit and money in the economy, not 
control it”. And the relationships between monetary policy and those variables that 
central bankers ultimately target – inflation, growth, or employment – are even more 
unstable. The link between central bank decisions and those crucial real economic var-
iables depends on the decisions of a much wider array of actors, some of which re-
maining entirely beyond the reach of even the most powerful central bank.  
The schematic illustration of the transmission mechanism below displays this com-
plexity (see Fig. 2.1). It shows that whether or not a central bank’s decision will pro-
duce the desired outcome depends not only on the lending behavior of commercial 
banks. It is also influenced by firms’ wage and price-setting decisions, governments’ 
fiscal policy stance, consumers’ preferences for spending vis-à-vis saving, and – via 
the exchange rate channel – the monetary policies of other central banks. Complicating 
matters even further, there may be exogenous shocks such as abrupt changes in com-
                                              
70 In fact, one of the ECB’s biggest problems is the fragmented banking sector in the Euro area. In this light, 
Reichlin & Baldwin (2014: 17) ask: “how can a monetary authority credibly commit to keeping inflation stable 
when its policy rate is transmitted differently across the currency area?” 
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modity prices which ‘distort’ agents’ decisions. The various oil shocks occurring over 
the course of the past 40 years are the most obvious case in point. 
 
Fig. 4.1: Main transmission channels of monetary policy decisions  
(author’s representation, based on ECB 2011: 59) 
Three aspects of the transmission mechanism are particularly important to note for the 
purposes of this study. First, some important forces determining how monetary policy 
influences the economy are completely outside the central bank’s control. Central 
banks may be able to establish some form of relationship with domestic governments, 
the financial sector, or other central banks. Formal coordination mechanisms and fora 
for consultation and cooperation with third actors (e.g. in the context of the Bank for 
International Settlements) as well as informal channels may help ruling out some 
forms of disruptive behavior such as counterproductive fiscal policies or competitive 
devaluations by trading partners. Still, big shifts in the supply and demand for goods 
and labor or an embargo of oil exporting countries, can cause monetary policies to fail. 
This leads to a second important aspect: many of these factors are deeply interrelated. 
For instance, changes in global conditions do not only change the context of economic 
decision-making; they may also change the ways how firms respond to interest-rate 
decisions themselves. Thus the fundamental relationships between economic variables 
change over time. Because of these inherent uncertainties and historically unstable 
relationships in monetary policymaking, central banks have focused on different vari-
ables at different times. And “very often the choice of focus follows from the particu-
lar theory of economic behavior that for a period appears most convincing” (Davies & 
Green 2010: 26).  
Third it is hard to overstate the relevance of expectations. The view presented in 
Woodford (2005) that “very little else matters” and that the level of interest rates as 
such are “of negligible importance” may appear somewhat extreme. But it is not only 
63 
 
that market expectations about future interest rates affects today’s borrowing costs. 
Monetary policy decisions – and the way they are communicated – also guide firms’ 
expectations of future inflation and, thus, price and wage-decisions. Taking into ac-
count the widely recognized importance of expectations leads to the crucial question of 
how central bankers themselves think about agents’ expectations. For, in order to in-
fluence the expectations of somebody, one must have some idea as to how that some-
body forms expectations in the first place. Since the late 1990s, this has become in-
creasingly important, as central bankers’ economic models started to include forward-
looking expectations (see McCallum 2008: 4). In this respect, how central bankers 
model the expectations of economic agents becomes in itself an essential part of mone-
tary policymaking. 
4.1.4 Rational expectations and money illusion 
How do economic agents – such as banks, non-financial firms, or households – arrive 
at expectations about the future? There is no simple answer to this rather basic ques-
tion, as a recent episode around the Nobel Prize in Economics illustrates: The 2013 
prize was shared by economists from seemingly opposing camps, which stirred much 
debate. While Eugene Fama’s contributions to the field are rooted in the assumption of 
rational expectations and efficient markets, much of Robert Shiller’s work in behav-
ioral finance focuses on irrational behavior. Shiller had as early as 1984 called the idea 
that efficient markets always get prices right “one of the most remarkable errors in the 
history of economic thought” – and consequently mused that his fellow Nobel laureate 
had “a fundamentally different view of the world”. The 2013 Nobel Prize was thus 
followed by intense discussions of an ancient question: when, and under which cir-
cumstances, do people behave rationally or irrationally? The answer to this basic ques-
tion is obviously of fundamental importance to macroeconomic modelling – and this 
goes for central banks in particular which aim at influencing the economy by steering 
the expectations of economic agents. 
Our expectations of the future are often crucially shaped by past experience. When 
facing the uncertainties of future developments, Keynes (1937: 13) contends that we 
tend “to assume, contrary to all likelihood, that the future will resemble the past”. Oth-
er sources of information that could be modelled as shaping expectations include ex-
pert opinion and human conventional beliefs (see Dow 2013: 117). These, however, 
are much harder to model than simply extrapolating past developments. Therefore it 
may not come as a surprise that economists inside and outside of central banks have 
until the mid-1970s usually resorted to the concept of adaptive expectations 
(McCallum 2008: 3) – assuming precisely that people base their expectations of the 
future on past trends. Problems with such a conception arise, of course, when we have 
reason to believe that past trends are about to change. When policymakers publicly 
announce a change in policy, for instance, adaptive expectations do not adjust. This, of 
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course, is rather implausible since ignoring a policy change could potentially lead to 
costly mistakes. Therefore, adaptive expectations were increasingly challenged and, 
finally, superseded by a very different view.  
The ‘rational expectations revolution’ led to the almost complete reversal of the previ-
ous approach. To state it bluntly, economic agents went from super-stupid to super-
smart. While adaptive expectations imply naïve actors who blindly follow past trends, 
even though “the future never resembles the past” (Keynes 1937: 13), rational expecta-
tions assumes that people optimally incorporate all available information into their 
expectations about the future – and act accordingly. Importantly, this includes not only 
past trends, but also current policy rules and how they will affect macroeconomic out-
comes in the future. This is rooted in the standard neoclassical assumption of utility 
maximizing actors: because being systematically wrong about the future can be very 
costly for economic agents, they devote considerable resources to avoid being wrong. 
Another key assumption behind this modeling technique is that the agents in the model 
share the model’s own predictions to be valid; therefore, rational expectations are 
sometimes also called model-consistent expectations.  
When John F. Muth (1961) first proposed the idea of rational expectations, he was met 
with skepticism. Were agents’ cognitive abilities not limited? And was their level of 
information not heterogeneous (see McCallum 2008: 4)? Yet rational expectations 
overcame these reservations, since the idea did not imply that individuals could not go 
wrong when forecasting the future. The proponents of rational expectations simply 
held such forecasting errors did not occur systematically; they were random. Individu-
al errors were therefore thought to be averaged out71 and it was thus thought to be 
fruitful to model expectations as rational and model-consistent. This line of thinking 
was embraced by “an overwhelming majority of economists […] as the way to repre-
sent how rational individuals think about the future” (Frydman & Phelps 2013: 2). 
The success of the rational expectations hypothesis did not protect it from criticism 
entirely. For decades, however, it effectively banned other ideas about peoples’ expec-
tations and behavior from economists’ research agendas (Fehr & Tyran 2004: 2). Con-
ceptions of people making mistakes systematically disappeared largely. This includes a 
concept of particular importance to this study: the idea of money illusion.  
In brief, money illusion describes that people often make bad economic decisions be-
cause they are not aware of inflation. This is anything but a new idea: the great classi-
cal economist Irving Fisher published a book on The Money Illusion as early as 1928. 
He expressed the view that people generally fail to realize “that the dollar, or any other 
unit of money, expands or shrinks in value” (Fisher 1928: 4) as a consequence of mon-
                                              
71 Or, as Thomas J. Sargent (2008) puts it (citing Abraham Lincoln): “You can fool some of the people all of the 
time, and all of the people some of the time, but you cannot fool all of the people all of the time.” 
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etary shocks. In short, the vast majority of people err systematically because they tend 
to perceive monetary values in nominal and not in real terms. Inflation and deflation 
do confuse the wider public, which does not reason through its effects (Akerlof & 
Shiller 2010: 6). With its focus on sources of systematic mistakes in human decision-
making, of course, this line of thinking ran counter to the dominant rational expecta-
tions approach. For instance, James Tobin (1972: 3) wrote that “an economic theorist 
can, of course, commit no greater crime than to assume money illusion.” 
Whether people are prone to money illusion or not is, ultimately, an empirical ques-
tion. It does not come as a surprise, then, that money illusion resurfaced as a conse-
quence of yet another revolution: the rise of behavioral economics. Inspired by earlier 
research by cognitive psychologists (see e.g. Tversky & Kahnemann 1981), behavioral 
economists started to investigate how individuals actually make decisions in experi-
mental settings. In this line of research, some efforts have been directed to establish an 
empirically founded understanding of some crucial questions: when, and under which 
conditions, do people fall victim to money illusion (Fehr & Tyran 2004; Maugeri 
2010)? Do inflationary and deflationary shocks distort decision-making in a similar 
way, or do their effects differ (Fehr & Tyran 2001; Noussair et al. 2012)? Do inflation 
expectations reflect learning, in the sense that expectations of age groups differ ac-
cording to their divergent experiences, e.g. experiencing hyperinflation (Malmendier 
& Nagel 2016)? 
In their influential book on Animal Spirits, George A. Akerlof and Robert J. Shiller 
(2010: 47) contend that “the economy is full of telltales of money illusion”. In their 
view, this is largely a consequence of the third function of money discussed above: its 
use as a unit of account. This means that people think in terms of money. For instance, 
contracts and legal provisions are denominated in money terms. Accounting is another 
important example. If people did indeed see “through the veil of inflation”, they rea-
son, they could easily adjust the nominal quantities for inflation. For instance, wage 
contracts and mortgages could be formed in such a way that they automatically adjust 
for changes in the costs of living. This, however, is rarely the case. Through indexation 
of wage contracts, unions could easily throw aside the veil of inflation. Yet they don’t. 
To the contrary, economists observe a great deal of resistance to cuts in nominal wages 
– more evidence of money illusion in wage setting (ibid: 48). Generally speaking, the 
stickiness of prices and wages seems to confirm that “it is considerably easier and 
more natural to think in nominal rather than in real terms” (Shafir et al. 1997: 367). 
It is tempting to think of rational expectations and money illusion as contradictory 
worldviews. If we, rather, regard them as modelling devices which should represent 
the best possible approximations to empirical reality, there may be some potential for 
synthesis across different schools of thought. As early as 1976, Robert Lucas suggest-
ed that the usefulness of the rational expectations hypothesis depends on the character 
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of a situation, drawing on Knight’s classic distinction between risk and uncertainty: 
“In situations of risk, the hypothesis of rational behavior on the part of agents will 
have usable content, so that behavior may be explainable in terms of economic theory. 
In such situations, expectations are rational in Muth’s sense. In cases of uncertainty, 
economic reasoning will be of no value” (Lucas 1977: 15). In situation of Knightian 
uncertainty such as an economic crisis of the magnitude of the ‘Great Recession’, then, 
behavioral economics may provide more useful insights than the rational expectations 
hypothesis regarding the expectable patterns of human behavior.  
However, behavioral economics has not yet arrived – and is unlikely to ever arrive – at 
an empirically-grounded conception of inflation expectations that is easily transferred 
into standard macroeconomic models. The empirical heterogeneity of expectation for-
mation which they report is hard to reconcile with existing models; they require a sim-
pler framework. In the words of Robert Skidelski (2017), such efforts to incorporate 
radical uncertainty into central bank models “suffer from the impossible dream of tam-
ing ambiguity with math” (Skidelski 2017). Therefore, central bank economists are 
largely left with a choice between adaptive and rational expectations (Wren-Lewis 
2013), which may well explain why the latter remains so influential to this date.  
Still, central bankers’ models of the economy can and do include deviations from per-
fectly rational expectations and behavior. New-Keynesian DSGE (Dynamic Stochastic 
General Equilibrium) models, for instance, combine rational expectations with nomi-
nal price rigidities, mirroring human distaste for nominal wage cuts. This is conse-
quential because “taking money illusion into account gives us a different macroeco-
nomics – one that arrives at considerably different policy conclusions” (Akerlof & 
Shiller 2010: 50). In New-Keynesian DSGE models “temporary nominal price rigidi-
ties provide the key friction that gives rise to non-neutral effects of monetary policy” 
(Clarida et al. 1999: 1662). In other words: such a model of the economy assumes that 
monetary policy can have positive effects on the economy beyond providing price sta-
bility. This leads us to the issue of how a particular way to perceive and model the 
economy leads to corresponding views of what a central bank can, and indeed should, 
do.  
4.2 What monetary policy can and cannot do: 
views on central banks’ objectives 
There are three conventional goals for central bankers: achieving stable prices, stable 
output (usually stated in terms of growth and employment), and a stable financial sys-
tem. While everybody agrees that all of these objectives are desirable, there is much 
less agreement as to whether and how central bankers can actually influence these 
goals. Even more controversial are the relationships among the three objectives. Can 
central bankers realistically aim at achieving all of them at once? Are there trade-offs 
between them, and, if so, which goals should be given priority? These fundamental 
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questions have found different answers at different times. There have been significant 
changes in views “both in terms of what monetary policy might be expected to deliver 
and in terms of the precise tools to be deployed to meet those ends. These views have 
inevitably been formed as part of wider debates about how the economy works” (Da-
vies & Green 2010: 26). The section below thus describes how debates about what the 
‘right’ goals of monetary policy are have evolved over time.  
4.2.1 Controlling inflation 
Today, we are (still) living in the age of the inflation-targeting central bank. Inflation, 
usually defined as a sustained increase in the general price level of goods and services, 
has become something like the central banker’s natural enemy. This has not always 
been the case. But since the 1990s, as the Fed’s Paul Volcker (1994: 31) stated “it is 
again respectable to say that the first – and some people would say the only – job of 
the central bank is to maintain price stability”. Over the past two decades, we have 
become so accustomed to regarding it the central bankers’ principal job to safeguard 
stable prices, that this statement rings almost superfluous or self- evident. However, as 
Buiter (2006: 2) points out, “conventional welfare economics considerations point in 
many different directions, but they do not point towards price stability as the natural 
objective of monetary policy”. Still, inflation targeting has become “the de facto 
standard framework for monetary policy” (Reichlin & Baldwin 2013: 10). But what 
does it mean to target inflation? How is inflation measured? Inflation of what? And 
what causes changes in these measures of inflation? 
Defining and measuring inflation 
Inflation-targeting central banks publicly commit to a quantitative objective for medi-
um-term inflation. This requires, of course, a measure of the general price level. The 
targeted inflation rate is usually the annualized percentage change in a general price 
index over time. And most central banks resort to the so-called consumer price index 
(CPI). For instance, the first central bank to announce a quantitative inflation target, 
the Reserve Bank of New Zealand, resorted to a CPI inflation target in 1989. The in-
dex measures price changes in a market basket of consumer goods and services pur-
chased. Given how prominent this index (or its alternatives) figures in central bank’s 
policy strategies, it is everything but trivial which aspects are included to include in 
such a basket and how they are weighted. These price indices usually focus on those 
goods and services that matter most for households’ everyday consumption. More im-
portant than what they include is arguably what the indices leave aside. Most notably, 
they do not include asset prices. This is contrary to an early proposal in Irving Fisher’s 
seminal book on The Purchasing Power of Money (Fisher 1911). He believed that pol-
icymakers should try to stabilize a broadly defined index that included the prices of 
shares, bonds, and property as well. To omit price developments in these areas, critics 
argue, leads to biased measures which can “result in significant errors in monetary re-
search, theory, and policy” (Alchian & Klein 1973: 174). Because the CPI is con-
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structed on the basis of current consumption services only, it considers the prices of 
only part of the utility function and is therefore an inadequate measure (ibid: 178). 
Another key question is whether or not to include food and energy prices. Contempo-
rary central bankers have answered this question differently. While some, including 
the ECB and the Bank of England, focus on measures of headline inflation, which do 
include these more volatile components, the Fed has opted for a measure of core infla-
tion excluding food and energy. This, again, may sound like a minor technical aspect. 
But it has far-reaching consequences. Central bankers who focus on core inflation un-
doubtedly disregard items on which households spend a rather large share of their in-
come. Why? The reason is that food and energy components have historically been 
highly variable, but have tended to correct themselves over time (Bullard 2011). 
Therefore, measures of headline inflation can send misleading signals – at least over 
the short run. The idea behind focusing on core inflation then is not to disregard a sub-
stantial part of the prices people are paying. Rather, its proponents see core inflation as 
a better measure of underlying inflation trends and, thus, a solid predictor of future 
headline inflation. Still, for central bank practice, the choice of a measure can be very 
consequential, for instance when it comes to the question of how policy should react to 
an oil shock (Davies 2014b). Also, changes in energy prices may have an effect on 
core inflation through so-called second round effects: if companies raise prices and/or 
workers demand higher wages in response to temporarily higher energy prices, the 
long-term trend in both core and headline inflation will tick upwards – even if the in-
crease in oil prices that triggered this development is eventually reversed.  
However inflation is measured, inflation-targeting implies a quantified target. Here, 
almost all central banks seemed to agree on a number: 2%. Why has 2% become the 
almost universally accepted standard, rather than 1% or 3%? As Krugman (2014) 
points out, the number is not the result of a scientific process, but rather a political 
compromise. On the one hand, 2% seemed low enough for those worried about the 
costs of inflation. At the same time, it seemed high enough for those worried about 
interest rates hitting the zero lower bound (ZLB). The worry was that nominal interest 
rates close to zero may limit the central bank’s capacity to stimulate the economy. In 
such a situation, monetary policy becomes ineffective and the economy falls into a 
liquidity trap. This concern as well as the well-known aversion of workers to accept 
nominal wage cuts (downward wage rigidities), made an inflation target of 0% - abso-
lute price stability – seem unwise. Recent experience, however, shows that an inflation 
target of 2% is also an insufficient insurance against zero-lower-bound episodes. As 
Whelan (2013: 108) argues, “we know now that the liquidity trap is not a theoretical 
curiosity. Economies that operate at a 2% average rate of inflation are one recession 
away from the difficulties associated with falling into that trap.” Therefore, he and 
Krugman are joined by several other respected macroeconomists in their call for high-
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er inflation targets (see Blanchard et al. 2010; Ball 2013). Despite such demands, how-
ever, central bankers seem a long way from reconsidering the conventional 2% target. 
Causes of inflation: real or nominal factors? 
I now turn to the crucial bone of contention: what causes inflation? If we want to con-
trol inflation, we need to have an understanding of the dynamics that lead prices to rise 
or fall. These dynamics are complex, to say the very least. As a consequence, the con-
sensus view has changed considerably over time, with far-reaching consequences for 
the conduct of monetary policy. In the 1950s and 1960s, the Keynesian view was dom-
inant among economists. According to this paradigm, inflation was caused by either 
‘demand pull’ or ‘cost push’ dynamics. Demand pull inflation occurred when higher 
aggregate demand pulled up inflation: by pressing upon productive capacity demand 
was thought to bid up prices and wages. The idea of ‘cost push inflation’, then, ap-
proached the phenomenon from the other side of the equation: rising costs of produc-
tion pushed prices up. There could be numerous factors initiating such a process, from 
powerful trade unions enforcing higher wages to rising costs for imports of intermedi-
ate products, such as oil from the OPEC countries (Singleton 2010: 186-187). A prom-
inent version of the ‘cost push’ idea is the ‘wage-price spiral theory’ of inflation, fo-
cusing on wages bidding up prices. Because higher wages eventually led to higher 
prices, workers in an economy close to full employment could again demand higher 
wages to meet expected price hikes, thus initiating a self-sustained spiral of ever-rising 
prices which could in principle go on forever. It is important to note that both ‘demand 
pull’ and ‘cost push’ views of inflation assign little or no role to the government or the 
central bank. Inflation was driven by economic agents’ decisions. It was, crucially, 
driven by real economic variables. The government could attempt to stop the upwards 
spiral, for instance by regulating wage-setting, but the central bank had little or no role 
to play. 
This view was nothing less than turned on its head by Monetarist ideas. Not only did 
they imply a completely different theory of how the economy works. They also as-
signed the responsibility for inflation to one institution only: the central bank. If infla-
tion occurred, central bankers were simply not doing their job. This core idea of Mone-
tarist inflation theory is best summarized by Milton Friedman’s famous quote that “in-
flation is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon” (Friedman 1970: 11). This 
implied that inflation could only occur if the quantity of money increased faster than 
output. Inflation, then, was ultimately driven not by real economic variables – or hu-
man behavior – but by one nominal variable: the money supply. The core idea is sim-
ple and plausible. If the amount of money increases and the amount of goods and ser-
vices remains the same, producers can successfully enforce higher prices. This, of 
course, was not thought to happen immediately. Friedman did account for long and 
variable time lags in monetary policy, stating that “we cannot predict at all accurately 
just what effect a particular monetary action will have on the price level and, equally 
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important, just when it will have that effect” (Friedman 1968: 15). Over the long haul, 
however, money growth in excess of production growth would inevitably lead to infla-
tion. 
While monetarism clearly spurred a “counter-revolution in monetary theory” (Fried-
man 1970), in practice it did not work as well. Due to its simplicity and the apparent 
problems of Keynesian policies to address the stagflation of the late 1960s and early 
1970s, it was hugely successful in changing how economists thought about the econ-
omy and how central bankers tried to tame inflation. As the Economist (2006) puts it, 
for some time “a central banker who did not believe in monetarism would have been 
viewed as equivalent to a priest who admits to being an atheist”. As controlling the 
money supply was thought to be the route to low inflation, central banks around the 
world adopted targets for monetary aggregates. As Kirshner (1999: 611) concluded 
some thirty years later: “The practice of monetarism depends on two things: the ability 
to control the money supply, and a stable relationship between money and other mac-
roeconomic variables. The last twenty years have convinced macroeconomists that 
neither is true”. Central bankers often found it hard to control the money supply be-
cause of the rather loose connection between base money and broad money (see chap-
ter 4.1.3). Also, the relationship between inflation and money growth often did not 
conform to Friedman’s dictum. Regressions of inflation on monetary growth find that 
“the influence of money is either insignificant or unstable” (King 2003: 70).  
As a consequence, central bank after central bank abandoned its monetary targets. Or, 
as Gerald Bouey, then governor of the Bank of Canada, famously stated: “we didn’t 
abandon the monetary aggregates, they abandoned us” (The Economist 2006). In 
search of a workable alternative, most central banks then followed the example of the 
Reserve Bank of New Zealand and started targeting inflation directly. There are, how-
ever, important exceptions to this rule. Among the few central banks that chose to keep 
an eye on monetary aggregates were the Swiss National Bank (SNB) the German 
Bundesbank, and, as a consequence, also the ECB. And, as detailed in chapters 2 and 
3, the ECB still assigns the analysis of monetary developments a special role under its 
famous two-pillar strategy. These, however, are exceptions. The failure of monetarism 
to ultimately win the war on inflation led many central banks to drop their formal tar-
gets for monetary growth. While this meant that, somewhat oddly, money lost some of 
its prominence in practical monetary policymaking, central bankers did not go so far as 
to conclude that money did not matter for inflation at all. Monetary analysis continues 
to influence decision-making in all leading central banks (Stark 2006: 17). Seen this 
way, monetarism is not dead. Proponents argue that there never was reason “to expect 
a simple relationship between inflation and output and money growth in reduced form 
estimates” (King 2003: 71). Understanding the true role of money, Mervyn King fur-
ther states, requires a theoretical model that allows for the central role of expectations 
(ibid.). 
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Today, many agree that the best predictor of future inflation is expected inflation. We 
thus return to Woodford’s dictum that very little else than expectations matters in 
monetary policy. Inflationary or deflationary developments can, of course, initially be 
triggered by an exogenous shock such as a rapid rise or fall in oil prices. However, 
whether this development is sustained or chocked of crucially depends on how eco-
nomic actors respond to it (Blyth 2007: 87). This is what central bankers call second-
round effects, e.g. when companies raise prices or workers successfully demand higher 
wages to compensate for higher food or energy costs. Thus, a main concern for central 
bankers is to ‘anchor inflationary expectations’ – and the formal adoption of an infla-
tion target in quantitative terms serves this purpose. The relevance of having inflation 
expectations anchored is mirrored in central bankers’ obsession with ‘credibility’. 
Credibility implies achieving a reputation for being reliably committed to price stabil-
ity, and inflation-targeters presume that such reputation is built more easily when a 
low inflation target in numerical terms is announced and followed (Cukierman 2007: 
2). And in some way, it is theorized, a central bank can gain flexibility by establishing 
credibility. This is because market actors, who deem a central bank’s inflation com-
mitment credible, are unlikely to change their expectations of future inflation if current 
inflation fluctuates a bit. Therefore, a credible central bank attains “wiggle room to do 
some stabilization while still being faith to the inflation target” (Reichlin & Baldwin 
2013: 13).  
In the two decades preceding the crisis, central banks appeared to have won the war on 
inflation. Average inflation rates were substantially lowered in the 1990s and 2000s – 
the ‘Great Moderation’ – and central bankers received a lot of praise. Some analysts, 
however, have cast doubt on whether they deserve all this praise or whether they en-
joyed tailwinds which made the fight against inflation a lot easier. At the center of this 
question about non-policy factors causing disinflation is the debate about globaliza-
tion. Arguably, the Great Moderation coincides with increased global competition in 
the markets for goods, services, and labor. And this increased competition, which is 
beyond the command of any central banker, is likely to have contributed to lower 
wages and prices (see Borio & Filardo 2007; Gamber & Hung 2001). Through the rise 
of emerging economies like China and India, for instance, new workers with low sala-
ries enter the global economy, driving down both import prices and – to a lesser extent 
– domestic wages. Others argue that the more important effect of global competition is 
not a direct one. This line of reasoning focuses on the political economy of globaliza-
tion. Since competition does not only reduce overall price levels, but also has the ten-
dency to make prices and wages more flexible, Rogoff (2004) argues, it moderates the 
effects of monetary policy on output. Because of this, there is less reason for central 
banks to inflate. Through this indirect effect, then, globalization has enhanced the anti-
inflation credibility of central banks and thereby contributed to lower prices. While the 
precise impact of globalization on inflation dynamics is disputed (see Lopez-
Villavicencio & Saglio 2014), this debate serves as a useful reminder that there are 
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numerous factors outside the control of central banks which may exert an influence on 
the prices we pay.  
Deflation 
The main threat that central bankers face in 2015, however, is deflation rather than 
inflation. While the dangers of deflation had almost been forgotten before the Great 
Recession, they now dominate the conversation again. Central bankers disagree, how-
ever, whether deflation is only a remote threat or already a reality. Apparently, the def-
inition and measurement of what constitutes a deflation is even less straightforward 
than that of inflation. So how do we recognize a deflation when we see one? In princi-
ple, this should be easy: when prices are falling. An environment with price growth 
below zero should therefore be one of deflation. Central bankers and analysts have, 
however, come up with new labels and descriptions for different degrees of disinfla-
tion, including ‘lowflation’ (IMF) or deflation as “a pernicious negative spiral” 
(Draghi 2014). Such labels are politically relevant, as they imply different degrees of 
urgency and may therefore provide different signals regarding the need to act.  
The ECB president, for instance, has defined deflation for the Euro Area as “a self-
fulfilling fall in prices across a very large category of goods and across a very signifi-
cant number of countries” (Draghi 2013b). Apart from the question of what constitutes 
a significant number of countries, the emphasis on the self-fulfilling nature of price 
declines is striking. It shifts attention away from actual measures of consumer price 
changes and underlines the relevance of inflation expectations. Adopting this defini-
tion may allow a central bank to neglect negative price growth – deflation – as long as 
such a development is caused by exogenous factors such as a decline in energy prices. 
Only if declining inflation expectations signal second-round effects, or the beginning 
of a ‘pernicious negative spiral’, the central bank is really called to arms. The opposing 
position is that this may be too late. In light of monetary policy’s long time lags, there 
is a need to act forcefully before a self-sustained downward spiral materializes 
(Moghadam et al. 2014). Otherwise, a central bank may find it very difficult to later 
reverse the trend. In this light, it is also highly relevant what measure of inflation ex-
pectation you choose. While central banks tend to focus on long-term inflation expec-
tations, Moghadam et al. (2014) insists that also nearer-term expectations can feed into 
spending and wage decisions. And such deflationary tendencies can already be trig-
gered by an environment of ‘lowflation’, that is: of inflation above zero but well below 
the standard target of 2%. 
Cui bono? 
Concluding this section, I wish to underline how different situations of inflation and 
deflation are. They imply very different background conditions for monetary policy-
making. Possibly even more important, they benefit different groups of people – and 
therefore create very different politics. A deflationary environment resembles a multi-
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person prisoner’s dilemma, since individually rational behavior leads to a situation that 
is collectively disastrous (Blyth 2007: 80). For instance, when a worker tries to protect 
himself from unemployment by accepting lower wages, this decision keeps the down-
ward spiral going and, thus, serves to worsen the overall situation. In short, everybody 
loses in deflations. And it takes a third party to step in and stop the self-fulfilling 
prophecy of ever lower prices and wages by allowing for coordination. Inflation, on 
the other hand, knows losers as well as winners. It depends on the assets you hold in 
which you will find yourself. Therefore, inflation is “at the same time less ambiguous 
and more political than deflation” (ibid: 82). It benefits borrowers over creditors, be-
cause it reduces the real value of debt.  
The popular dictum that inflation is bad for everyone, then, is more political strategy 
than empirical reality. It probably derives its appeal from the horrors of hyperinflation 
in people’s minds. If inflation figures become highly variable and go well into the two 
digits, this has real economic costs. Such a development clearly reduced the informa-
tional role of prices and creates uncertainties that distort economic activity (Kirshner 
1998: 73). For instance, lending becomes very risky and less profitable. Therefore, 
credit rationing occurs, limiting investment and economic activity (Boyd & Champ 
2006). Below such very high levels of inflation, however, welfare costs of inflation are 
hard to find. An empirical study did not even find a negative impact of inflation on 
growth for inflation rates below 20% (see Barro 1996). In this light, Kirshner (1999: 
613) states that inflation-targeting has been successful on its own terms only. The au-
tonomous, inflation-targeting central bank has successfully reduced inflation. There is 
no evidence, however, that this strategy has also helped real economic performance in 
terms of superior growth rates or employment figures. At the same time, the financial 
crisis of 2007/08 has clearly demonstrated that price stability does not guarantee finan-
cial stability. In this situation, central bankers note with great disquiet that “the con-
sensus on the merits of price stability is fraying at the edges” (Borio 2014: 18). If low 
inflation rates are less and less seen as an end in itself, central bankers may increasing-
ly face pressures to stabilize economic output and the financial system. Therefore, the 
following two subsections illustrate how the conversations about these two potential 
objectives of central bankers have evolved. 
4.2.2 Supporting growth and employment 
Whether – or how – monetary policy can contribute to economic growth is arguably 
the most politicized issue of central banking. Even more controversial than debates 
about the nature and causes of inflation, the relationship between inflation and output 
constituted the core of disputes between Keynesians and Monetarists in the 1960s and 
70s. Or, as James Tobin put it in his presidential address to the American Economic 
Association in 1972: “Unemployment and inflation still preoccupy and perplex econ-
omists, statesmen, journalists, housewives, and everyone else. The connection between 
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them is the principal domestic burden of presidents and prime ministers, and the major 
area of controversy and ignorance in macroeconomics” (Tobin 1972: 1).  
 
Fig. 4.2: Wage inflation and unemployment in the United Kingdom, 1861-1913  
(Phillips 1958: 285) 
At the heart of these debates is the so-called Phillips curve. Examining the relationship 
between wage inflation and unemployment in the United Kingdom from 1861 to 1957, 
A. W. Phillips (1958) found a stable inverse relationship: when wage inflation was 
high, unemployment was low and vice versa (see figure 4.2 above). Phillips put forth a 
simple and plausible explanation of demand and supply in labor markets: with a lower 
unemployment rate the labor market got increasingly tight and companies hat to raise 
wages in order to attract scarce labor. And if companies’ costs rise, so will eventually 
the prices of their products. At higher levels of unemployment, companies were not 
facing such pressures – and therefore wage and price growth slowed down (Phillips 
1958: 283). In light of such a downward-sloping Phillips curve, there clearly seemed 
to be a trade-off. Politicians could simply choose their preferred combination of infla-
tion and unemployment. If a little more employment came at the cost of a little more 
inflation, there was a (fundamentally political) choice to be made. 
Economic thinking about the Phillips curve changed drastically in the 1970s. Initially 
it greatly inspired academic work, and – given the close fit between estimated curves 
and the data in numerous countries – central banks decision-making as well. At the 
height of its popularity, however, the Phillips curve came under attack. Two influential 
theoretical contributions by Phelps (1967) and Friedman (1968) aimed at undermining 
the plausibility of a stable Phillips curve trade-off. The main argument was that such 
trade-off was only temporary. In Friedman’s own words: “there is always a temporary 
trade-off between inflation and unemployment; there is no permanent trade-off” 
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(Friedman 1968: 11). Key to this line of reasoning is, again, the role of expectations: 
monetary growth may initiate an economic stimulus and, thus, lower unemployment in 
the short-run; over the longer term, however, people adapt their expectations, thus off-
setting the initial stimulus. This is because after some time with higher inflation and 
lower unemployment, employees recognize that prices are rising and demand higher 
nominal wages to compensate for this. When workers as well as employers take infla-
tion into account, then, employment contracts will increase wages at the rate of ex-
pected inflation. In Friedman’s account, then, there is no money illusion: rational 
workers look at real rather than nominal wages and react to changes in real wages ac-
cordingly. And there is nothing a central bank can do to offset this. Because, as Fried-
man puts it, even if “the higher rate of monetary growth continues, the rise in real 
wages will reverse the decline in unemployment, and then lead to a rise, which will 
tend to return unemployment to its former level” (ibid: 10). 
Friedman’s message is simple and clear: in the long run, monetary policy simply can-
not lower unemployment. If an expansionary monetary policy is employed to stimulate 
growth and create jobs, unemployment will inevitably return to its initial level after 
some time. In the end, we arrive at the same level of unemployment – which Friedman 
calls the ‘natural rate’ – only at higher levels of inflation. If we adopt a longer-term 
perspective, then, the Phillips curve becomes increasingly vertical. In essence it is a 
vertical line above the ‘natural rate of unemployment’. While the term ‘natural rate’ 
has attracted criticism because it seems to imply that this rate is socially optimal or 
unchangeable, this is not what Friedman means.72 The rate is man-made, or better: pol-
icy-made, and can therefore be changed, for instance by improving employment ex-
changes or the availability of information about job vacancies. In short: governments 
can reform labor and product markets when unemployment becomes an issue. But they 
cannot – and should not – resort to monetary policy.  
According to the Friedman view, central bankers can thus help economic development 
in only two ways. First, they can prevent money from being becoming a source of 
economic disturbance itself by refraining from attempts to stimulate the economy; at-
tempts which were doomed to fail anyways. And, second, by following this rule, cen-
tral bankers could guarantee a stable background for the economy. Because when price 
stability prevails, everybody can act with full confidence that the average level of pric-
es will be highly stable. As this reduces transaction costs, monetary policy can con-
tribute to keeping the economic engine well oiled (ibid: 13). In short, Friedman holds 
that price stability is the only thing monetary policy can achieve – and if it tries to do 
                                              
72 The term has still been replaced because it evokes such connotations. Economists now use the term ‘non-
accelerating rate of unemployment’ (NAIRU) when referring to the level of unemployment below which infla-
tion is believed to rise. The NAIRU should not vary when monetary and fiscal policies change, because they 
affect aggregate demand without altering the so-called real factors affecting the supply and demand for labor, 
such as demographics, technology, or union power (see Hoover 2008).  
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more, it risks failing even on that front.73 The prescription is equally clear: the central 
bank should avoid interfering with market dynamics. 
It is hard to overstate the significant of this altered understanding of the Phillips curve. 
Charles Goodhart, professor emeritus at the LSE and former member of the Bank of 
England’s Monetary Policy Committee, called it “the most crucial change that has oc-
curred in our thinking about the working of the macroeconomic system” in his lifetime 
(Goodhart 2003: 65). This change in thinking fundamentally changed central banking 
for a number of reasons. Not only did Friedman’s dictum fit the era’s political mood 
against an activist state. Also, developments of the following years seemed to prove it 
right. In the 1970s, many developed countries experienced high levels of both inflation 
and unemployment at the same time. Theories based on the original Phillips suggested 
that such a phenomenon, known as stagflation, simply could not happen. Thus, as the 
Phillips curve relationship broke down, so did Keynesian prescriptions for monetary 
policy. Also, the way the argument was framed arguably helped the revolution in cen-
tral banking as well. Arguing that something should not be done is one thing. But it 
arguably is quite another to state that something cannot be done. If accepted, such an 
argument leaves little room for alternatives. And so the Monetarist doctrine became 
almost universally accepted within one decade. For instance, Paul Volcker summa-
rized the “current prevailing wisdom” as the realization “that reliance on a trade-off 
between unemployment and inflation was a great mistake [and] that the inverse corre-
lation could not hold once inflation became anticipated” (Volcker 1994: 31). In line 
with his statement, Volcker dramatically changed the Fed’s conduct of monetary poli-
cy in the early 1980s to an inflation-is-all-that-matters approach (Blyth 2002: 167-
172). 
It is important to note that this radical policy change is rooted in an altered understand-
ing of economic behavior, and, most importantly, the role and nature of actors’ expec-
tations. In a way, the consensus went from money illusion to rational expectations (see 
section 4.1.4 above). Adopting a view of well-informed and rational actors meant that 
only a miscalculation or a complete monetary surprise could affect output (Singleton 
2010: 188). A different reading of Friedman and Phelps, then, contends that inflation 
can stimulate output and employment only to the extent that it is unexpected 
(McCallum 2008). All this means that the shape of the Phillips curve crucially depends 
on how expectations are modeled. After all, the triumph of monetarism did not cause 
the death of the Phillips curve. In its ‘expectations-augmented’ version, the Phillips 
curve was and remains a fundamental tool for macroeconomic forecasting. And since 
even new classical economists committed to rational expectations accept that wages 
                                              
73 In Friedman’s own words: “I fear that […] we are in danger of assigning to monetary policy a larger role than 
it can perform, in danger of asking it to accomplish tasks that it cannot achieve, and, as a result, in danger of 
preventing it from making the contribution that it is capable of making.” (Friedman 1968: 5)  
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and prices are somewhat sticky, it is not thought to be completely vertical (Hoover 
2008).  
Interestingly, more recent data resembles Phillip’s original observations. In the United 
States from 2000 to 2013, there is a simple inverse relationship between inflation and 
unemployment (Wren-Lewis 2014a). This, again, may be explained with expectations: 
if the ‘Great Moderation’ had the effect of firmly anchoring inflation expectations, this 
would make monetary policy an effective tool for influencing output again. Since ac-
tors who are convinced that a central bank lives up to its preannounced inflation target 
do not adjust their expectations of future inflation in response to short-run deviations 
of actual inflation, such deviations are not anticipated and can have a real impact. And 
the even more recent episodes of unconventional monetary policies display a relation-
ship, which could not be any more different, as Gavyn Davies (2013) notes:  
“Increasingly, central bankers are reversing the orthodoxy of the past several 
decades. Previously, they have followed Milton Friedman in treating the long-
run Phillips Curve as vertical, which meant there would be no output gains in 
exchange for higher inflation if monetary policy were eased for prolonged pe-
riods. Now, they are edging towards a world in which the Phillips Curve is 
horizontal, so monetary easing is reflected in output increases, with no rise in 
inflation.” 
Once again, fundamental questions on the nature of inflation and its relationship to 
economic activity are debated. Much of the certainties of the recent past have become 
unsettled, and the central banking community displays a rare episode of open dissent. 
And what is more, with financial stability potentially becoming another aspect to be 
considered in monetary policymaking, the simple days of the Great Moderation are 
unlikely to come back anytime soon. 
4.2.3 Providing financial stability: to lean or not to lean? 
Central bankers only rediscovered financial stability very recently. After the financial 
crisis, however, the interconnectedness of financial stability and price stability con-
cerns quickly became one of the most contentious issues, feeding rare conflicts in cen-
tral banking circles. Considering the blame central bankers took for having helped the 
crisis by carelessly ignoring financial imbalances, their (renewed) focus on this issue is 
hardly surprising. This is especially true because criticism did not stop at failures of 
banking supervision. Also, the role of monetary policies single-mindedly focused on 
price stability came increasingly under scrutiny. While, for instance, Fed policymakers 
did notice relevant developments in financial markets prior to 2007, they were seem-
ingly unconcerned about them (Golub et al. 2014). Consequently, voices demanding 
central bankers to consider changing asset prices grew increasingly louder after the 
crisis. 
78 
 
To be sure, contributing to financial stability has long been regarded as a central 
bank’s duty. Prior to the crisis, however, financial stability was “often viewed as the 
junior partner to monetary policy” (Bernanke 2011: 5). However, this did not mean 
that financial stability was regarded unimportant. The dominant view – dubbed the 
Jackson Hole Consensus, because it was repeatedly presented at that conference (Is-
sing 2011a: 5) – simply was that maintaining price stability was the best central bank-
ers could do to contribute to financial stability. It was widely held that one could simp-
ly not hope to head off bubbles because they were too hard to identify. After all, it is 
hard to determine whether rising prices are driven by “irrational exuberance” or ra-
tional valuations of economic fundamentals. Therefore, targeting financial imbalances 
was perceived as risky, if not impossible, endeavor. Risks were associated with misdi-
agnosing bubbles, collateral damage of using ‘blunt’ monetary policy instruments to 
fight them,74 and the harm pre-emptive bursting of bubbles could cause. Because of 
this, there was a strong consensus that central bankers should focus on price stability 
and keep an eye on changing asset prices only to the extent that they affected the 
bank’s inflation forecast (Bernanke & Gertler 2001: 253). And if this was not enough 
to prevent financial imbalances from emerging, central banks were told to focus on 
cleaning up the mess after the storm had passed. This means they should respond to 
declining asset prices after a bubble had burst in order to stabilize output and inflation. 
In other words, as “leaning against the wind” ex ante was impossible or, at least, very 
costly, central banks should focus on “cleaning”, i.e. limiting the damage ex-post. 
The Jackson Hole Consensus also had important implications for the relationship of 
monetary and prudential policy. Assigning financial stability concerns to the micro-
prudential instruments and focusing monetary policy solely on the pursuit of consumer 
price stability implied a strict separation between the two realms. This neatly corre-
sponded with the praised Tinbergen dictum (Tinbergen 1952) that one policy instru-
ment (a variable that policymakers can control directly, e.g. the short-term interest 
rate) should be assigned to one policy objective only (the variable policymakers wish 
to influence but cannot command directly, e.g. price stability). This is because achiev-
ing two different objectives with the use of the same instrument inherently involves a 
risk of conflict between the two goals. 
The crisis, however, was a painful reminder that this clear separation does not hold in 
practice. It showed that monetary policy and financial stability are intrinsically linked, 
and that neglecting this by downplaying a central bank’s financial stability functions 
runs serious risks. As a consequence, prominent central bankers like the ECB’s Peter 
Praet came to regard the belief that monetary and microprudential policy can be con-
ducted separately as a “flaw in the intellectual underpinning” (Praet 2011) of pre-crisis 
central banking. And as the crisis exemplified that the economic costs of cleaning in-
                                              
74 Collateral damage can be expected in terms of losses in output and employment, as strong increases of interest 
rates are needed to mitigate upward developments of asset prices (Issing 2011a: 7). 
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stead of leaning can be very large, many felt that “just cleaning up is no longer an op-
tion” (Smets 2014: 292). 
Already before the crisis, the Bank of International Settlements (BIS) had pointed out 
that price stability sometimes might not be enough. In an important paper published in 
2006, the BIS’ Head of the Monetary and Economic Department, William White, 
demonstrated that recent economic history is full of examples of financial crises that 
were not preceded by inflationary pressures (White 2006). This, he argued, demanded 
central bankers to pay more attention to the longer-term effects of their policies. The 
crisis, then, confirmed his concerns faster and in a more drastic fashion then he had 
probably ever envisioned it himself. It demonstrated two crucial aspects: first, the 
built-up of the crisis during presumably calm days showed that preserving price stabil-
ity alone is insufficient to guarantee financial stability; and, second, strong disinfla-
tionary pressures after the crisis exemplified how financial instability can have nega-
tive feedback effects on price stability itself. 
In the light of recent events, then, it is an interesting question why financial stability 
became neglected in the first place. Parts of the answer may be found in the intellectu-
al leadership of Alan Greenspan, the Maestro, arguably the world’s most influential 
central banker of the past decades. While chairman of the Fed, he persistently argued 
for cleaning instead of leaning (e.g. see Greenspan 2002). This is why the Jackson 
Hole Consensus is sometimes also termed ‘Greenspan doctrine’ (see Mishkin 2011: 
60). His legacy in this regard was benevolently interpreted by colleagues, for instance 
when evaluating the years 2000-2002 as successful real world test of the cleaning 
strategy. As Blinder and Reis (2005) hold, the bursting of the dot-com bubble – the 
biggest bubble in history by then – was followed by only a small recession and did not 
lead to the failure of a single sizable bank. Consequently, they found fears that the 
cleaning strategy will prove insufficient “unfounded” and asked rhetorically that if the 
strategy “worked this well after the mega-bubble burst in 2000, shouldn’t we assume 
that it will also work well after other, presumably smaller, bubbles burst in the future?” 
(Blinder & Reis 2005: 68). They did assume that – and so did almost everybody else 
until 2007. When concerns about the cleaning strategy proved not to be that unfounded 
in 2007, the Financial Times pointed out two other crucial factors for disregarding fi-
nancial stability: the power of big banks and low risk awareness in good times: “Over 
the past 40 years, then, the guardians of financial stability within central banks have 
lost power to markets and to international commercial banks. Most of all they have 
lost power to the monetary policymakers within their own institutions. Monetary poli-
cy is high profile and of constant interest; financial stability hits the headlines in a 
crisis once or twice each generation. The risk that it becomes a backwater is con-
stant.”75 
                                              
75 “The Conundrum of Financial Stability”, Financial Times, 19 June 2008  
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The crisis, then, changed all that in demonstrating the high costs of the cleaning strate-
gy and the close links between monetary policy and financial stability. But it is one 
thing to point out the interrelatedness of price stability and financial stability that 
seemingly invalidates the Jackson Hole Consensus, and another thing to solve the 
problems this entails. While only few central banks actually have a clear mandate to 
pursue financial stability (Davies & Green 2010: 59), hardly anyone questions today 
that they should do their best to prevent systemic financial crises. The crucial question 
then is how far financial stability concerns should influence monetary policy decisions. 
And the answer to this question is critically influenced by how one believes that mone-
tary policy actually does impact financial stability. Few doubt that it does, but there is 
nothing close to a consensus as to what extent and how. These uncertainties have 
sparked extensive research activities in recent years, collecting “evidence that the 
standard monetary policy stance intimately interacts with important drivers of financial 
imbalances such as credit, liquidity, and risk taking” (Smets 2014: 292). However, the 
evidence is far from being comprehensive and unambiguous. Consequently, much un-
certainty remains and we witness a wide array of views about how central bankers 
should take financial stability concerns into account when setting monetary policy. 
This range of perspectives is nicely summarized by the ECB’s Frank Smets (2014), 
who distinguishes three paradigms (see figure 4.3 below): As the name suggests, the 
‘Modified Jackson Hole Consensus’ remains close to pre-crisis orthodoxy in that it 
holds that monetary and prudential policy can easily be separated. It puts a lot of faith 
in newly emerging macroprudential approaches and assigns macroprudential authori-
ties the task of guaranteeing financial stability (e.g. by means of higher capital re-
quirements). Thus, the modified consensus maintains that monetary authorities should 
keep a narrow focus on price stability, because the short-term interest rate is not a very 
effective instrument to deal with financial imbalances (Smets 2014: 269). In short: no 
leaning!  
 
Fig. 4.3: Three views on financial stability (Source: Smets 2014: 268) 
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The second view departs from the old orthodoxy in important ways and believes lean-
ing against the wind to be, at times, vindicated. Proponents of this approach share two 
beliefs regarding the interaction of monetary policy and financial stability: first, mone-
tary policy affects risk-taking behavior of market actors and, therefore, conditions for 
financial stability; and, second, financial instabilities negatively affect the transmission 
process of conventional monetary policies. This suggests modifying flexible inflation 
targeting frameworks in a way that “financial stability concerns are taken into account 
in deciding on the optimal adjustment path for inflation” (ibid: 272). However, they 
remain a secondary objective of monetary policy, which continues to focus on price 
stability.  
A third view, dubbed ‘Financial Stability Is Price Stability’ marks a much more radi-
cal departure from the old consensus. It believes financial and price stability to be so 
closely intertwined that distinguishing the two is impossible. Smets cites Alan Blinder 
as prominent voice holding that “there is no price stability without financial stability”. 
Willem Buiter (2012: 1) is even more pronounced when stating that “systemic finan-
cial stability trumps price stability or macroeconomic stability every time ‐ anywhere.” 
Both point out the importance of a well-working financial system for an effective 
transmission process. It also underlines that maintaining financial stability reduces the 
probability of systemic stress and therefore the probability that monetary policy be-
comes constrained by the zero lower bound (ZLB) in the first place. Consequently, 
proponents of the third view suggest a major overhaul of existing policy frameworks 
as they want monetary policy to pursue price stability and financial stability as coequal 
objectives. 
It is an open debate. Recent publications suggest that the first and the third view, little 
change and radical change, are rather minority positions, while most fall somewhere in 
between. This in between-position usually involves recognizing financial stability as a 
central bank’s core objective, but seeing it clearly secondary to price stability. Ben 
Bernanke, for instance, states that the restoration of financial stability policy to coe-
qual status with monetary policy will be “one of the most important legacies of the 
crisis” (Bernanke 2011: 5), but finds monetary policy “too blunt a tool to be routinely 
used to address possible financial imbalances” (ibid: 12). However central bankers 
rank objectives, they do recognize that the potentially conflicting goals of price stabil-
ity and financial stability can make their jobs much harder than they were in the past.  
It is a heated debate, too. A good example of the controversies it sparks is the unusual-
ly harsh conflict between the BIS and most of its member central banks about raising 
rates in 2014, displaying “two very distinct intellectual strands in the central banking 
community” (Davies 2014a). In response to sharp increases of asset prices following 
extended periods of expansionary policies, some leading BIS-figures made the case for 
tightening. They argued that loose monetary policy artificially inflates asset prices 
while being increasingly ineffective in boosting growth. This view was rejected by the 
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IMF, the Fed and most major central banks (Bershidsky 2014). The BIS view was 
based on a balance sheet view of the economy, emphasizing the importance of the fi-
nancial cycle. Interpreting recent events through this lens, the financial crisis was 
helped by too low interest rates triggering credit expansion and ever-rising asset pric-
es. In this view, monetary policy before the crisis has long been asymmetric: eased 
substantially during downturns while only modestly tightened during upturns (ibid.). 
The asymmetry of this strategy is also being accused of potentially creating moral haz-
ard by being passive during the build-up of a bubble and announcing its role as a sav-
ior after the bubble bursts (Issing 2011a: 5). Consequently, the BIS calls for a more 
symmetric approach, leaning more deliberately against booms and easing less aggres-
sively during busts (Borio 2014: 18).  
The major central banks perceive the run-up to the crisis quite differently. Generally, 
they hold that interest rates have not been too low over the long term and stress that 
higher rates in the 2000s would have done little to prevent the formation of bubbles in 
housing and credit markets – unless they would have been much higher with adverse 
effects on output. As the Fed’s Janet Yellen (2014: 5f) states: “a very significant tight-
ening, with large increases in unemployment, would have been necessary to halt the 
housing bubble.” 
The episode shows how different views about today’s monetary policy are – and how 
the diverse perspectives are rooted in different interpretations of the past. It also shows 
that there is, at least occasionally, a tradeoff between financial stability and price sta-
bility. Analyzing policy regimes from the classic gold standard until the post-Bretton 
Woods era, Borio (2014: 7) shows that “no policy regime in history has simultaneous-
ly achieved sustained monetary and financial stability”. And while there has been sig-
nificant progress on the front of macroprudential policy lately, it appears unlikely that 
it alone is enough to ensure financial stability. One source of doubt regarding the ef-
fectiveness of macroprudential tools is political: “prudential supervision is often sub-
ject to more political pressure than monetary policy” (Mishkin 2011: 65). The water-
ing down of the Basel III regulation for capital requirements is a recent case in point. 
Therefore, permanently overcoming the trade-off between monetary and financial sta-
bility and attaining both simultaneously “is likely to remain beyond reach” (Borio 
2014: 4). For central bankers facing the contrasting needs of the real economy and the 
financial sector in a balance sheet crisis, this presents a real dilemma (Davies 2014a). 
All this shows that the proper role for financial stability objectives in monetary policy 
frameworks remains contested, spurring heated debates between the world’s leading 
macroeconomists. As linking monetary policy to various forms of systemic risk “poses 
severe intellectual challenges” (Praet 2011), there is nothing close to a consensus as to 
how this link should be established. The issue of financial stability also underlines that 
many challenges for monetary policy loom even larger in bad times. As the discus-
sions in post-2007 economies suffering from low aggregate demand show, concerns 
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about output stability further complicate the picture, demonstrating that the issue of 
financial stability is even more controversial during busts (Borio 2014: 12). It is these 
special conditions of monetary policy during economic downturns that I now turn to. 
The following section discusses perspectives as to how the conditions of a depressed 
economy constrain the workings of conventional policies, and whether unconventional 
tools can help to overcome these limitations. 
4.3 Monetary policy in hard times: experimenting in uncharted territory 
In normal times, the short-term interest rate is not only the central banker’s single most 
important tool; it is his only tool. Monetary policy is interest rate policy. Therefore it 
has become commonplace to model monetary policy using Taylor rules. Faced with 
the severity of the ‘Great Recession’, however, central bankers’ conventional ammuni-
tion was quickly exhausted. Most central banks quickly cut interest rates until they hit 
the zero lower bound (ZLB) – the ECB being the notable exception that inspired this 
study. With interest rates at zero, then, conventional monetary policy had lost its pow-
ers. The normal credit channel is impaired by conditions of a liquidity trap. This 
“awkward condition in which monetary policy loses its grip because the nominal inter-
est rate is essentially zero” (Krugman 1998: 137) arguably describes the situation of 
most developed economies in 2010-2014 quite accurately. With the nominal interest 
rate at zero, money and bonds become almost prefect substitutes. This implies that 
there is no opportunity cost in holding cash rather than bonds – and therefore banks are 
likely to hold central bank injections of money as a cushion rather than to increase 
lending (Hausken & Ncube 2013: 6). 
What is more, central bank’s analytical tools have proven to be unsuitable for such 
conditions as well. In particular, models of the money supply have assumed the trans-
mission mechanism to work smoothly at all times. This is reflected in the survival of a 
mechanistic money-multiplier in monetary theory, which implies that if the central 
bank increases the supply of base money, the banking system will automatically up-
grade the supply of credit proportionally (Bofinger & Debes 2010: 2). This thinking is 
reflected in central bank’s models as well, which often do not model the interplay be-
tween the central bank and the banking system. The ECB’s model for forecasting and 
policy analysis, for instance, does not include a financial sector at all (see Christoffel 
et al. 2008). Recent experience shows, however, that the financial crisis has fundamen-
tally impaired the transmission mechanism. The credit channel, in particular, ceased to 
function as commercial banks tended to use cheap central bank money to repair their 
own balance sheets after the crisis, rather than making it available to the real economy. 
Thus, central bank’s very low rates failed to spur bank lending.  
Both the ZLB and the breakdown of the transmission mechanism obviously compli-
cate monetary policymaking sharply. If they are to have any effect on economic condi-
tions, central bankers are forced to innovate in such a situation. They need to come up 
84 
 
with new, often untested, tools. And while they have a wealth of data at their disposal 
to analyze how interest rate changes affect economic activity under various circum-
stances, they cannot draw on experience with unconventional monetary policy. There-
fore, they cannot possibly know whether a particular unconventional policy will work, 
how it will work, or what side-effects it may create. They are “mostly artfully impro-
vising […] as they go along” (Jones 2014: 7). In other words, central bankers are fly-
ing blind. 
Quantitative Easing: printing money? 
As pointed out in the beginning of this chapter, a central bank can in principle do two 
things: influence either the price or the quantity of money. When interest rates were 
cut to zero, the price avenue was exhausted. Then, the central bank can only try to tar-
get the quantity of money by buying assets directly – which is what the name quantita-
tive easing refers to. Quantitative easing (QE) has certainly become the most popular 
and, at the same time, the most controversial unconventional tool that central bankers 
have resorted to. Given the great emphasis on QE in the United States, many commen-
tators even claim that it has effectively replaced interest-rate policy as the Fed’s main 
instrument (Cúrdia & Woodford 2009: 1; Gambacorta et al. 2012: 2). QE can mean 
many things, however. As Blinder (2013: 248-256) points out, QE has become an um-
brella term encompassing a variety of ways to use the central bank’s balance sheet in 
order to improve credit conditions. As QE operations can either attempt to change the 
size or the composition of a central bank’s balance sheet, and central banks can pur-
chase either government bonds or private-sector securities, Blinder distinguishes four 
varieties of QE (see table 4.2 below). 
  Composition of balance sheet Size of balance sheet 
Government securities “Operation Twist“ Direct QE; Sovereign QE 
Private-sector securities Qualitative Easing Credit Easing 
Table 4.2: Four Varieties of Quantitative Easing (Source: Blinder 2013: 249) 
The core idea of QE is clear: the central bank buys assets in order to provide liquidity 
to ailing financial sectors. As a consequence, more reserves are made available to 
commercial banks – and the hope is that they will make use of them by increasing their 
lending to the real economy. As Blinder emphasizes, this can happen in several ways. 
QE is usually associated with a growing balance sheet. It can, however, also attempt to 
improve financial conditions by only altering the composition of the central bank’s 
balance sheet, e.g. by selling highly liquid assets (such as Treasury bonds) to banks 
and taking on less liquid assets in return. Much more common, and more controversial, 
is QE as ‘money printing’ – meaning operations that increase the size of the central 
bank’s balance sheet. Here, the central bank creates new bank reserves (base money) 
to buy assets from banks and thus provides them with fresh liquidity.  
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Given the lack of experience, nobody really knows how QE works. One much-quoted 
statement made by Fed-chair Bernanke exemplifies that: when asked about his confi-
dence that the policy would deliver the desired effects, he replied: “The problem with 
QE is it works in practice, but it doesn’t work in theory.” Yet while there may not be a 
well-established and recognized theory central bankers could resort to, many ideas 
about how QE might work were put forth. It was discussed that QE could potentially 
improve financial conditions in a various ways, which include portfolio rebalancing 
effects, liquidity effects, signaling effects, and the exchange rate channel. Many cen-
tral bankers pursuing QE programs placed their bets on portfolio effects (e.g. see 
Bernanke 2012). The idea is that, generally speaking, large-scale purchases of gov-
ernment bonds by the central bank drive down bond yields. As this makes sovereign 
bonds less attractive to investors, it should push them into investing in more risky as-
sets. They have an incentive to rebalance their portfolio towards other asset classes 
such as corporate bonds, thereby financing more activities in the real economy.  
 
Fig. 4.4: Potential Transmission Channels of QE (Source: Hausken & Ncube 2013: 6) 
This portfolio effect could also play out in a more indirect way, namely via the ex-
change rate. For the case of the Eurozone, consider that investors who are pushed out 
of the market for sovereign bonds because of the ECB’s purchases have two options: 
they can either invest in private sector activities within the Eurozone or invest else-
where, outside of the Eurozone, instead. If they opt for the latter, the outflow of capital 
pushes down the exchange rate, thereby stimulating exporting industries at home. Be-
cause QE has had a sizable impact on exchange rates, it is reminiscent of old debates 
surrounding ‘currency wars’. Indeed, QE has attracted harsh criticism as a means of 
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protectionist devaluation from economists and politicians like the Brazilian Finance 
Minister Guido Mantega (see Moschella 2015: 134). Faced with such accusations, cen-
tral bankers pay lip-service to G20 commitments to avoid currency manipulations by 
stressing that they do not target the exchange rate. After all, competitive devaluation is 
ultimately a zero-sum-game.  
Even if they do not intentionally manipulate the exchange rate, QE programs have had 
such a sizable impact on currencies’ external values that many believe that this may 
actually be the most effective channel for QE to work. Even though beggar-thy-
neighbor policies are officially frowned upon, central bankers with a mandate solely 
focused on domestic conditions may have no other choice. As Odendahl (2014) points 
out, “most other transmission channels of monetary easing do not seem to be working 
as expected or hoped” and therefore “the currency remains an important way to stimu-
late the economy”. In a similar vein, Mario Draghi has stressed that “the exchange rate 
is not an ECB policy target, even if the exchange rate is important for price stability 
and growth” – stating further that a weak exchange rate of the Euro was “a natural out-
come of diverging monetary policy paths in the US and the euro area” (Draghi 2015a).  
Finally, QE can be regarded as a signaling device. Several studies have found that 
bond purchase programs in the US and the UK had their greatest effect at their an-
nouncement, while the actual implementation of these programs had much smaller 
effects on bond yields (see Joyce & Tong 2012; D’Amico & King 2013). This leads us 
back to the crucial importance of inflation expectations. If QE’s ‘real’ effects are ra-
ther small, it may only work if it is understood by markets as a credible signal of the 
central bank’s future intentions. Following Eggertsson & Woodford (2003: 200), this 
requires the central bank to credibly commit to keeping interest rates low even after 
the recovery. Krugman (1998: 139) has called this ‘credibly promising to be irrespon-
sible’, meaning to seek a higher future price level. It has been argued that QE serves 
such a purpose. It credibly signals a commitment to keep interest rates low in the fu-
ture, because if the central bank hiked rates later it would suffer sizable losses on the 
assets it purchased (Hausken & Ncube 2013: 6).  
Forward Guidance: is talk cheap? 
There is certainly more than one way to make credible commitments regarding the 
future path of monetary policy. The most obvious alternative to using QE as a signal-
ing device is communication. It is also much simpler. The central bank can try to in-
fluence market expectations regarding the future path of short-term interest rates by 
promising to hold them at a particular level for a, more or less explicitly, pre-defined 
period. To do so, the central bank only includes some words in its announcements and 
the market does all the work – provided the verbal commitments are believed. If they 
are believed, expected lower interest rates for the future should encourage private 
agents to substitute for current consumption, thereby providing an economic stimulus 
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in the present (see Bihari 2017). Given the low costs associated with this, it doesn’t 
come as a surprise that most central banks resorted to some form of forward guidance 
to influence inflation expectations in the crisis. As a consequence, their communica-
tion practices have come under (even) closer scrutiny.  
The Federal Reserve, for instance, has changed its language on the likely course of 
future interest rates several times over the period 2009 to 2013, while actual rates re-
mained unchanged at the ZLB. First, it stated that economic condition would likely 
warrant “exceptionally low levels of the federal funds rate for some time” – until 
‘some time’ was replaced with ‘an extended period’. In August 2011, it changed this 
again by specifying a particular calendar date with ‘at least through mid-2013’, which 
eventually became ‘late 2014’ and then ‘mid-2015’ (calendar-based guidance). Final-
ly, the link to specified dates was replaced by framing forward guidance in terms of 
economic conditions (data-based or outcome-based guidance), tying future rate hikes 
on reaching specified figures for unemployment (above 6.5%) and the inflation fore-
cast (at or below 2.5%, see Plosser 2013: 4). Although the impact of such announce-
ments is difficult to assess (because they usually do not happen in isolation of other 
policy changes), forward guidance is well grounded in expectations theory. And even 
though empirical evidence of rational expectations is rather hard to find, Blinder 
(2013: 245) finds that forward guidance worked “pretty well” in the US.  
Both QE and forward guidance have now entered almost every major central bank’s 
toolkit. In fact, it is even being discussed whether both ‘emergency’ policies which 
were inspired by the problems associated with the ZLB may be here to stay and be-
come permanent instruments of central banks. This is remarkable, as both policies rep-
resent approaches that would have been inconceivable not too long ago. One case in 
point is the Fed’s adoption of an explicit double threshold for rate hikes, which argua-
bly marks a radical departure for US monetary policy. When the Fed made higher in-
terest rates conditional on reaching a certain threshold value for unemployment, El-
Erian (2012; 2013) characterized this move as a ‘reverse Volcker moment’ – marking 
a departure from Volcker’s ‘inflation-is-all-that-counts’ approach to one that subordi-
nates low inflation to other economic objectives.  
Still far more radical ideas than QE and forward guidance have entered the debate – 
even though they are yet to be implemented. One such idea concerns the adoption of 
higher inflation targets of, say, 4 percent, as respected economists have recommended 
central bankers to do in order to avoid getting stuck at the ZLB again (see Ball 2013; 
Krugman 2014). Another idea for reforming monetary policy frameworks is to switch 
from targeting inflation to targeting nominal GDP instead. The underlying idea, its 
proponents hold, is combining two underlying goals of all central banks – namely low 
inflation and normal growth – into one single target (Woodford 2013). Phasing in 
nominal-GDP targeting in the current crisis, Frankel (2013: 93) argued, “delivers the 
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advantage of some stimulus now, when it is needed, while respecting central bankers’ 
reluctance to abandon their cherished inflation target” altogether. I included both pro-
posals – the adoption of higher inflation targets and nominal-GDP targets – in my sur-
vey among central bank economists discussed in the following chapter (see 5.2) to 
record how central bankers themselves perceive such ideas for reform 
Possibly the most curious proposal brought to the table is the idea of ‘helicopter mon-
ey’ (see Turner 2013; Reichlin et al. 2013; for a sharp rejection of the idea, see Issing 
2015), which implies the permanent monetization of government debt. The term al-
ludes to a helicopter drop of freshly printed central bank money, as Milton Friedman 
(1969) metaphorically proposed. While nobody proposes using actual helicopters to 
distribute cash, a practical real-life version of the policy suggests that the government 
could give firms and households a tax rebate while the central bank creates the money 
needed to finance it. Given the resistance among policymakers, helicopter money – or 
‘cash for free’ – is unlikely to be added to central bankers’ toolkits anytime soon. 
However, the fact that the idea is being seriously debated among central banking cir-
cles today shows just how far the profession has come in terms of unconventional 
thinking. 
4.4 Conceptualizing monetary paradigms: orthodoxy and revisionism in flux 
The above discussion shows that both monetary theory and central banking practice 
have entered spheres that were unconceivable only a few years ago. All this suggests 
that past orthodoxy has been severely damaged by recent events and a fundamental 
rethink of central banking is unfolding. Indeed, one core argument of this thesis is that 
this rethink occurs at different speeds in different places – and that this explains central 
banks’ divergent policies during the crisis years. In other words: some central banks 
were quick to tear up their old rulebooks while others (read: the ECB) had a much 
harder time bidding previous orthodoxies farewell. Yet, how do we turn the above dis-
cussion of change and continuity in monetary thought into empirically testable impli-
cations? 
Discussions of monetary theory in both academia and practice are usually couched in 
terms of broad macroeconomic paradigms such as ‘Monetarism’, ‘Keynesianism’, 
‘Neoclassical economics’, or – for the curious case of Germany – ‘Ordoliberalism’. As 
is the case with any broad paradigm or worldview, these provide orientation by turning 
our attention to the bigger picture rather than getting lost in the details. Because of 
that, however, they do not necessarily apply perfectly to every single relevant aspect of 
monetary theory and central banking practice elaborated on above. Furthermore, they 
carry normative baggage, as these terms are often heavily politicized.  
This is why I choose two different labels for my summarizing Table 4.3 below, differ-
entiating between orthodox and revisionist monetary theory. Admittedly, this does not 
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provide the reader with a more accurate description of empirical reality. Worse even, 
these labels are time-sensitive as what is considered as orthodox may change from 
time to time. In fact, today’s revisionism might well end up as tomorrow’s orthodoxy – 
and could with some justification be described as yesterday’s orthodoxy as well, in-
voking the image of a pendulum swinging back and forth. For all these shortcomings, 
using these rather inculpable terms hopefully avoids an all-too-normatively charged 
reading of the table, which should simply provide a synopsis of the range of opinions 
on the monetary policy issues discussed in this chapter. Certainly reductionist, and 
therefore dangerously oversimplified, it is a broad didactic device rather than a sharp 
analytical tool. 
 Orthodox Revisionist 
Economic agents rational prone to animal spirits 
Expectations 
include only random errors,  
no systematic mistakes 
include systematic errors,  
i.e. money illusion 
Wage-/price-setting adaptable downward sticky 
Cause of inflation 
nominal factors:  
money grows faster than output 
real factors,  
e.g. wage-price-spirals 
Phillips curve vertical downward sloping 
Monetary  
neutrality 
yes no 
Stimulating  
output? 
impossible /  
only temporary76  
possible,  
at the price of higher inflation 
Financial  
stability 
spotting bubbles impossible; 
no leaning against the wind  
financial stability  
is price stability 
Policy at the  
zero lower bound 
money creation can  
always induce inflation 
money growth is not  
inflationary (liquidity trap) 
Biggest threat inflation deflation 
Table 4.3: Range of views on different aspects of monetary theory 
The ‘orthodox’ and ‘revisionist’ perspectives summarized in the two columns are best 
viewed as ideal-types or extreme positions. They serve as opposite ends of a continu-
um, implying that most economists would probably position themselves somewhere in 
between. After all, few believe people to be either perfectly rational or irrational all of 
the time. More realistically, whether or not they act rationally will depend on the spe-
cific character of a situation (e.g. the institutional setting) under examination. Yet, the 
                                              
76 unless the monetary shock is a complete surprise 
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table clarifies on which aspects monetary economists have disagreed in the past and 
can, in principle, disagree today.  
Furthermore, table 4.3 suggests that views on particular aspects of monetary theory are 
not completely independent of views on other aspects. While I do not wish to suggest 
that a particular view on the formation of expectations automatically implies a corre-
sponding belief about what contribution monetary policy can make to safeguard finan-
cial stability, certain logical consistencies do exist among the aspects summarized un-
der each ideal type. For instance, if we believe agents to be perfectly rational, we are 
likely to think that they make no systematic mistakes regarding their expectations of 
the future, that they will swiftly adapt prices and wages in line with prevailing infla-
tion rates and, therefore, that money is neutral.  
Finally, macroeconomic paradigms do fit into the table to some extent. Regarding sev-
eral aspects ‘Orthodoxy’ is substitutable with either ‘Neoclassical economics’ or 
‘Monetarism’, while many ‘revisionist’ positions might just as well be labelled as 
‘Keynesian’. This underlines that this table basically maps economic philosophies 
from a pre-crisis perspective: during the ‘Great Moderation’ the orthodox (or consen-
sus) view of monetary economics was mostly ‘Neoclassical’, while ‘Keynesian’ views 
had largely lost their appeal after the stagflation of the 1970s. During the 1950s and 
60s, however, ‘Keynesian’ beliefs had been the Orthodoxy of the day, underlining the 
pendulum metaphor alluded to above. 
Yet how does German monetary conservativeness figure into this dichotomy? Which 
beliefs about the economy inform German central bankers’ positions and how do they 
relate to Orthodoxy and Revisionism, or to basic Keynesian and Monetarist premises? 
Given the prominence of German views in debates of ECB policymaking, this particu-
larly important aspect for this study deserves further attention. 
What is ‘Ordoliberal’ monetary policy? 
Much of the debate on Germany’s peculiar approach to monetary policy refers to a 
specific paradigm which, according to popular narrative, is deeply rooted in the coun-
try’s history and continues to influence both German economists and policymakers 
(see Bofinger 2016; Issing 2000; Young 2014). Sometimes also dubbed the Freiburg 
school of economics, Ordoliberalism is the theory behind Germany’s model of the so-
cial market economy (Bonefeld 2012; Vanberg 2004). Interestingly, Ordoliberalism 
rests on both a strong state imposing order – Ordo – and free market thinking – Liber-
alism. The strong state of the Ordoliberals provides the legal and institutional frame-
work that they believe efficient markets to require; but the Ordoliberal state is not to 
directly interfere with economic processes. It is primarily a regulatory state. 
Walter Eucken (1891-1950) is usually referred to as the founding father of the 
Ordoliberal tradition – not least by German members of the ECB’s Governing Council 
(see Issing 2000, 2004; Stark 2008; Weber 2007; Weidmann 2014). His approach to 
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macroeconomics rests on three core principles: balanced public budgets (coupled with 
a neglect of the demand-side effects of fiscal policy), price stability (with an asymmet-
ric preference for deflation), and price flexibility as the most important solution to un-
employment problems (see Bofinger 2016; Wolf 2016). Eucken’s writings were deep-
ly influenced by his times. His early empirical analyses focus on the German experi-
ence of hyperinflation in 1922/23 and the causes of the deflation from 1929 to 1933 – 
spectacular macroeconomic failures which Eucken found to be caused by active de-
mand management. Consequently, Ordoliberals in the tradition of Eucken favor strict 
rules to limit not only market behavior, but also discretionary government action. This 
suspicion of an activist state has been interpreted as understandable reaction to the Na-
zis’ abuses of central state power (Allen 2005: 200). It is perhaps more surprising, as 
Bofinger (2016: 15) suggests, that Eucken thought he could develop general economic 
principles from the very specific historical experience of Germany – and that these 
continue to enjoy popularity among German economists until today.  
This may be the case not so much for historical reasons, but, as Blyth (2015: 138-142) 
details, because it is a great instruction sheet for Germany’s specific economic model. 
As a late industrializer, Germany’s economic profile has been heavily focused on ex-
port-oriented manufacturing. After the Second World War, its successful export-led 
growth model was greatly helped by an economic policy geared towards cost competi-
tiveness, which required “wage control through the restriction of consumption and a 
strong anti-inflationary stance” (ibid: 139). As nothings succeeds like success, Blyth 
argues, the continuing influence of Ordoliberalism in Germany is better understood as 
a consequence of its perfect fit with the country’s peculiar economic structure than its 
equally peculiar history. This is why German economists still study Walter Eucken’s 
principles while economists everywhere else are unlikely to have ever heard of him. 
But what exactly are those principles? 
To Eucken and his followers, monetary policy was the first and most important consti-
tuting principle of the ‘Ordnungspolitik’: “All efforts to make a competitive order a 
reality are pointless unless a certain level of monetary stability can be ensured; mone-
tary policy thus has primacy for the competitive order” (Eucken 1952: 256, as translat-
ed in Issing 2004). However, it is one thing to point out the overarching importance of 
price stability, and quite another to specify how to attain it. Here, Ordoliberalism of-
fers broad principles rather than clear guidance for policy. In line with its overall rule-
based legalistic approach, Ordoliberals would like to grant monetary policymakers as 
little discretion as possible. According to Eucken, policymakers are constantly exposed 
to pressure by interest groups, public opinion and wrong theories and should therefore 
be constrained by clear rules (Eucken 1952: 257). In this view, monetary policy is 
done best if the human element is eliminated and replaced by an automatic mecha-
nism. The more monetary policy is rule-based (e.g. restricted by fixed annual targets 
for monetary growth), the better it can be expected to insulate itself from political 
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pressures to prioritize growth and employment objectives (Dyson 2000: 29). Ordolib-
erals are therefore clearly on one extreme end of the spectrum in the debate of rules vs. 
discretion. 
This line of thinking clearly became deeply embedded in the German Bundesbank. 
The former Bundesbank President Hans Tietmeyer expressed this clearly in a speech 
he gave at an ECB Colloquium held in honor of Otmar Issing in 2007:  
“We at the Bundesbank described our prevailing strategy of money 
stock management as ‘subjection to rules, with the option of discretion-
ary action in exceptional circumstances’ or ‘rule-based behaviour’. We 
wanted to keep the option of flexible moves open. And this behaviour 
was sometimes named as ‘pragmatic monetarism’. Even so, for us in 
the Bundesbank it was always important to abide by the concept of fun-
damentally ‘rule-based behaviour’.” (Tietmeyer 2007: 65)77 
As Tietmeyer’s statement underlines, the Ordoliberal focus on constraining rules has 
much in common with seminal contributions to Monetarist thought by Friedman 
(1960) and Kydland & Prescott (1977). It does not come as a surprise, then, that 
Ordoliberals are considered as Monetarists. After Eucken’s initially preferred solution 
– fixing policy on Commodity-Reserve Currency – had proven to be unworkable, the 
idea of controlling inflation by restricting the annual growth of monetary aggregates 
seemed close enough to the Ordoliberal ideal of an automatic mechanism. As a conse-
quence the German Bundesbank chose monetary targeting à la Friedman (1960, 1968) 
as its framework and started announcing yearly money supply targets after the end of 
Bretton Woods in 1973 – and formally continued to do so even in the 1990s when 
most central banks had long switched to targeting inflation directly (Feld 2016: 48).  
Yet, most of the fundamental principles of modern-day central banking seem to con-
form to Ordoliberal views: independent central banks are shielded from the direct 
pressures of politicians and public opinion, their hands tied by more or less restrictive 
mandates, preannounced numerical inflation targets and prescriptive policy rules á la 
Taylor (1993). All this, alongside other rather broad macroeconomic principles en-
dorsed by Ordoliberals, appears to be compatible with a lot of standard economic 
analysis. Consequently, much confusion exists as to where Ordoliberals should be 
placed within the range of established macroeconomic theories. To give an extreme 
example, Peter Bofinger (2016: 15) finds that “Eucken’s economic philosophy can be 
regarded as the complete antithesis to Keynes” and his emphasis on demand manage-
ment by the state, while Simon Wren-Lewis does not see Ordoliberalism and Keynesi-
anism as necessarily incompatible. Since Ordoliberalism admits the existence of mar-
                                              
77 Speaking at the same occasion (and right after Tietmeyer), former Fed chair Paul A. Volcker (2007: 72) made 
the following remark on the role of rules and discretion in central banking: “Dare I say it out loud? Without art, 
without judgment and discretion, there would be no need for central bankers at all.”  
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ket imperfections and sees a role for the state in correcting them, he argues, it is not 
entirely Anti-Keynesian (Wren-Lewis 2014b). 
Ordoliberal policymakers and academics therefore do not fit squarely into a particular 
branch of monetary theory. As Ordoliberalism is more accurately characterized as 
“much more a philosophy of regulatory policy than a part of economics” (Sandbu 
2016a), the FT’s Wolfgang Münchau (2014) argued that “Ordoliberals lack their own 
coherent monetary policy framework. They used to be Monetarists. Their position to-
day is mostly inconsistent.” For the purposes of my empirical analysis offered in the 
following chapter, this begs the question: How do we know an ordoliberal central 
banker when we see one?  
I assume Ordoliberals to share basic premises of Monetarist thought such as the neu-
trality of money. On the contrary, I expect them to express skepticism towards 
Keynesian concepts such as animal spirits and sticky prices. I further expect them to 
be less concerned about or even ignorant of the existence of liquidity traps where cen-
tral banks become powerless, and therefore more concerned about money growth. Fi-
nally, I expect them to be more concerned about the dangers of inflation than of defla-
tionary risks. More generally, I assume them to put more emphasis on previous rules 
and traditions and to be less open to discretionary experimentation by policymakers or 
changes in policy frameworks. In short, I expect them to be more orthodox than other 
central bankers. Based on my survey data, the following chapter analyzes to what ex-
tent these and other theoretical assumptions hold empirically.  
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5. WHAT DO CENTRAL BANKERS THINK THEY CAN DO?  
ECONOMIC BELIEFS AND HOW THEY MATTER FOR POLICY 
“I am getting old enough to have lived through several swings of opinion  
about the role and effectiveness of monetary policy.” 
Paul A. Volcker, 1994 
Central banking has arrived at a crossroads. The previous chapter has demonstrated 
how the crisis “threw a large rock into the calm waters of central banking” (Davies & 
Green 2010: 1), shaking up many old certainties of monetary thought. Consequently, 
fundamental debates about the goals and tools of central banks, which appeared settled 
during the deceivingly calm days of the ‘Great Moderation’, have resurfaced. Just as 
monetary policy assumed a more important role than ever, central bankers appeared 
less confident about their knowledge and capacities than ever. Yet they had little time 
to spend on soul-searching. Amidst all the uncertainty, central bankers had to do some-
thing to tame a crisis they didn’t understand. In order to make sense of this challenging 
environment, I argue, central bankers had to turn to their beliefs about how the econo-
my works. And because these beliefs differed, so did central banks’ policies.  
By offering an empirical analysis of these beliefs, I now turn to the Achilles’ heel of 
ideational research. To make the case for the importance of ideas, we have to find a 
way to measure them. This is not a trivial task, as ideas are notoriously hard to track 
down. Consequently, ideational studies on monetary policy and EMU usually offer 
broad historical narratives rather than direct measures of the variables of interest (e.g. 
Kaltenthaler 2006; Marcussen 2000; McNamara 1998; Verdun 2000a). Regarding the 
case of the ECB more specifically, there have been ample discussions of economic 
philosophies in both academia (see Brunnermeier et al. 2016) and the media. For in-
stance, much has been made of the fact that both Ben Bernanke and Mario Draghi both 
pursued their PhD studies at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) under 
the supervision of Stanley Fischer (Hilsenrath & Blackstone 2012). Even more fre-
quently discussed is ‘Germany’s parallel universe’ of macroeconomics (Münchau 
2014), often assigning German-style economic thinking a decisive role for fiscal aus-
terity and monetary hawkishness in Europe. Yet while such speculations about differ-
ences in economic thinking inside the ECB tend to receive a lot of attention, they often 
remain just that: speculations.  
This study aims to go beyond that by measuring central bankers’ economic beliefs di-
rectly. I thus surveyed 422 central bank economists on their attitudes towards key as-
pects of monetary theory and their policy preferences. Based on this new dataset, I 
discuss the following questions below: 
 Do central bankers’ economic beliefs actually differ? And, if so, which? 
 How are differences in beliefs linked to individuals’ policy preferences? 
 And how are these beliefs and preferences distributed among central banks?  
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As I show below, central bankers indeed hold different views about how the economy 
works (see 5.2), and these differences in beliefs are intimately linked to their inflation 
preferences (see 5.4). Most importantly, I observe important distinctions between dif-
ferent central banks regarding both economic beliefs and inflation preferences (see 
5.5). In particular, central bank economists working in Northern and core European 
monetary institutions differ from their colleagues in Southern Europe as well as An-
glo-American central bankers. Northern European central bankers are both more skep-
tical about the contribution monetary policy can make to stabilize the economy and 
more concerned about inflationary risks associated with unconventional monetary pol-
icy. They are less optimistic about what monetary policy can do and, at the same time, 
more concerned about trying to do too much. And these beliefs matter for policy pref-
erences, too: Northern European central bankers are much more hawkish regarding 
inflation than central bankers elsewhere. 
By pointing out these differences, the survey data helps us to understand why the ECB 
responded to the Great Recession much more slowly and cautiously than its peers. It 
also sheds light on the dividing lines among Eurosystem central bankers. The data 
suggests that the ECB got stuck in the middle in a battle of economic ideas between an 
orthodox core and a more revisionist periphery. Trying to find some middle ground 
between the divergent beliefs and preferences of its member institutions, the ECB’s 
response to the Great Recession remained closer to previous orthodoxy than the Feder-
al Reserve or the Bank of England, which quickly tore up old rulebooks.  
Before turning to the analysis of the survey data (5.2-5.4) and its implications for Eu-
ropean monetary policy (5.5), however, I discuss the details of my survey-based em-
pirical strategy. The following section 5.1 introduces the approach by laying out the 
rationale for surveying central bank economists (5.1.1) and offering details on the data 
collection process, including a discussion of response rates and potential problems as-
sociated with non-response bias (5.1.2). 
5.1 Central bankers’ economic beliefs: why and how to measure them 
In the age of independent central banks, monetary policy is made by a committee of 
technocrats whose authority mainly derives from their highly specific knowledge. In 
the case of the ECB, this process of collegial and technocratic decision-making hap-
pens very much behind closed doors. No meeting transcripts are published which al-
lows for identifying individual positions in order to shield committee members from 
outside influence. In other words: even if there may be no real world example of eco-
nomic experts making policy entirely free of political interference, the ECB’s Govern-
ing Council comes fairly close. It is designed as an expert committee of equals who 
pool information, models and experience, argue about policy, and make decisions con-
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sensually without granting politicians a seat (or even a phone call).78 Despite all the 
difficulties associated with researching decisions made behind closed doors, we can 
assume the ECB Governing Council to be a setting where economic ideas play a par-
ticularly important role  
While there is no shortage of conceptions of ‘ideas’ (such as worldviews, norms, val-
ues, shared mental models, or paradigms), I conceptualize ideas as ‘shared causal be-
liefs’. Causal beliefs establish relationships between means and ends and thus provide 
an account of how the economy works. Monetary theories – understood as probabilis-
tic arguments connecting economic causes and effects – offer policymakers guidance 
when they face the uncertainties emerging from a crisis. They provide them with an 
interpretive framework, allowing for reducing uncertainty and making collective ac-
tion possible (Blyth 2002: 35-39). Thus, causal beliefs help central bankers to make 
sense of a situation and argue for particular policy responses. 
Arguably the biggest hurdle for studying policymakers’ beliefs is measuring them. 
Gerring (1997: 966-8) raises the important question of where we try to locate beliefs – 
in peoples’ minds, behavior, or language? Here our methodological arguably follow 
our epistemological choices: if we look for ideas in actors’ minds, we probably inter-
view or survey them; if we focus on behavior, we may opt for participant observation 
or experimental methods; and if we concentrate on language, we are likely to employ 
discourse analysis. Unfortunately, the literature on ideas rarely exploits this potential 
methodological variety. Béland and Cox (2010: 17) point this out in their survey arti-
cle of ideational research: “Because the field is dominated by narrative, interpretive 
methods, the greatest challenge for research on ideas is to employ more statistical and 
quantitative methods”. This relative absence of quantitative studies may be of concern 
for two reasons: first, one may perceive every single mode of inquiry as being inher-
ently flawed in a specific way – and methodological variety therefore as an end in it-
self. Second, using different methods to study the same phenomenon may yield differ-
ent results. This is why I use two very different sources of data to examine the same 
concept: a survey of central bank economists (chapter 5) in combination with public 
speeches and interviews of central bankers (chapter 6). 
While almost all ideational scholarship relies on data derived from public discourse of 
some sort, I emphasize a different empirical strategy. Rather than analyzing central 
bankers’ public interventions for traces of economic ideas and coding them according-
ly, I asked them directly with the help of a standardized questionnaire on economic 
ideas. Such a survey-based measure of ideas may differ substantially from measures 
based on central bankers’ speeches in various ways. First, it does not include the stra-
tegic element typically influencing speech acts. In central banking this does not only 
                                              
78 Mari Draghi, for example, denied having cleared his famous ‘whatever it takes’-remarks with any European 
government (Financial Times 2012), thus rebutting rumors that he consulted German chancellor Angela Merkel 
over the phone before making the remarks. 
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include that policymakers may speak differently to different audiences as Bennani and 
Neuenkirch (2017) have shown. Central bankers also need to keep more than just one 
eye on how financial markets react to what they say. Not only since the adoption of 
explicit and implicit forward guidance schemes have policymakers’ speeches pro-
voked strong market reactions; Draghi’s ‘whatever it takes’ being only the most strik-
ing example. All this make it very likely that central bankers’ speeches constitute high-
ly edited public interventions which tend to downplay uncertainties and potentially 
existing divisions in economic views.  
A second major difference is that my measure includes not only policymakers but pro-
fessional central bank economists as well. This means I do not model individuals’ eco-
nomic beliefs but a proxy for the economic beliefs of different institutions. Thanks to 
other variables recorded in my survey, respondents may also be grouped by gender, 
age, nationality, education, career patterns, or specific beliefs. As such, the measure 
does not allow for making heroic assumptions about individual decision-makers or 
single decisions. What it does provide, however, is a novel proxy measure of an insti-
tution’s economic thinking.  
5.1.1 A survey-based measure of economic beliefs 
I attempted to take on the challenge to ‘quantify ideas’ by surveying central bankers. 
More specifically, I carried out an online-survey during the second half of 2016 (active 
from June 28 to December 31) among central bank economists and policymakers, 
which included eight survey items related to contentious aspects of monetary theory. 
Focusing on all departments that usually contribute to monetary policy formation (of-
ten called Economics, Research, Financial Stability, Counsel / Advisers to the Board) 
as well as the decision-making bodies themselves, I sent the survey link via email to 
all economists I could identify as working in those units. This amounted to a list of 
2,657 individuals in total (for details on institutions and their response rates, see Table 
5.3). Next to a link to the online survey (which used the Qualtrics platform), my email 
included a short introduction to my research as well as, crucially, a Letter of Support 
by Prof. Richard Portes which encouraged potential respondents to participate (all 
documents included in Appendix A2).  
 
Fig 5.1: Survey design 
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The survey questionnaire, which I pre-tested with the help of both central bank staff 
and academics,79 was divided into three parts: questions on individual characteristics, 
their causal beliefs, and their policy preferences. The underlying idea was to produce a 
database which could provide hints about how causal beliefs emerge (a) and how they 
influence policy preferences (b). Indicators of causal beliefs could then potentially 
serve as both dependent and independent variable. On the one hand, they can be linked 
to individuals’ personal backgrounds (such as age, nationality, gender, education, ca-
reer patterns) in order to assess which factors are most likely to make central bankers 
adopt certain beliefs. Thus the data allows for testing empirically some existing as-
sumptions regarding belief formation. On the other hand, both individual characteris-
tics and belief indicators can be related to individuals’ policy preferences directly (see 
Fig 5.1).  
My central part of my survey – the belief items – is informed by my discussion of con-
troversies in monetary thought offered in chapter 4. More specifically, it translates key 
aspects of the summarizing table 4.3 into clear cause-and-effect statements and asks 
respondents for their degree of agreement with each statement (see Table 5.1 below). 
Survey respondents saw these eight items in randomized order and were asked to indi-
cate their degree of agreement with each statement on a 7-point Likert scale ranging 
from –3 to +3 where ‘–3’ meant ‘disagree completely’ and ‘+3’ meant ‘agree com-
pletely’. This, I argue, constitutes a fairly straightforward way to quantify the econom-
ic ideas actors hold in a way that allows for comparison across institutions. Allowing 
respondents to place themselves along a continuum follows from the consideration that 
ideational differences between central bankers are likely to be gradual rather than cat-
egorical.  
The agreement scores produced by this survey serve as proxies for the relevance of 
several aspects of monetary thought within central banks. I record attitudes towards a 
particular theory of inflation (1), the role of price stickiness (2), rational expectations 
(3) and money illusion (4), the effects of monetary policy on growth and employment 
(5) or the potency and risks of unconventional monetary policy (6). Two different 
statements regarding the relationship of price stability and financial stability were in-
cluded as well: whether ‘leaning against the wind’ is possible (7) and how relevant it is 
to do so for price stability purposes (8). Table 5.1 provides an overview of how these 
aspects were operationalized and what kind of responses could be expected from or-
thodox and revisionist ideal types (following Table 4.3). 
                                              
79 After drafting the questionnaire, I asked seven of my interviewees from both the European Central Bank and 
the Bundesbank whether they would be willing to participate in a (paper-based) pre-test of my survey at the end 
of our interview. Being present while they filled in the questionnaire, I was able record their feedback as to how 
to improve the survey instantly. Before finally sending out my survey link to the various central banks, I also 
pre-tested the online questionnaire with the help of eight colleagues at the European University Institute and, 
specifically, our Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa Working Group on ‘The Design and Governance of Monetary and 
Fiscal Policies and Financial Regulation in the European Union’.  
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# Statement Orthodox  Revisionist 
1 Inflation is primarily a monetary phenomenon. Agree Disagree 
2 
Downward rigidities of prices and wages are relevant 
for the purposes of monetary policy formation. 
Disagree Agree 
3 
Agents do not err systematically in their  
expectations of future developments. 
Agree Disagree 
4 
Human beings make mistakes because they perceive 
monetary values in nominal and not in real terms. 
Disagree Agree 
5 
Monetary policy effects on output or employment 
growth are only transitory. 
Agree Disagree 
6 
When interest rates are stuck at their lower bound,  
M1 growth is not inflationary. 
Disagree Agree 
7 Monetary policy cannot reliably target asset prices. Agree Disagree 
8 
There can be no price stability without financial  
stability. 
Disagree Agree 
Table 5.1: Causal belief items included in the survey 
It is worth noting that all of these statements are positive rather than normative state-
ments; instead of asking how the economy should work, they describe particular theo-
ries about how it does work. Furthermore, these axioms are phrased in rather broad and 
general terms (with the exception of statement 6). I aimed for such a high level of gen-
erality because I assume the way economists respond to these statements to be rela-
tively stable over time. This is of particular importance for a one-off survey measure, 
which is necessarily static. Unless a major event happens, which is greatly at odds with 
a particular belief and forces those holding it to update their thinking, these beliefs are 
unlikely to change. I thus refer to the variables measured in this part of the survey as 
relatively time-insensitive core economic beliefs.  
I measured policy preferences in the same way as the belief items, asking respondents 
for their degree of agreement with three ideas for reforming monetary policy frame-
works. These included raising inflation targets (1), adopting nominal-GDP targets (2), 
or a stronger emphasis on financial stability (3). All of these reform ideas were dis-
cussed in some form during the Great Recession, even though no central bank in my 
sample has changed its monetary policy strategy to formally implement them yet. I 
therefore expect responses to be free of confirmation bias; since central banks did not 
change their official line, survey respondents should not have felt any pressure to agree 
with their institution’s decision.  
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# Statement Orthodox  Revisionist 
1 
Given recent experiences with the lower bound, central 
banks should have inflation targets higher than 2%. 
Disagree Agree 
2 Central bank should have nominal-GDP targets. Disagree Agree 
3 
Financial stability concerns should be taken  
into account for monetary policy decisions. 
Agree Disagree  
Table 5.2: Policy preferences items included in the survey 
It is not straightforward to assign orthodox and revisionist central bankers expected 
values for these preference items. One may expect orthodox central bankers to reject 
any change in monetary policy frameworks because of the reputation costs associated 
with making such changes. Central bankers generally defend their credibility tooth and 
nail because credibility has become seen as ‘the elusive elixir of modern macroeco-
nomics’, as Mervyn King once remarked. This is because monetary policies, which 
rely on market reactions to produce the intended results, need to be credible in order to 
be effective.80 Changing a central bank’s policy strategy then may cause their credibil-
ity to take a hit for several reasons: first markets may interpret a change as admitting 
past mistakes. More important, however, is a second consideration: central banks seek 
to anchor long-term inflation expectations, which requires them to signal the greatest 
possible amount of stability and predictability. To give just one example, Peter Praet 
(2016) reasoned that changing the ECB’s target in hard times “would be opportunistic 
and would damage the ECB’s credibility. It is precisely in turbulent times that the ob-
jective needs to be kept.” For if you change your policy strategy or targets once, how 
are markets to believe that you are not going to change it again?  
Therefore orthodox central bankers reject both higher inflation targets and nominal-
GDP targets. Revisionist minds as defined above, however, are much more concerned 
about the risk of deflation and getting stuck at the ZLB again. At the same time, they 
are more optimistic about the contribution activist monetary policy can make to sustain 
economic growth. Thus central bankers of the revisionist type are likely to be more 
open to targeting higher inflation rates (to guard against the risk of deflation) as well 
as nominal-GDP (to focus on real economic developments). I thus regard the first two 
preference items as good proxies for central bankers’ inflation hawkishness. Still, even 
revisionist minded central bankers do not change monetary policy frameworks light-
heartedly, as they are aware of the reputational risks of doing so as well. One should 
therefore not expect two clearly divided camps of central bankers. Rather, they should 
differ on these questions in degree, which is why I measure openness to reforming pol-
icy frameworks on a 7-point scale as well.  
                                              
80 Dellepiane-Avellaneda (2016) points out how much this line of reasoning is rooted in the ‘rational expecta-
tions revolution’.  
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It is less clear what positions to expect from orthodox and revisionist central bankers 
when it comes to the issue of focusing more on financial stability concerns when mak-
ing monetary policy-decisions. Again, one may reason that doing so would constitute a 
change, which orthodox policymakers are likely to oppose. Yet, proponents of more 
‘leaning against the wind’ usually argue for more restrictive monetary policy during 
economic booms in order to prevent bubbles from building up. It is essentially a hawk-
ish position, adopted to argue for higher interest rates. Tellingly, the case for more 
leaning is most prominently made by the Bank for International Settlements in Basel – 
a stronghold of monetary conservatism. Finally, central banks would not need to for-
mally change their mandate to pay more attention to developments in financial markets 
when setting interest rates (as the ECB does, following its ‘Two Pillar Strategy’). 
Thus, I expect orthodox central bankers to be more open to ‘leaning against the wind’ 
than their revisionist colleagues. 
5.1.2 Institutions covered and their response rates 
As monetary policy in the Eurozone is my main concern here, I sent my questionnaire 
to members of all twenty member institutions of the Eurosystem. In order to make in-
teresting comparisons, however, the survey also comprised the Federal Reserve Sys-
tem (Board of Governors and all twelve regional Federal Reserve banks) as well as 
nine monetary institutions around the globe. These include four more members of the 
European System of Central Banks (the Bank of England, as well as the central banks 
of Sweden, Poland, and the Czech Republic) and central banks of three other Anglo-
Saxon countries (Australia, Canada, New Zealand). Finally, I included two particularly 
interesting institutions which do not fall into any of the categories mentioned above: 
the Swiss National Bank and the National Bank of the Kyrgyz Republic.81 
A word on response rates and non-response bias: the response rates per institution 
range from 10.1 to 30 percent, with most central banks falling somewhere in between 
15 and 25 percent (see table 5.3 below, as well as Appendix A3 for a detailed list of 
response rates per institution).82 Yet one clear pattern can be observed: the further 
away a central bank from continental Europe, the lower the response rate – the obvious 
outlier being the US Federal Reserve System with only 8.1 percent. Three factors may 
help explain this pattern. First, a dissertation project at the European University Insti-
                                              
81 The Swiss National Bank has a similarly strong emphasis on price stability as the German Bundesbank and is 
particularly affected by the ECB’s policies. The National Bank of the Kyrgyz Republic features prominently in 
indices of central bank independence, often surpassing the ECB as the (formally) most independent central bank 
in the world (e.g. see Dincer & Eichengreen 2014: 216-18).  
I originally included two further institutions in my survey, which I unfortunately had to drop because they re-
turned too few responses: the Banco Central do Brasil as South America’s biggest central bank and the Bank of 
Japan, which serves as an important reference point as the first monetary institution to confront the ZLB. 
82 It should be noted, however, that the actual response rate could be substantially higher, since potential re-
spondents were contacted via email only. This means I had no means of tracking how many individuals actually 
received the email inviting them to participate (and how many emails got caught up in spam filters). Thus, the 
numbers presented assume (perhaps unrealistically) that every email I sent was delivered and seen.  
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tute Italy may garner more attention and sympathy in Rome and Frankfurt than, say, 
Kansas City and Sydney. This probably goes for Prof. Richard Portes as well, who 
kindly supported my data collection with his Letter of Support. This certainly opened 
doors everywhere, but perhaps more so in Europe than elsewhere.  
A second factor relates to accessibility of central bank economists’ personal profiles 
on their institutions’ webpages. While all US Federal Reserve banks and the Bank of 
England present comprehensive profiles of their economists online (including contact 
details), this is the case for only few Eurosystem institutions. Here I had to gather per-
sonal information from the banks’ working paper series, conference proceedings, and 
lists on online platforms such as LinkedIn, ResearchGate, and RePEc (Research Pa-
pers in Economics). As a consequence, I assume that economists at the Fed and the 
Bank of England receive more uninvited requests like mine and can therefore be ex-
pected to be somewhat less likely to respond. 
 Contacts Responses Response Rate 
1) Eurosystem 1290 270 20.9% 
      European Central Bank 256 46 18.0% 
      Core countries’ NCBs* 424 76 17.9% 
      Peripheral / Southern countries’ NCBs** 498 118 23.7% 
      Eastern countries’ NCBs*** 112 30 26.8% 
2) Federal Reserve System 743 60 8.1% 
3) Anglo-Saxon Central Banks§ 360 44 12.2% 
4) Other Central Banks+ 264 48 18.2% 
Total 2657 422 15.9% 
Table 5.3: Survey response rates for different groups of central banks 
* Austria, Belgium, Germany, Finland, Netherlands, Luxemburg 
** Cyprus, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Malta, Spain, Portugal 
*** Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Slovenia 
§ Australia, Canada, New Zealand, United Kingdom 
+ Czech Republic, Kyrgyzstan, Poland, Sweden, Switzerland 
Arguably the most important factor, however, is that my data collection was undertak-
en in a period during which both the Federal Reserve and the Bank of England suf-
fered political assaults. Both the UK’s Brexit campaign and the presidential campaign 
of Donald Trump in the US launched fierce attacks on their respective central banks, 
blaming it for adverse economic developments, arguing for their heads to be replaced 
– even calling into question their independence (Sandbu 2016c). In this climate, one 
might expect any central bank to tread even more carefully than otherwise when it 
comes to their communication with the public, including external researchers.83  
                                              
83 I received several emails from Federal Reserve economists stating that they would have liked to participate but 
their requests for permission to do so were rejected by their heads of department because the organization was 
currently “being extremely careful in how it communicates” (quote from personal communication).  
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Non-response bias: comparing equally imperfect subsamples 
Central bankers are a tough population to survey. “They are a tight-lipped group that 
knows how to keep secrets,” as Blinder et al. (2016: 4) state in their survey-based 
study of central bankers. As such, they are unlikely to respond to survey requests in 
great numbers, even if you grant them full anonymity (as I did). This is particularly 
relevant if a survey includes detailed biographical information, which I had to do in 
order to empirically test existing theories about the role of education, origin, work ex-
perience etc. for belief formation. In this light, a relatively low response rate was to be 
expected.  
An average response rate of 21 percent for the Eurosystem (and 16 percent overall) 
could be interpreted as a rather satisfying result. However, the differences to Anglo-
Saxon central banks (12 percent) and the Federal Reserve System in particular (8 per-
cent) need to be considered. In order to address concerns related to different response 
rates, I only include central banks in institution-specific analyses if more than 10 per-
cent of all contacted individuals responded and if this comprises a minimum of 4 inde-
pendent responses (the Federal Reserve System with 60 responses and a response rate 
of only 8.1 percent being the obvious exception). The same goes for analyses of par-
ticular subsets of populations, e.g. economists representing a particular nationality, age 
group, business unit etc. within a single institution.  
 
Fig 5.2: Gender and age of survey respondents by different groups of central banks 
Yet, different response rates across institutions invoke the concern that non-response 
bias may be at play to varying degrees, thereby invalidating comparisons. However, 
my surveyed populations do not differ significantly across central banks despite these 
differences in response rates. As figures 5.2 and 5.3 show, the composition of re-
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spondents within different groups of central banks is very similar in terms of age, gen-
der, work experience, or representation of central banks’ organizational units.  
Central banking is still very much a man’s world. For all four geographical groups of 
central banks in my survey, about four out of five respondents were male (Eurosystem: 
82 percent; Federal Reserve: 81 percent). This ratio is only slightly different for An-
glo-Saxon (86 percent) and other central banks (77 percent). If we compare different 
groups of institutions within the Eurosystem (see graphs on the right hand side of the 
figures 5.2 and 5.3), the only institutions with a higher ratio of female respondents are 
Southern European central banks, where three out of four respondents reported to be 
male (76 percent). When comparing age cohorts, a similar pattern emerges. Age struc-
tures are very similar, particularly among those groups comprising most respondents 
(Eurosystem and Federal Reserve). Only respondents from Anglo-Saxon and (within 
Europe) Eastern European central banks are modestly younger on average.  
 
Fig 5.3: Respondents’ affiliation to business areas by different groups of central banks 
In terms of the representation of central banks’ organizational structures, the similari-
ties are equally striking. This is particularly true if we consider that not all central 
banks structure their operations identically (i.e. some do not have separate units for 
Economics and Research, while others do). Again, the biggest and, for the purposes of 
this study, most relevant groups of respondents (Eurosystem and Federal Reserve Sys-
tem) are the most similar ones. The only notable difference is that more Fed econo-
mists reported working in the Research division while fewer represented the executive 
branches. The latter may again be explained with the political attacks Fed officials en-
dured during the data collection period. Arguably, they had an even bigger impact on 
communication practices of the Fed’s senior officials than on its staff economists.84 
Beyond that, differences are negligible – and the same goes for respondents’ career 
patterns. On average, there are no significant differences in terms of respondents work 
experience in different sectors (see table 5.4 below). 
                                              
84 The fact that no Federal Reserve economist reported working for the Markets division is easily explained by 
the fast that this division does not exist. The tasks other central banks assign to a specific Markets division can 
be found in sections within the Division of International Finance (Global Capital Markets section) or the Divi-
sion of Research and Statistics (Capital Markets section). see Federal Reserve System Organizational Chart 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/aboutthefed/organization-charts-accessible.htm [accessed: 4 Jan 2017] 
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Total 
Euro-
system 
Fed 
System 
Anglo-
Saxon§ 
ESCB+ Other* 
Central banks 11.56 12.20 10.88 9.57 11.48 9.17 
Ministries / govern-
ment agencies 
1.23 1.38 1.41 0.44 0.56 1.80 
Financial firms 0.86 0.94 0.98 0.38 1.09 0.25 
Non-financial firms 0.47 0.53 0.20 0.14 0.64 1.18 
Universities / research 
institutions 
4.03 3.98 4.54 1.64 6.23 4.69 
Central bank of  
current employment 
10.57 11.10 10.33 8.84 10.09 8.44 
Table 5.3: Respondents’ work experience in different sectors (in years) 
§ Australia, Canada, New Zealand, United Kingdom 
+ Czech Republic, Poland, Sweden 
* Kyrgyzstan, Switzerland  
Against this backdrop I argue that my data allows for comparison across institutions, 
even if every single subsample for a specific central bank may not be representative of 
that institution. Assuming that central banks have similar workforces, comparing the 
average values across different institutions is possible provided that these subsamples 
have similar structures. In simple terms, while a subset of 20 percent cannot claim to 
be representative of all economists working in this particular central bank, they can be 
compared to the 20 percent who responded from other institutions – unless we have 
reason to believe that the composition of respondents from one institution differs sig-
nificantly from others. For the purposes of comparison, then, it does not matter that my 
respondents do not constitute a perfect representation of beliefs and preferences within 
each individual institution. What matters is that all subsamples are equally imperfect, 
as the above shows. In other words, I do not claim to compare representative subsam-
ples of central bankers; I claim to compare comparable subsamples.  
5.2 Central bankers’ beliefs: do they differ at all? 
Central bankers are usually seen as a prime example of a global epistemic community. 
Typically they are highly educated middle-aged men, who hold Economics PhDs from 
Anglo-American elite universities. Throughout their education and work experiences 
they have many opportunities to be socialized in parallel ways, which gives observers 
the impression that central bankers are likely “to look at and analyze the world in very 
similar ways” (Marcussen 2006: 191). In other words: we often assume the transna-
tional community of central bankers to hold similar views of the (economic) world. 
What is the point, then, in asking them to participate in a survey that focuses on differ-
ences in economic worldviews? 
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I depart from this wide-spread assumption of similarity, which I believe to be mostly a 
remnant of the ‘Great Moderation’. This does not necessarily mean that differences in 
thinking did not exist before the crisis challenged many a conventional wisdom and 
brought disagreements to the fore. Rather, it was possible to ignore existing differ-
ences in views as long as central banking was a relatively straightforward and conflict-
free business. This, however, is no longer the case as the politicization of monetary 
policymaking and untypically harsh conflicts among leading central bankers in recent 
years have shown. 
My survey thus documents how economic beliefs inside the central banking communi-
ty differ. I begin by simply showing the distribution of all responses recorded for the 
eight cause-and-effect statements about the economy included in my survey. As the 
below shows, there is a surprisingly high degree of disagreement. Respondents’ views 
varied widely on all questions, with the exception of the almost universally accepted 
importance of price stickiness for monetary policy formation.  
Survey items Mean SD N + 0 – 
Causes of inflation 
Inflation is primarily a  
monetary phenomenon. 
0.83 1.62 412 268 48 96 
Downward rigidities of prices and wages are rele-
vant for the purposes of monetary policy formation. 
2.09 1.08 413 386 12 15 
Agents: rational expectations and money illusion 
Agents do not err systematically in their  
expectations of future developments. 
-0.43 1.75 409 143 35 231 
Human beings make mistakes because they perceive 
monetary values in nominal and not in real terms. 
1.06 1.43 412 312 36 64 
Financial Stability 
Monetary policy cannot reliably target  
asset prices. 
0.97 1.66 413 268 47 98 
There can be no price stability without  
financial stability. 
0.98 1.74 407 275 37 95 
Growth effects and side-effects of unconventional policy 
Monetary policy effects on output or employment 
growth are only transitory. 
0.93 1.72 417 278 30 109 
When interest rates are stuck at their lower bound, 
M1 growth is not inflationary. 
0.52 1.73 366 195 68 103 
Table 5.4: Descriptive statistics for Causal Belief items85 
                                              
85 Table 5.4 summarizes under ‘+’ all positive responses given in reaction to each statement, ranging from +1 to 
+3 (agree completely) and under ‘–’ all negative responses, ranging from –1 to –3 (disagree completely). For a 
more detailed table see Appendix A4.   
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I record little agreement on Friedman’s famous Monetarist dictum that inflation is ‘al-
ways and everywhere a monetary phenomenon’. When asked for their agreement on 
the (somewhat more moderately phrased) statement that ‘inflation is primarily a mone-
tary phenomenon,’ a noticeable majority (268 respondents) supported the view that 
money primarily determines inflation rates, while a sizable minority (98 respondents) 
was opposed. Interestingly, there is much more support for the revisionist (Keynesian) 
notion of price stickiness (with a mean of +2.09) than for the rather orthodox Monetar-
ist theory of inflation (+0.83). This is important because many believe that central 
bankers can influence economic growth and employment because prices are sticky. 
Recently, this link between the empirical observation (that prices are indeed sticky) 
and the policy implication (that central bankers can influence economic activity) has 
been questioned (see Wang & Wright 2016). However, the way my survey item was 
phrased – ‘Downward rigidities of prices and wages are relevant for the purposes of 
monetary policy formation’ – implies both. Downward rigidities are both real and rel-
evant for monetary policy, according to the vast majority of central bank economists in 
my sample.  
When it comes to theories of how economic agents make decisions, the data shows a 
similar pattern. Central bank economists are, by and large, supportive of money illu-
sion (+1.06) – a revisionist concept often associated with Keynes – and much more 
skeptical about the orthodox concept of rational expectations expressed in the belief 
that economic agents do not err systematically (–0.43). This may not surprise the read-
er in the wake of a financial crisis which saw many of the world’s most powerful fi-
nancial firms facing bankruptcy because they had erred collectively. Yet, as some ver-
sion of rational expectations is still built into central banks’ models of the economy 
(Taylor 2016), this widespread skepticism may come as a surprise.  
Much controversy surrounds the question of what monetary policy can and should do 
to secure financial stability (see chapter 4.2.3). While the period before the financial 
crisis of 2007/08 clearly showed that price stability alone is insufficient to safeguard 
the stability of the financial system, the years after the crash seemed to indicate that 
the reverse is true as well: the turbulent years of the Great Recession saw practically 
every major central bank miss its price stability target year after year. Consequently, 
the view that price stability is difficult to attain in the absence of financial stability 
prevails among the majority of survey respondents (+0.98). While this may speak to 
upgrading financial stability to a central bank’s explicit goal on equal footing with 
price stability, however, it does not automatically imply the use of monetary policy 
instruments for financial stability purposes. That’s why an equally large majority of 
central bank economists hold that ‘monetary policy cannot reliably target asset prices’ 
(+0.97), which is a core underpinning of the pre-crisis Jackson Hole consensus. 
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This persistent skepticism about ‘leaning against the wind’ among central bankers is 
confirmed in another recent study. Johnson et al. (2016) analyzed central bankers’ 
public speeches after the crisis and found evidence for an emergent, tentative post-
crisis consensus among central bankers. This view holds that central banks should fo-
cus more on financial stability issues than in the past, but do so through the use of new 
macroprudential instruments rather than interest rate policy. Whether or not monetary 
policy can and should be used in the pursuit of financial stability86 thus remains a dif-
ficult topic on which opinions vary.  
 
Fig. 5.4: Responses for items ‘Neutrality of Money’ and ‘Money Growth at ZLB’ 
I now turn to the two belief items that were arguably the politically most sensitive ones 
included in the survey. The first concerns the ‘Neutrality of Money’ and asked re-
spondents whether monetary policy could affect output and employment in a lasting 
way (see chapter 4.2.2). The idea that monetary policy cannot have a lasting effect on 
real economic variables such as employment or real GDP is supported by the majority 
of respondents (+0.93). In this view, trade-offs between inflation and employment (as 
the traditional Phillips curve asserts) exist only in the short run. In the long run, an in-
crease in the money supply will be offset by a proportional rise in prices and wages. 
This means, even if we believe that monetary policy can stabilize the economy in the 
short run, this effect does not last. In the long run, two out of three respondents believe 
money to be neutral. This may be consequential for economists’ policy preferences, as 
we can expect those think that monetary policy can have a lasting effect on the econ-
omy to be more supportive of activist policies. Supporters of the ‘Neutrality of Money’ 
idea, on the contrary, are likely to be less supportive because they do not believe that 
activist policies induce GDP or employment gains.  
The inflationary effects of balance sheet policies became of the most salient and politi-
cized issues of monetary policy in the Great Recession. Proponents of such unconven-
tional policies argued that increasing the supply of base money by purchasing bonds 
                                              
86 This implies, in the words of the Bank of Canada’s Stephen Poloz (2015): “choosing a different path for inter-
est rates than would be optimal for the inflation target in order to mitigate risks to financial stability.” 
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stabilizes the economy without creating inflationary risks, when interest rates are stuck 
at the zero lower bound (ZLB).87 This was hotly debated before the Federal Reserve 
started experimenting with unconventional policies, and it remains a contested issue. It 
is still largely unknown how such policies work and which risks and side-effects they 
may induce. As a consequence, as many as 56 survey respondents chose not to reveal 
their agreement with the statement: ‘When interest rates are stuck at their lower 
bound, M1 growth is not inflationary’. Of those who did respond, 195 agreed and 103 
disagreed to some degree, underlining the contested nature of this issue (+0.52).  
Again, what one believes to be true in this matter should influence one’s policy posi-
tions. Those who fear the inflationary risks of balance sheet policies are more likely to 
oppose them (and more activist monetary policy in general). Those who do not expect 
central bank purchases to have adverse effects on inflation, on the other hand, are more 
likely to endorse unconventional policies designed to stabilize the economy in a reces-
sion.88 Before I turn to the issue of how these beliefs are associated with policy prefer-
ences empirically, however, I briefly discuss how the concrete beliefs described above 
are related to the much broader macroeconomic paradigms. 
5.3 What role for paradigms? 
Economic ideas are usually discussed in terms of macroeconomic paradigms or 
schools of thought such as ‘Keynesianism’ or ‘Neoclassical Economics’. Such labels 
greatly help us impose some order in the complicated and technical world of macroe-
conomic policy. While they may be helpful to analyze broad swings in economic poli-
cy, however, they are arguably not the ideal way to analyze specific monetary policies 
and central bankers’ thinking about them. Since these paradigms resemble big boxes 
with blurred edges, real-world monetary policies tend to not fit squarely into one box 
or another. Thus central bankers’ models of the economy usually combine insights 
associated with several different paradigms (i.e. some form of rational expectations 
combined with frictions resulting from downward rigidities). Furthermore, central 
bank economists do not particularly like these broad and politicized labels, insisting 
that they have little relevance for their day-to-day technical work. Macroeconomic 
paradigms are associated with economic ideology – and independent central bankers 
have every incentive to avoid appearing to be caught up in ideological battles.  
This is why my survey emphasizes specific beliefs instead of broad paradigms. Since 
these paradigms feature prominently in public as well as academic debates, however, I 
did include a self-identification item in my survey. Here I asked respondents: “Would 
you consider any of the following intellectual frameworks to be of particular relevance 
                                              
87 Or, since recent experiences indicate that rates can indeed go below zero, some undefined, slightly negative 
value which constitutes the lower bound for short-term interest rates. 
88 However, an alternative interpretation is possible as well: if unconventional policies are adopted with the main 
purpose of creating higher rates of inflation (i.e. avoiding deflation), those who do not believe that they can 
achieve that goal might be expected to oppose such policies as useless. 
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for your work?”, offering them a choice among the following: Monetarism, Neoclassi-
cal economics, Keynesianism, Ordoliberalism, Public choice / institutional economics, 
and Supply side economics.89 In order not to force respondents into one particular box, 
my survey allowed them to choose as many paradigms as they wished. However, they 
had to rank them in order, starting with the most important.  
This data allows me to analyze how specific beliefs are related to paradigms. It also 
shows how adherents of different schools of thought are distributed among survey re-
spondents. To show how paradigms matter for the specific beliefs respondents hold, I 
constructed six binary dummy variables for self-identification with each of the para-
digms included in the survey. I coded respondents as adherents of a particular para-
digm if they chose it as either first or second most important intellectual framework 
for their work. Table 5.5 below displays the mean values (and number of observations 
in brackets) regarding both economic beliefs and policy preferences for each of the six 
dummy variables created.  
Some of these results indicate that paradigms are indeed good proxies for beliefs. Self-
reported Monetarists, for example, are (unsurprisingly) most likely to agree that infla-
tion is primarily a monetary phenomenon (with a mean of 1.34 compared to 0.83 
among all respondents). The same pattern can be observed for endorsing Rational Ex-
pectations (0.05 vs. –0.43). Clearly the label Monetarism then reveals something about 
a central banker’s beliefs regarding inflation and expectation formation. In other areas, 
however, the data is not as straightforward. Famously-Keynesian notions such as 
Money Illusion or Sticky Prices are almost universally accepted. While it is true that 
agreement with these notions are higher than average among self-proclaimed 
Keynesians, these differences are rather negligible (+0.17 for Money Illusion and a 
mere +0.05 for Price Stickiness).  
However, self-identification with Keynesian ideas does matter for other aspects of 
monetary policy. Keynesians are more likely than others to believe that M1 growth is 
not inflationary when interest rates are stuck at their lower bound. Thus we can expect 
them to be less concerned inflationary risks associated with unconventional monetary 
policy. Most importantly, Keynesians are most likely to support higher inflation tar-
gets: of all subgroups of respondents, self-reported Keynesians are the only group 
which does not, on average, oppose this controversial proposal to reform existing 
monetary policy frameworks. This may not surprise us, given that the case for higher 
inflation targets has first been made by prominent Keynesian economists such as Oliv-
ier Blanchard (et. al 2010) and Paul Krugman (2014) – and only recently been echoed 
from more conservative corners such as the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco 
(see Williams 2016) or the Wall Street Journal (see Ip 2016).  
                                              
89 I adopted the list of paradigms from a previous study on schools of thought among German economists (Frey 
et al. 2007). For a synopsis of their results see their table 2.2 (ibid.: 364). 
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Variable 
Mean 
(Obs) 
Mean 
(Obs) 
Mean 
(Obs) 
Mean 
(Obs) 
Mean 
(Obs) 
Mean 
(Obs) 
Mean 
(Obs) 
Beliefs 
Inflation a monetary phenomenon 
0.83 
(413) 
1.34 
(118) 
0.11 
(19) 
0.66 
(209) 
1.01 
(219) 
0.93 
(58) 
0.59 
(82) 
Price Stickiness 
2.09 
(414) 
2.15 
(119) 
2.00 
(18) 
2.14 
(210) 
2.20 
(220) 
2.26 
(57) 
2.01 
(80) 
Rational expectations 
-0.43 
(410) 
0.05 
(117) 
-1.29 
(17) 
-0.56 
(208) 
-0.23 
(217) 
-0.05 
(58) 
-0.85 
(82) 
Money illusion 
1.06 
(413) 
1.11 
(116) 
1.00 
(18) 
1.23 
(208) 
0.96 
(218) 
1.08 
(59) 
1.11 
(83) 
Neutrality of money 
0.93 
(418) 
1.32 
(118) 
1.00 
(18) 
0.70 
(212) 
1.10 
(220) 
0.75 
(60) 
0.42 
(84) 
M1growth at ZLB not inflationary 
0.52 
(367) 
0.26 
(113) 
0.08 
(12) 
0.86 
(197) 
0.54 
(192) 
0.12 
(51) 
0.49 
(69) 
No price stability without  
financial stability 
0.98 
(408) 
0.95 
(116) 
1.72 
(18) 
0.82 
(208) 
0.89 
(214) 
1.47 
(58) 
1.04 
(82) 
Cannot target asset prices 
0.97 
(414) 
0.99 
(118) 
0.44 
(18) 
1.05 
(211) 
1.06 
(218) 
1.18 
(57) 
0.98 
(83) 
Preferences 
Support for higher inflation target 
-0.28 
(411) 
-0.52 
(117) 
-1.21 
(19) 
0.02 
(210) 
-0.29 
(218) 
-0.34 
(58) 
-0.16 
(80) 
Support for NGPD target 
-0.73 
(398) 
-0.72 
(116) 
-1.33 
(18) 
-0.49 
(207) 
-0.91 
(213) 
-0.73 
(56) 
-0.65 
(79) 
Increased role for financial stability  
in monetary policy 
1.32 
(419) 
1.31 
(119) 
1.47 
(19) 
1.37 
(211) 
1.20 
(220) 
1.20 
(59) 
1.39 
(84) 
Self-identification 
Monetarism 119 119 4 40 59 8 7 
Ordoliberalism 19 4 19 7 3 1 4 
Keynesianism 212 40 7 212 109 12 39 
Neoclassic economics 222 59 3 109 222 25 15 
Supply-side economics 60 8 1 12 25 60 13 
Public Choice/Institutional economics 84 7 4 39 15 13 84 
Table 5.5: Economic beliefs and preferences by macroeconomic paradigms 
The small group of central bank economists who identify with Ordoliberalism stands 
out in several respects. First, they are particularly critical of Monetarist concepts such 
as rational expectations or inflation being primarily a monetary phenomenon. This is 
surprising given that Ordoliberalism is usually considered as intellectually close to 
Monetarism, and the German Bundesbank as ‘Ordoliberal stronghold’ long pursued a 
policy approach considered as ‘pragmatic Monetarism’. Less surprising is that 
Ordoliberal respondents strongly agree with the idea that there can be no price stability 
unless financial stability prevails (1.72 compared to an average value of 0.98) – and 
consequently demand a more prominent role for financial stability considerations in 
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monetary policy frameworks.90 Confirming the cliché of being extremely hawkish re-
garding inflation, Ordoliberals also most strongly oppose the adoption of higher infla-
tion targets (–1.21 compared to –0.28). 
For all those interesting differences, however, there is need for caution. Table 5.5 also 
shows that among the 212 self-reported Keynesians, a surprisingly high number (109) 
also identifies with Neoclassical economics and a further 40 with Monetarism. Simi-
larly, more than one in three Ordoliberals (7 out of 19, to be precise) considers 
Keynesian ideas to be of particular relevance for their work. This may surprise a read-
er who thinks of these paradigms as constituting opposite ends of the spectrum eco-
nomic theory provides. It suggests that central bank economists are flexible pragma-
tists rather than ideologues who, in their daily operations, are guided more by what 
they believe to work in practice than by one particular school of thought. This suggests 
that we should think about central bankers’ economic ideas in terms of the concrete 
beliefs they hold rather than in terms of some broad (and politicized) macroeconomic 
paradigm. This is why the following analyses focus on the former, while leaving para-
digms mostly aside. 
5.4 Do beliefs matter for policy preferences? 
So far I have presented evidence that central bank economists’ do disagree about key 
aspects of monetary theory. This appears to confirm the assumption of Knightian un-
certainty established earlier: in the Great Recession central bankers have become more 
powerful and, at the same time, more uncertain about their knowledge and capacity to 
act than ever before. Fed chair Janet Yellen (2016) bluntly admitted that “the events of 
the past few years have revealed limits in economists’ understanding of the economy” 
and sketched out four areas where a better understanding is needed. Financial Times 
journalist Martin Sandbu (2016b) comments on her much-debated speech as follows:  
“while Yellen surely does not mean to express despair, it only takes recog-
nising the premise of her talk — that macroeconomists do not know very well 
whether demand affects supply; how an economy of non-identical people be-
haves; how finance matters, and what determines inflation — to ask what 
hope in hell central bankers have of making the right policy calls”. 
While this degree of disagreement and uncertainty may be a surprising result in and by 
itself (and a cause of concern in the eyes of observers like Martin Sandbu), this study 
focuses on how beliefs matter for policy. Therefore I now turn to the critical questions 
of a) how different beliefs about the economy are related to policy preferences and b) 
how both beliefs and preferences are distributed between central banks.  
                                              
90 This is very much in line with the prominent role of monetary aggregates in both the Bundesbank’s and the 
ECB’s monetary policy strategy.  
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Survey items mean SD N + 0 – 
Given recent experiences with the lower bound, central 
banks should have inflation targets higher than 2%. 
–0.28 1.82 410 144 72 194 
Central bank should have  
nominal-GDP targets. 
–0.73 1.59 397 94 82 221 
Financial stability concerns should be taken  
into account for monetary policy decisions. 
1.32 1.44 419 332 27 60 
Table 5.6: Descriptive statistics for Preference items91 
I start by analyzing which beliefs we may expect to play a role for central bankers’ 
inflation preferences. As introduced above, my questionnaire included three items 
concerning policy preferences: raising inflation targets, adopting targets for nominal-
DGP, and allowing financial stability concerns to influence monetary policy decisions. 
At first glance, table 5.6 confirms the preconception that central bankers are mostly 
conservative. In light of the expectations formulated above, the mean values point to 
preferences for orthodox positions: a majority of central bank economists in my sam-
ple opposes both higher inflation targets and introducing nominal-GDP targets, while 
most support a stronger role for financial stability considerations. However, the ques-
tion on higher inflation targets appeared the most divisive preference question, with 
144 respondents expressing some degree of openness to the idea and 194 opposing it. 
On the contrary, majorities are large regarding both the nominal-GDP-item and the 
Financial Stability-item. 
Of those three items, openness to adopt higher inflation targets clearly offers the most 
straightforward way to operationalize inflation preferences. Therefore, the survey item 
I use to construct my main dependent variable is the level of agreement respondents 
reported regarding the following statement: ‘Given recent experiences with the lower 
bound, central banks should have inflation targets higher than 2%’. I consider this a 
good proxy for an individual’s inflation hawkishness because I expect inflation hawks 
to strongly disagree with higher inflation targets and inflation doves to be more open 
to this idea. This assumption results from the following considerations: 
The more a person agrees with higher inflation targets… 
 …the likelier she is to fear the risk of deflation more than the risk of inflation. 
 …the likelier she is to accept changes in monetary policy frameworks (includ-
ing the adoption of novel monetary policy instruments). 
 …the likelier she is to favor activist monetary policy (especially when low in-
flation persists). 
                                              
91 Table 5.4 summarizes under ‘+’ all positive responses given in reaction to each statement, ranging from +1 to 
+3 (agree completely) and under ‘–’ all negative responses, ranging from –1 to –3 (disagree completely). For a 
more detailed table see Appendix A4.   
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This leads to the question of which economic beliefs are most strongly associated with 
support for higher inflation (targets). Figure 5.5 offers graphic representations of uni-
variate regressions for all eight belief items (independent variable on x-axis) on sup-
port for higher inflation targets (dependent variable on y-axis). The data suggests that 
some beliefs matter for inflation preferences, while others don’t. In particular, finan-
cial stability beliefs are not at all or only weakly correlated with an individuals’ infla-
tion hawkishness (see Fig 5.5g and 5.5h). Given the content of these survey items, this 
is less surprising than the insignificance of survey items related to theories of inflation. 
In the case of Price Stickiness (5.5b) this is obviously a consequence of near-universal 
agreement; there is simply too little variance to explain anything. Dismissing the Mon-
etarist theory of inflation as a primarily monetary phenomenon (5.5a) as insignificant 
for an economists’ expected inflation hawkishness, however, is much more counterin-
tuitive. 
What remains are four propositions, signaling an empirical relationship between econ-
omists’ inflation hawkishness and a) their beliefs about how human beings make eco-
nomic decisions, b) how they form expectations about the future, c) whether money 
can impact growth and employment in a lasting way, and d) whether money growth is 
inflationary when interest rates are stuck at zero. In probabilistic terms, we may sum-
marize the graphs given in Fig 5.5 as follows: 
 The more a central bank economist believes in the neutrality of money, the 
more likely she/he is opposed to higher inflation (targets). 
 The more a central bank economist believes money growth not to be inflation-
ary when interest rates are at their lower bound, the more likely she/he is to 
support higher inflation (targets). 
 The more a central bank economist believes in rational expectations, the more 
likely she/he is opposed to higher inflation (targets). 
 The more a central bank economist believes in money illusion, the more likely 
she/he is to support higher inflation (targets). 
In simple and generalized terms, the data suggests that those who believe in rational 
expectations and the neutrality of money are likely to be inflation hawks. Those who 
believe in money illusion and think that balance sheet policies at the ZLB are not infla-
tionary, on the other hand, are more likely to be inflation doves. 
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Fig. 5.5: Linear regression lines for preferences for higher inflation targets (Y) on 
eight economic beliefs (X), 95% confidence intervals 
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5.5 Beliefs and preferences across institutions: is the ECB really a special case? 
Does the above help understanding central banks’ divergent policy choices during the 
Great Recession? To make the case that ideas mattered, I now turn to the question of 
how economic beliefs and policy preferences are distributed among the central bankers 
in my sample. For this purpose, I created dummy variables for individuals’ affiliations 
with a particular central bank in order to run institution-specific regressions. I only 
include central banks in these analyses for which four or more responses were record-
ed, which is why four smaller institutions – the central banks of Cyprus (2 responses), 
Malta (2), Slovakia (3), and Slovenia (3) – had to be excluded from the analysis.92 
It is important to note that the relationships between variables can be expected to 
change through this weighting procedure. The analyses of the relationships between 
beliefs and variables at the individual level include 422 observations (section 5.2.2) 
and were mostly driven by Eurosystem economists, which account for almost two-
thirds of the overall sample (270 out of 422). The following analysis at the institution-
al level contains only 25 observations, as I consider only the one value for all institu-
tion (the mean) – regardless of whether this mean value summarizes 48 individual re-
sponses (as for the Banca d’Italia) or a mere 7 (as for the Central Bank of Ireland). 
While this procedure gives outsize importance to the smaller central banks in the sam-
ple (relative to their staff size and the number of responses from that institution), it is 
important to note that this procedure is the exact equivalent of the Eurosystem’s for-
mal decision rule. ‘One head, one vote’ gives the Banque Centrale du Luxembourg the 
same voting power in the ECB Governing Council as the Banque de France enjoys. 
Consequently both institutions have equal weight in the calculations below, no matter 
how many responses I recorded from each institution. The same goes, of course, for 
non-Eurosystem central banks. 
I focus my considerations below on the ‘Neutrality of Money’. This is because a) the 
theoretical implications for inflation preferences are the most obvious, and b) the cor-
relation with inflation preferences is strongest among my analyses at the institutional 
level. Figure 5.6 shows that the relationship between the belief in Monetary Neutrality 
and support for Higher Targets is stronger at the institutional than at the individual 
level (see Fig 5.5e), indicating some concentration of beliefs and preferences within 
central banks. One possible explanation for this concentration is that economists are 
socialized around certain sets of beliefs at the workplace through repeated interactions 
with their superiors and peers. Another theory suggest a self-selection channel: econ-
                                              
92 The same goes the National Bank of the Kyrgyz Republic (NBKR), but for different reasons. As the NBKR has 
an official target of 7%, asking employees of this institution whether central bank should have inflation targets 
higher than 2% obviously invites confirmation bias (unsurprisingly the NBKR is an outlier regarding this ques-
tion). Two other central banks do not have a target of exactly 2%: the Royal Bank of Australia (RBA) with a 
target of 2-3% and the National Bank of Poland (NBP) with 2.5%. Since these targets are arguably still close 
enough to 2%, however, I consider the responses of economists associated with these two institutions as still 
valid. Yet this difference should be kept in mind when interpreting figure 5.6. 
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omists are most likely to join those institutions they believe to be close to their own 
view of the economy.  
Regarding the distribution of institutions, Figure 5.6 displays several distinct clusters. 
Anglo-Saxon (black) and Southern European central banks (blue) are predominantly 
found in the upper left corner, indicating dovishness as well as a relatively high degree 
of conviction that monetary policy can have a lasting impact on growth and employ-
ment. Diametrically opposed is the cluster of Northern / core European central banks 
(red) among which both the belief in the neutrality of money and inflation hawkish-
ness are highest. A fourth group of Eastern European institutions does not form a dis-
tinct cluster: the central banks of Lithuania and Estonia are found in the dovish 
/revisionist corner, while their Latvian and Polish counterparts are close to the middle, 
and the Czech National Bank finds itself close to the orthodox and hawkish central 
banks of Northern Europe.  
 
Fig. 5.6: Linear regression for preferences for higher inflation targets (Y) on the belief 
in the Neutrality of Money (X), means per institution 
The ECB appears stuck in the middle between a revisionist South and an orthodox 
North. To phrase it positively, it seems to have found a middle road between the Eu-
rosystem’s divergent member institutions. This confirms neither old images of the ‘Eu-
ropean Bundesbank’ nor more recent (German) fears of an institution captured by 
Southern / debtor states’ interests. Rather, it invites images of the ECB as an organiza-
tion which represents the diverse economic philosophies and interests of its member 
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institutions. As such, it cannot afford to disregard the views of either North or South, 
but has to aim for a compromise. In terms of economic beliefs, this European middle 
road leads the ECB closer to economic orthodoxy than the US Federal Reserve or the 
Bank of England. While Southern European beliefs and preferences appear closely 
aligned with Anglo-American views, the ECB needs to be somewhat more orthodox/ 
hawkish in order not to alienate its members from Northern Europe. 
Interestingly, this result also speaks to related studies on this topic. Markus Brun-
nermeier, Harold James, and Jean-Pierre Landau recently published a book entitled 
“The Euro and the Battle of Ideas”, which approaches the topic from a historical per-
spective. While their book is much broader in focus, parts of their historical narrative 
speak directly to the findings presented above: 
“The euro crisis has led to the outbreak of a war of ideas in the European 
continent […]. It is a struggle between northern, but above all German, and 
what are sometimes called southern, but above all French, theories. The de-
bate is not limited to French and Germans: Finns, Austrians, and sometimes 
Slovaks and Poles behave as if they are more Germanic than the Germans, 
and France is often seen as a champion of a Mediterranean Europe.” (Brun-
nermeier et al. 2016: 2) 
While this neatly summarizes the distribution of Eurozone institutions in Fig. 5.9, the 
authors also observe how differences in economic thinking across continental Europe 
relate to Anglo-American views: 
“Overall, Anglo-American and French philosophies have many parallels, in 
particular deep roots in Keynesian thinking and an emphasis on liquidity 
over solvency considerations. Notably, whenever US or UK politicians lec-
tured EU officials about optimal economic policy, they almost always sided 
with the French liquidity interpretation—favoring big bazooka and bailout 
solutions” (ibid: 11). 
Summing up, my survey data suggests that economic beliefs matter a great deal for 
policymakers’ preferences and the policy choices they make. This goes in particular 
when conditions of Knightian uncertainty prevail, as during the Great Recession or, to 
an even higher degree, in the Euro crisis. In these highly unique situations, when past 
experience is of little help and it is impossible to arrive at a reasonable calculation of 
what one’s own ‘naked self-interest’ may be, policymakers rely on their ideas about 
how the economy works in order to make decisions. Importantly, this does not mean 
that policymakers become ideologues. Rather than some grand economic theory, it is 
their very concrete ideas about ‘what works’ that influences their decisions. What pol-
icymakers believe to be possible critically shapes what they deem desirable (Steinmo 
2003).  
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In the case of European monetary policy, a close examination of central bankers’ eco-
nomic beliefs thus helps us to understand why the ECB remained relatively conserva-
tive when compared to its peers. What is more, it enhances our understanding of the 
occasionally surfacing conflicts within the ECB’s Governing Board. What was once 
considered a dull business dominated by ‘very boring guys’ (Singleton 2010) has 
turned into a battleground of economic ideas, which frequently makes headlines in 
broadsheet and tabloid newspapers alike. And as central bankers continue to struggle 
with the challenging economic conditions of the ‘new normal’, this conflictual pattern 
is unlikely to subside anytime soon. 
5.6 Policymakers matter! 
While the above strongly suggests that policymakers who think differently about the 
economy are likely to pursue different policies, independent central bankers have an 
institutional incentive to downplay such differences. After all, the very notion of cen-
tral bank independence is based on minimized discretion: central bankers are supposed 
to be apolitical technocrats whose words and deeds are highly constrained by narrow 
mandates. In this perspective, it does not really matter who the people making these 
decisions are. This ‘myth of neutrality’ (Adolph 2013) is important to maintain inde-
pendence and depoliticize the appointment process for key positions as much as possi-
ble. One example of this line of reasoning can be seen in an interview ECB chief 
economist Peter Praet gave to the Swiss Neue Züricher Zeitung in September 2015, 
when he was pushed on differences between him and his German predecessors:  
NZZ: You give the impression, however, that you take a more Anglo-
Saxon approach, whereas your two predecessors, Issing and Stark, 
were rather more of the tradition of the Deutsche Bundesbank and 
were, therefore, more stability-oriented in their thinking.  
PP: I would firmly disagree. I and the entire Executive Board of the ECB 
have utterly committed ourselves to price stability. That is our mandate, 
the task enshrined in the European treaties. […] All of our policies, in-
cluding the less conventional ones, are aimed at maintaining price sta-
bility. By the way, during the time of my predecessor Otmar Issing, the 
ECB defined more precisely what is meant by price stability: below, but 
close to, 2%.  
NZZ: However, on the issue of the purchase of government bonds, 
there has been a true break with past tradition. Your predecessors were 
strictly against it, whereas you and Mario Draghi are clearly in favour 
of these purchases. 
PP: Who knows what my predecessors would have done in my position. 
They were not in a situation in which key interest rates had reached the 
lower limit, thereby leaving hardly any room for manoeuvre in terms of 
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interest rates. However, I am sure that they would also have done every-
thing necessary to fulfil the mandate. (Praet 2015) 
Mario Draghi made a similar argument in response to an interview question by the 
German tabloid Bild about the significance of his Italian origins: “There is really no-
body in the world who is interested in the fact that I am an Italian apart from the 
German media. And what difference would it make if a non-Italian were now in office? 
None at all. He or she would pursue the same course as we do now” (Draghi 2016c). 
The message is clear: do not personalize monetary policy, it does not matter who is at 
the helm! 
However, the analysis above suggests that it is of utmost importance who is taking a 
seat inside the Governing Council. As central bankers can and do differ in their views 
of how the economy works, these differences are an important factor for the policies 
they pursue. Policymakers – and the beliefs they hold – matter! To demonstrate how 
economic beliefs influenced ECB decision-making, I now return to the specific path 
the ECB chose to take in its fight against the Great Recession and the Euro Crisis. The 
following chapter offers a detailed narrative of what the ECB did and didn’t do since 
2007 with a particular emphasis on the policy positions different actors argued for.  
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6. WHAT CENTRAL BANKERS DID AND DIDN’T DO: 
KEY MONETARY POLICY DECISIONS, 2007-16 
“As I warned in 1993, when the ECB structure was first proposed, having an unaccountable  
central bank with no parliament above it, its independence protected by essentially inviolable 
 international treaty, was a recipe for excessively and destructive counter-inflationary extremism. 
This is indeed what has happened in response to the crisis.” 
Adam S. Posen, 13 November 2013  
In the early days of the crisis, central bankers around the world knew what needed to 
be done. They were almost unanimous in their responses to the liquidity problems 
caused by the fall of Lehman Brothers. The focus was on providing liquidity to tum-
bling financial institutions to prevent credit flows from running dry. Such credit short-
age, they feared, could further deepen the recession that followed. And indeed it did, 
despite the central bankers’ coordinated efforts.  
Soon, however, divisions would surface. In particular, the ECB started to diverge from 
the extraordinarily loose policies that its peers pursued to fight the recessions that had 
taken hold of their economies. Why did the ECB decide not to do more? Or, rather, 
why did it take so long to adopt the aggressive measures of its peers? This is the cen-
tral question this dissertation examines, with a particular emphasis on the role of poli-
cymakers’ economic beliefs.  
This chapter provides a detailed account of what the ECB actually did throughout the 
crisis. It offers a narrative of the ECB’s monetary policy decisions in the period of 
2007 to 2016, reflecting on the debates surrounding these decisions and the positions 
key actors fought for. Most importantly, I intend to go beyond giving a purely descrip-
tive account of what the ECB did by also highlighting the paths it chose not to take. 
Such counterfactuals of ‘what could have been’ require some point of reference, often 
established through comparisons with similar institutions or a different period in time. 
Given the ECB’s short history and its uniqueness as the world’s only supranational 
central bank, however, finding appropriate points of reference is anything but straight-
forward. After all, one may argue that no institution like the ECB has ever existed, and 
no other central bank has to fight a recession of historic dimension while simultane-
ously facing the threat of disintegration (which may mean extinction).  
I propose two categories of comparison: first, the moves made by other major central 
banks such as the US Federal Reserve and, second, policy recommendations the ECB 
received from a so-called Shadow Council of professional economists. The US Fed 
and the Bank of England were facing very similar macroeconomic conditions during 
the period of interest, and the Fed arguably comes closest to the ECB structurally as it 
oversees a similarly large and heterogeneous currency area and has a similar organiza-
tional structure. Taking on the Shadow Council recommendations as well allows me to 
identify critical junctures, at which the ECB’s decisions deviated from what it peers 
and ECB watchers perceived as the right way to go. Apart from describing the ECB’s 
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policies between 2007 and 2016, the following section thus seeks to provide answers 
to two perhaps more interesting questions: What alternative ways of dealing with the 
crisis were discussed and by whom? And why did they fail to win sufficient support 
for their plans in the ECB’s Governing Council? 
I divide my chronological narrative into three parts: the initial financial crisis (2007-
09), the emergence of the European debt crisis (2010-12), and the ECB’s remarkable 
turnaround after Draghi took over from Trichet (2012-15). Within each of these three 
sections I first describe the economic situation central banks confronted during the 
respective period, followed by an account of how the ECB and other central banks re-
sponded to these conditions. I then analyze of how ECB policies diverged from the 
recommendations it was given by the Shadow Council and end by reflecting on the 
role economic beliefs during this particular period. 
6.1 When disaster strikes: the response to the financial crisis (2007-09) 
The global financial crisis that began in the summer of 2007 has most likely changed 
central banking policy for good. It took central bankers just as much by surprise as 
anybody else, calling their wisdom into doubt and eventually forcing them to engage 
in policy experiments without historical precedent. Somewhat paradoxically, this big 
bang has increased central banks’ powers vis-à-vis other policymaking institutions 
while, at the same time, exposing them to levels of criticism not seen in decades. Be-
ing the crucial ‘game changer’ that brought presumably boring central bankers into the 
limelight, the financial crisis of 2007/2008 seems a logical point of departure for this 
study. 
Even though the dust has had ample time to settle since its outbreak, the jury on what 
caused the crisis – and whether central bankers are to blame – is still out. Given that 
experts continue to debate the Great Depression and the role of the Federal Reserve in 
causing or worsening it until this very day (see Eichengreen 2015), this should come 
as no surprise. Central bankers themselves point to regulatory missteps and global im-
balances as the root causes of the crisis (Johnson et al. 2016: 5-10). They disagree 
sharply, however, what role their own inflation-targeting policies played. Had their 
narrow focus on price stability not clearly failed to provide a stable economy? And, 
more specifically, had overly loose monetary policy fueled bubbles, particularly in the 
United States? While some adopted such self-critical positions, most central bankers 
closed their ranks around the argument that, to the extent that they shared some of the 
blame at all, this was mainly because they did not have the right (macroprudential) 
tools yet – and not because they used their tools wrongly. In the words of the Riks-
bank’s Lars Svensson (2010): “My view is that the crisis was largely caused by factors 
that had very little to do with monetary policy”. 
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The end of the Great Moderation: BNP Paribas, Northern Rock, and Lehman 
Whether or not they were to blame for causing the crisis, central bankers had to deal 
with it once it struck. As the financial crisis is now often associated with its peak – the 
fall of Lehmann Brothers in September 2008 – it is worth remembering that the trouble 
in US housing markets that eventually brought Lehman down had already been going 
on for more than a year. The failure of the British mortgage lender Northern Rock PLC 
sent the first big shockwave through the global financial system, demonstrating that 
the slump of US housing prices could claim casualties far beyond American borders. 
The decline of US housing prices since 2006, amplified through the widespread use of 
Mortgage-Backed Securities (MBS), had caused a freeze in interbank lending. A trig-
gering event for the evaporation of trust among banks was the announcement of BNP 
Paribas that it would close several investment vehicles invested in US ‘subprime’ 
mortgage assets on 9 August 2007.  
In hindsight, this was the day the financial crisis begun (ECB 2010: 64). While the 
BNP Paribas in itself was hardly significant, it did seem to confirm investors’ growing 
concerns about the value of securities linked to mortgage loans – so many buying 
them. Ironically, Northern Rock was actually in the business of prime lending to UK 
households and had practically no direct exposure to US subprime lending. However, 
the bank’s funding relied heavily on short-term borrowing in capital markets – and it 
therefore ran into severe difficulties when these markets froze. Thus, even though its 
own assets looked relatively solid, Northern Rock fell victim to a generalized re-
trenchment of its creditors attempting to shed risky exposures (Shin 2009: 102-3). 
The Northern Rock episode foreshadowed the troubles ahead in many ways. First, it 
showed how individual banks could fall victim to a generalized lack of trust. Second, it 
provided the first example of how the troubles in US mortgage markets could spread 
globally, even if an institution had little direct exposure to them. The incident brutally 
demonstrated how deeply US mortgage loans had become embedded in global finan-
cial markets and how this carried risks for everybody – not only for those who made 
these loans in the first place. And, finally, the bank run that followed could in the end 
not even be contained by the central bank’s liquidity support, resulting in the bank’s 
nationalization on February 17, 2008. Another bailout followed less than a month lat-
er, when the Fed put up $30 billion to aid the acquisition of investment bank Bear 
Stearns by J.P. Morgan. By then, in March 2008, it was clear that the global financial 
system was in dire straits – and central bankers had already spent almost half a year in 
emergency meetings trying to contain the unfolding crisis. 
All this should remind us that ‘the crisis’ by no means started with Lehman. However, 
the crisis certainly reached a new stage when Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy on 
September 15, 2008. Until this date, the world’s top central bankers were split as to 
whether they were dealing ‘only’ with a crisis of banking or whether a nearing reces-
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sion needed to be fought (Irwin 2013: 128). Now it was painfully clear that financial 
markets could indeed bring the entire global economy down. Lehman’s fall shredded 
any doubt that the crisis had become a monetary policy issue, and that it was no longer 
‘only’ a problem of financial stability. 
The ECB’s responses: a hike, slow cuts, and first forays into bond-buying 
Lehman’s fall thus marks the major turning point in the ECB’s monetary policy stance 
during the early stages of the crisis. While it had previously tried to keep its help for 
struggling banks completely separate from its monetary policy mission, this was no 
longer a viable option. Up until September 2008, the ECB had continued its tightening 
cycle begun in the spring of 2006. In the final days of the Great Moderation, the ECB 
enjoyed an environment of steady growth and contained inflation. In March and June 
2007, it raised its main policy rate (the minimum bid rate on the main refinancing op-
erations) in two steps of 25 basis points from 3.5 to 4 percent. Both of these steps were 
uncontroversial, as fissures in financial markets had not become evident at that stage 
and forecasts predicted a continuing period of sustained growth. In short: the ECB 
could focus on its primary job of controlling inflation and it did so by gradually raising 
rates to keep the economy from overheating.  
The ECB’s next rate hike in July 2008, however, proved to be much more controver-
sial. By then, the credit crunch had been going on for almost three quarters and was 
beginning to weigh on both business and consumer sentiment. Consumer price infla-
tion, however, continued to rise in the first half of 2008. Thus, a situation developed in 
which inflation risks and growth risks gave the ECB conflicting signposts. With eco-
nomic activity slowing, some already saw a recession coming and demanded rate cuts. 
At the same time upward price pressures raised the specter of rising inflation expecta-
tions. Stuck between a rock and a hard place, then, the ECB followed its inflation-
fighting instincts. Its decision to raise rates – while other central banks had long begun 
to lower them – was mostly the result of worries about second-round effects, namely 
that record-high commodity prices would lead people to expect higher inflation for the 
future and, through their price and wage decisions, turn these expectations into a self-
fulfilling prophecy. In the press conference on July 3, Jean-Claude Trichet made this 
reasoning crystal clear: “We are solemnly telling all economic agents, corporate busi-
nesses, price-setters in the economy and social partners that the worst decision they 
could take would be precisely to believe that what we are observing today, namely this 
protracted period of high inflation, will last in the medium term” (Trichet 2008b). 
While Trichet stressed that the Governing Council had unanimously decided to raise 
rates in July, the previous meeting had revealed conflicting views inside the commit-
tee, openly admitted by the ECB president (Trichet 2008a). The hike also came as a 
shock to financial markets, who had been betting that the ECB would follow the Fed 
and lower rates instead. When the ECB moved in the opposite direction, markets un-
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surprisingly condemned the move. Equally harsh, but perhaps more important, was the 
criticism that came from high politics. French president Nicolas Sarkozy even ignored 
the (then still widely respected) rule for European politicians not to attack the central 
bank. He criticized the decision to raise rates as “at best pointless, at worst totally 
counterproductive”,93 which made him probably the most prominent critic among 
many who regarded the ECB’s precautionary tightening as a policy mistake.  
 
Fig. 6.1: Interest rates for the Eurozone, the US and the UK 2007-2009  
(Sources: ECB, Fed, BoE) 
In hindsight, the critics were vindicated by the events after Lehman. As the financial 
shock translated into a fully-blown economic recession, the ECB’s strict separation 
between its liquidity provision for banks and its interest rate tool to steer the economy 
no longer held. Worries about inflation had to take the backseat for now, even in 
Frankfurt. As a consequence, the ECB not only joined its fellow central bankers in a 
concerted effort to stabilize the financial system through massive liquidity operations; 
it also became part of the first coordinated interest-rate cut in history. On October 8, a 
joint statement from six central banks was released, stating that monetary easing was 
warranted. “Accordingly, the Bank of Canada, the Bank of England, the European 
Central Bank, the Federal Reserve, Sveriges Riksbank, and the Swiss National Bank 
are today announcing reductions in policy interest rates. The Bank of Japan expresses 
its strong support of these policy actions”.94  
While this unprecedented cooperation sent a strong signal, it was not enough to stop 
the deepest global recession since the Great Depression from happening. Between 
March 2008 and March 2009, for instance, global stock markets lost almost half of 
their value (Irwin 2013: 165). Mirroring the dramatic downturn, the ECB’s participa-
                                              
93 “Elysée attacks 'misguided' policy of ECB”, Financial Times, 2 July 2008.  
94 https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20081008a.htm [accessed 17 May 2016] 
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tion in the coordinated rate cut was only the beginning of a loosening cycle. The ex-
traordinary cut of 50 basis points on October 12, 2008 (to 3.75 percent) was followed 
by another one in November and a 75 basis point cut in December (to 2.5 percent). 
Throughout the first half of 2009, the ECB continued lowering rates until they reached 
1 percent in May. Yet 1 percent appeared to be the floor the ECB was unwilling to 
break through. Consequently the ECB would hold interest rates constant at this level 
throughout its next 23 monthly meetings. 
The ECB accompanied its rate cuts with acting as a lender of last resort (LOLR) for 
the banking system to absorb the collapse in interbank markets. As banks stopped 
providing each other with the liquidity needed to carry out their everyday operations, 
the ECB stepped in and provided practically unlimited funds (Micossi 2015: 13). In 
central bank jargon, the ECB allocated liquidity through its main refinancing opera-
tions (MROs) as well as long-term refinancing operations (LTROs) through a fixed-
rate tender procedure with full allotment. Full allotment meant that banks would re-
ceive the full amount of central bank liquidity they asked for – as long as they could 
provide adequate collateral. Remarkably, this procedure was already put in place on 
Day 1 of the crisis, when the BNP Paribas announcement called banks’ finances into 
question. And as the crisis deepened, the ECB gradually relaxed collateral require-
ments and extended the loan terms from one month to three years, making it ever easi-
er for troubled banks to fund their businesses (ECB 2010: 64). In other words: the 
ECB did react remarkably swiftly and decisively to the funding problems of European 
banks.95 
In addition to these measures, which were termed ‘enhanced credit support’, two other 
non-standard operations are worth noting. First, the ECB entered into swap agreements 
with other central banks, which made it possible to provide their banks with other cur-
rencies as well, most importantly with US dollars. Second, once the ECB had reached 
its temporary interest rate floor at 1% in May 2009, it announced a bond purchasing 
program (CBPP1). The program, under which an aggregate volume of €60 billion of 
covered bonds were purchased within a year, was another building block in the ECB’s 
credit easing approach. It aimed at easing the provision of credit by reviving a market 
segment which in normal times provided an important source of funding for European 
banks but had dried up as a consequence of the crisis (Beirne et al. 2011: 9). 
Interestingly, the ECB’s first foray into asset purchases resulted in its second political 
assault in just under a year. After France’s Nicolas Sarkozy had criticized the ECB’s 
rate hike in July 2008, Germany’s Angela Merkel now struck as the ECB went to-
wards loosening. While most of her highly unusual stab at central banks focused on 
                                              
95 In fact, the ECB’s surprising move to inject money into the banking system in response to the BNP Paribas 
announcement was the first response of a major central bank to the financial crisis. While it has been criticized a 
lot for being behind the curve regarding its interest rate policies, this is certainly not true for its liquidity opera-
tions. 
129 
 
the steps the Fed and the BoE had undertaken (expressing a “great deal of skepticism” 
towards their policies and calling on them to “return to a policy of reason”), she also 
scolded the ECB for “bowing to international pressure with the purchase of covered 
bonds”.96 
Policies abroad: cutting rates to zero and starting the printing press 
Unusual as it was, it is also telling that Angela Merkel criticized foreign central banks 
more harshly than her own. It underlines that the ECB’s conventional and unconven-
tional policies paled in comparison to the much more drastic policies undertaken else-
where. Regarding interest rates policy, this goes in particular for the period in between 
the start of the financial turmoil and the Lehman crash (see Fig. 4.1): over the course 
of these 13 months, the Federal Reserve lowered its main interest rate a full seven 
times (–325 basis points in total), the Bank of England three times (–75), while the 
ECB was going the other way (+25). This underlines that in those early days, the 
world’s major central banks had very different interpretations of the crisis. Especially 
the sharp divergence between the Fed and the ECB puzzled observers and stimulated 
quite a bit of debate. As both central banks simultaneously faced downside risks to 
growth and upside risks to inflation, why did the Fed immediately switch into reces-
sion-fighting mode while the ECB did not? In the words of Martin Feldstein (2008): 
“The European Central Bank and the Federal Reserve are facing similar problems but 
pursuing different policies. […] Which central bank is doing the right thing?”  
The Lehman crash did not change this pattern of divergence. While it brought about 
drastic responses by all major central banks, the differences in their responses persist-
ed. On the interest rate front, the Fed and the BoE quickly cut rates until they came 
very close to zero, while the ECB was unwilling to go below 1 percent (see Fig 6.1). 
This, however, did no longer preoccupy central bankers as much. In the aftermath of 
Lehman, the Fed and the BoE increasingly shifted the focus away from interest rates 
and towards printing money. Bereft of the opportunity to cut rates further (or so they 
thought), they increasingly relied on balance sheet operations, in short: QE. According 
to BoE governor Mervyn King, the latter immediately follows from the former: “We 
are very close to zero. What we are doing now is switching to injecting money into the 
economy directly.”97 This was in March 2009. The Fed had started the printing press 
already in November 2008, when it began buying $600 billion of mortgage-backed 
securities with freshly minted money. They saw expanding the money supply through 
balance sheet policies as a logical continuation of lowering interest rates, once they 
had reached zero. 
Again, the ECB withstood calls to follow the Fed. While it did make use of its balance 
sheet, it did so to repair certain market segments rather than to increase the money 
                                              
96 see Germany Blasts 'Powers of the Fed', Wall Street Journal, 3 June 2009.  
97 “Bank begins 'printing money' to fight slump”, The Guardian, 6 Mar 2009.  
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supply. This approach has become called ‘credit easing’ (CE). Under a pure QE 
scheme, what kind of securities the central bank buys is of only secondary importance, 
or “incidental” (Bernanke 2009). What matters is that it buys something in order to 
inject money into the system. In contrast, a CE program like the ECB’s first program 
to purchase covered bonds (CBPP1) is all about which securities are being bought (see 
Fawley & Neely 2013: 55). Trichet insisted that CBPP1 was not QE and would not 
expand the ECB’s balance sheet. He expected the purchases to be sterilized automati-
cally because they would reduce demand for bank liquidity allocated through the 
LTRO programs. A quick look at the ECB’s balance sheet throughout the second half 
of 2009 proves his point: the CBPP1 had little impact on the size of the ECB’s balance 
sheet (see Fig. 6.2 above). More generally, the ECB used its balance sheet only mod-
estly in between 2007 and 2010 – in particular when compared to the Fed and the BoE. 
 
Fig. 6.2: Total Value of Assets: ECB, Fed and BoE, 2007-2009 (1 Jan 2007=100) 
Advice from the shadows 
One may object to comparing the ECB’s policies to those of the Fed and the BoE. 
Even though they faced roughly similar macroeconomic conditions between 2007 and 
2010, the currency areas they govern differ in important respects, most crucially re-
garding their financial systems. And, indeed, the specific designs of their balance sheet 
operations in the early days of the crisis reflect these different financial structures: the 
Fed and BoE bought securities in financial markets, while the ECB primarily lent to 
banks. Therefore a second category of comparison may be called for: the recommen-
dations of a so-called ‘ECB Shadow Council’. Just like other central banks’ shadow 
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committees,98 this panel of professional ECB watchers has given itself the task of 
stimulating public debates about how the independent ECB fulfills its mandate.99 The 
ECB’s Shadow Council (SC) was founded by the Wall Street Journal and the German 
business newspaper Handelsblatt in 2002 and brings together 15-18 monetary experts 
from academia, think tanks and financial institutions. Unlike the real Governing Coun-
cil (GC), the SC publicizes not only its final recommendations what the ECB should 
do, but also its deliberations and individual votes. As such, the monthly SC recom-
mendations and discussions offer a rich source of data which is tailored to the specific 
circumstances of ECB decisions. Due to its regular meetings and structured minutes, 
the SC allows us to systematically assess the broader discussion around individual 
ECB decisions. In particular, it allows for quantifying the divergence between ECB 
decisions and SC assessments. This regularity and measurability makes the SC data 
arguably the best source available to systematically assess the paths the ECB chose not 
to take. 
 
Fig. 6.3: Shadow Council Recommendations and ECB Interest Rate Decision, 2007-09 
I use Shadow Council data as a proxy for broader public debates about what monetary 
policy the Eurozone needs. Not only are individual SC economists very active partici-
pants of public debates on central banking issues; the SC’s recommendations them-
selves are also often picked up in the media and thus influence public discourse (Neu-
enkirch & Siklos 2013: 136). As the SC arrives at one common interest rate recom-
mendation (by simple majority voting) but also publishes individual votes, I computed 
                                              
98 The original idea goes back to the 1970s, when Karl Brunner and Alan Meltzer founded the Shadow Open 
Market Committee (SOMC) to parallel the Fed’s FOMC. Similarly, the Bank of England’s Monetary Policy 
Committee (MPC) is since 1997 shadowed by a Shadow MPC (SMPC). Similar shadow institutions were estab-
lished for the central banks of Australia, Canada, and New Zealand (Neuenkirch & Siklos 2013: 136). 
99 “ECB Shadow Council Is Set To Stoke Debate Over Rates”, Handelsblatt / Wall Street Journal, 4 Dec 2002. 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1038955049540408473 
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two different measures for deviations between the SC and the ECB. Figure 6.3 above 
shows a) to what extent the SC’s recommendations and b) the average of individual 
votes differed from ECB decisions in the early years of the crisis. While the SC rec-
ommendation provides the most straightforward measure for comparison, the average 
vote reveals shifts in the SC’s policy bias. It thus captures the more subtle movements 
when a minority of SC members changes their opinion.  
In line with Neuenkirch & Siklos (2013), I find that the SC was consistently less 
hawkish in its policy orientation than the ECB’s Governing Council. A value of 0 in 
Fig. 6.3 indicates perfect agreement between SC and GC, while a positive (negative) 
value implies that the SC recommended higher (lower) rates than the ECB subsequent-
ly adopted. The grey bars then display the ECB’s actual rate decisions: three hikes of 
25 basis points until July 2008, and then a series of cuts following the collapse of 
Lehman Brothers in September 2009. To give one example how to interpret the graph: 
if the ECB decision shows a value of -0.75 and the value for the SC recommendation 
is at -0.25 (as in December 2008), this implies that the SC recommendation was to cut 
rates by 1 percent.100 The graph shows that the SC actually favored higher rates in ear-
ly 2007: the meeting of February 2007 is the only one in this period for which the SC 
recommended a hike and the ECB did not follow suit (but did so one month later). We 
can also see that the SC’s bias throughout the first half of 2007 was for (slightly) high-
er rates.  
However, the SC soon started to recommend a more accommodative policies than the 
ECB was willing to deliver. First the SC’s bias turned towards lowering rates while 
the ECB held them constant. Then, with the surprising and much criticized rate hike of 
July 2008, the SC’s recommendation started to diverge from ECB policy. Finally, 
when the ECB started lowering rates after Lehman, the SC consistently argued for 
bigger and faster rate cuts. In particular, it disagreed with the ECB’s decision to stop 
loosening policy once it had reached the 1 percent threshold and urged the GC to move 
closer to zero. It was not before the recession somewhat abated towards the end of 
2009, that Shadow Council and Governing Council would see eye to eye again. 
Beyond the numbers the SC provided, its minutes strongly recommended more aggres-
sive policies. As early as January 2008, the SC urged the ECB to remove the bias to-
wards higher rates in its communication and prepare the public for lower rates instead 
(SC, 31.1.2008). After Lehman, “most members felt that the ECB has been easing 
rates too late and too little, and thus still had some catching up to do” (SC, 30.1.2009). 
In particular, it saw “no reason to set a rate floor at 1%” (SC, 1.5.2009) and more than 
two thirds of its members advocated some form of unsterilized QE (ibid.). When the 
                                              
100 It is important to bear in mind that an alternative interest rate path cannot be generated from the SC data. This 
is because the SC always bases its recommendation on the current level of ECB interest rates. If, for instance, the 
SC recommends a rate hike of 25 basis points for three meetings in a row and the ECB decides to hold rates at 
current levels in all three meetings, it does not follow that the SC would recommend a level of interest rates 
being 75 basis points higher. 
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ECB finally started purchasing assets under the CBPP1, the SC welcomed the move 
but found its size rather modest (SC, 29.5.2009). In sum, the SC perceived the ECB to 
be behind the curve for most of 2008 and 2009 and often argued it should follow the 
lead of the Fed and the BoE. In the words of SC member Marco Annunziata (and 
Chief European Economist of UniCredit): “I see no plausible reason for the ECB not 
to follow the more aggressive course of action of other major central banks.” (SC, 
27.4.2009).  
Different perceptions, different solutions 
In sum, the ECB’s responses to the first stage of the crisis (from 2007 to 2009) re-
mained remarkably conservative. As economists like Martin Feldstein and Marco An-
nunziata highlighted, ECB policymakers and their colleagues at the Fed faced very 
similar economic conditions. Yet their policies differed sharply, in terms of both con-
ventional and unconventional policy. This surprising degree of policy divergence re-
flects very different interpretations of the nature of the crisis – and different lessons 
from history. A look at Fed-chairman Ben Bernanke illustrates the point. Having spent 
much of his academic career studying the Great Depression, he knew that problems in 
the financial sector had the tendency to spread to other areas of the economy – a risk 
the Fed had severely underestimated in the 1930s, according to his own research (Ir-
win 2013: 119-20). Now chair of the Fed himself, Bernanke appeared determined not 
to repeat past mistakes and thus employed extraordinary measures to fight the reces-
sion early on.  
While Bernanke worried that the financial turbulence would bring down the whole 
economy, Jean-Claude Trichet was less concerned. He saw a banking crisis, full stop. 
The ECB thus tried to keep liquidity operations largely separate from monetary policy 
(see Blinder 2013: 94). Yes, the ECB would provide emergency liquidity support to a 
troubled banking sector. But no, this would not change its approach towards the econ-
omy as a whole. Trichet made this rather clear by invoking a metaphor:  
“A central bank has one emergency room which – sporadically – tackles 
casualties of car accidents and applies angioplasty and bypass surgery. 
These are, for example, the exceptional decisions on the refinancing on the 
money market to help it normalize its functioning. But these activities – criti-
cal as they are to the functioning of the system – make up a small fraction of 
their duties.” (Trichet 2007b)  
To paraphrase Trichet: just because we have to deal with the victims of a serious acci-
dent in our emergency room, we are not going to change the way we run this hospital. 
We will not allow this emergency to distract us from our main task, which is to control 
inflation.  
134 
 
This suggests that different history lessons prevailed in Europe. If US central bankers 
were scarred by the Fed’s mishandling of the Great Depression, ECB policymakers 
appeared much more fearful of a hyperinflation á la Weimar Republic. Because they 
feared the inflationary effects of money printing, ECB policymakers shied away from 
implementing unsterilized bond purchases. The decision to put only a limited and 
sterilized program for bond purchases in place corresponds closely with two convic-
tions analyzed in my survey: the Monetarist belief that ‘inflation is always and every-
where a monetary phenomenon’ and the concern that the growth of base money will 
have inflationary effects even when interest rates are close to zero.  
It is important to note that these beliefs were not absent from the US debate. Here, 
mostly conservative politicians and economists heavily criticized the Fed’s policies 
and predicted that runaway inflation would result from QE. For instance, Allan Melt-
zer (2009) published an opinion piece in The New York Times arguing that “the 
enormous increase in bank reserves – caused by the Fed’s purchases of bonds and 
mortgages – will surely bring on severe inflation if allowed to remain.” Unlike the 
ECB, however, the Fed’s Open Market Committee under the leadership of Bernanke 
remained unconvinced by such concerns. They believed that a rise in the monetary 
base would not be inflationary in a liquidity trap.  
This different way of thinking about how monetary policy works at the zero lower 
bound becomes also evident when contrasting the official ECB stance with the Shad-
ow Council’s recommendations. Perhaps the most obvious example is expressed in the 
SC’s reaction to an announcement Trichet made in January 2009. He stated that the 
Governing Council did not want to cut rates further to “very low levels” because it was 
keen to avoid getting caught in a liquidity trap (Trichet 2009). This was met with skep-
ticism at the SC, which held the view that “it was not very low rates per se which con-
stituted a liquidity trap, but rather the possibility that even at zero rates the monetary 
stimulus would be insufficient. Therefore, members argued that the desire to avoid 
such a situation should serve as an argument to cut rates aggressively, providing the 
necessary stimulus as early as possible” (SC, 30.1.2009). In this case, a different view 
of how the economy works led the SC to recommend sharply different policies.  
Interestingly, such views were not entirely absent from the ECB’s Governing Council 
either. The Governor of the Central Bank of Cyprus, Athanasios Orphanides, also 
made the case for cutting rates to zero quickly in order to avoid having to resort to un-
conventional policies later (see Orphanides 2009). Judging from the ECB’s decisions, 
however, Orphanides found himself in the minority within the GC while the majority 
of another committee of economists – the Shadow Council – agreed with him. This 
suggests that the ECB might have taken a different road early on if its policy commit-
tee had comprised more policymakers with a different view of the economy.  
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6.2 Worlds apart? Europe’s special path 2010-2012 
After a short period of relative calm, the crisis took on a distinct European flavor. If 
the financial events around the fall of Black Rock and Lehman Brothers had not been 
dramatic enough, this stage of the crisis would pit Europe’s people against each other 
and eventually call the Euro’s very existence into question (and, hence, the existence 
of the ECB itself). What would soon be labelled the ‘Sovereign Debt Crisis’ started at 
the end of 2009, when the newly elected Greek government announced that the budget 
deficit they inherited was worse than their predecessors had claimed. Much worse! 
Instead of being around 6 percent of GDP, the Greek deficit for 2009 amounted to a 
shocking 15.7 percent – the highest public deficit worldwide. As the Greek govern-
ment struggled to come up with precise estimates of just how bad the situation was, 
there was not one big bang announcement that made alarm bells ring. Rather, the esti-
mates worsened at a creeping pace, and so did the reactions of financial markets. Even 
though Greece’s credit rating was downgraded by all big rating agencies throughout 
December, it was not before January 2010 that investors started reconsidering their 
investment in the Greek state. Then, however, the Greek government’s borrowing 
costs quickly went through the roof (see Figure 6.4 below).  
 
Fig. 6.4: Interest rates of government bonds with 10-year maturities for selected Eu-
rozone countries, 2007-2012 (Source: Eurostat) 
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The story of how the Greek tragedy turned into a threat to the entire European integra-
tion project has already been told many times (e.g. Pisani-Ferry 2014; Sandbu 2015a) 
and this is not the place to repeat it at great detail. I thus restrict myself to reminding 
the reader of a few key developments that were particularly relevant for the purposes 
of Eurozone monetary policy (and, hence, this dissertation). First of all, concerns about 
EMU member states’ budgets quickly spread after the Greek debacle. As the time lag 
between news from Greece and rising bond spreads suggests, this was not only a result 
of the shocking numbers presented by the Greek government. More than anything else, 
the insistence of other EU governments that they would not bailout Greece reminded 
investors that EMU countries were actually not all the same. In fact, once EMU was 
created, huge differences in all relevant aspects for pricing country risks persisted: no 
convergence regarding countries’ public debt levels occurred. Yet all EMU members 
enjoyed practically identical borrowing costs, suggesting that markets never believed 
the notorious ‘no-bailout’ clause that EMU members ‘shall not be liable for or assume 
the commitments of’ another EMU country (see Pisani-Ferry 2014: 81).  
This suggests that investors had stopped worrying about the creditworthiness of indi-
vidual EMU member states; they only concerned themselves with the creditworthiness 
of the Eurozone as a whole. When core EMU governments (Germany in particular) 
tried to appease their enraged electorates with promises not to pay for Greek debt, 
however, investors rediscovered the relevance of individual countries’ economic fun-
damentals. And much like worries about Bear Stearns had spread to other banks in 
2008 the Greek problems quickly began to affect other European governments, too. 
While they differed immensely regarding their debt levels, Ireland, Spain, and Portugal 
had produced very large budget deficits in 2009 as well. Add Italy with its notoriously 
high level of public debt to the mix and you arrive at what became charmlessly called 
the PIIGS countries. Markets seemed to reevaluate the risks associated with PIIGS 
governments’ debt instruments, so they all saw their borrowing costs soar. And before 
the ECB knew it, the Greek problem had turned into the ‘Euro crisis.’  
The escalation of ECB politics over the issue of bond purchases 
Due to the escalating crisis in European sovereign bond markets, interest rate policy 
took the back seat in 2010. The series of cuts undertaken over the course of the previ-
ous year did not leave much more room for maneuver in any case. What is more, the 
post-Lehman recession seemed to be abating, making rate cuts a non-issue for the 
moment. With a modest recovery underway and Greece’s shocking public finances 
making headlines, the G-7 meeting in Iqaluit, Canada, signaled a global change of 
course: stimulus was out, belt-tightening the order of the day (Irwin 2013: 207-15). 
Therefore, the ‘ordinary’ monetary policy debates of early 2010 focused mostly on the 
when and how of exit from the extraordinary measures undertaken in 2009.  
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In the meantime, however, the Euro crisis forced the ECB knee-deep into contentious 
politics. By the start of 2010, the Greek problem had become a concern for the ECB. 
In its press conference on January 15, much of the Q&A session focused on the issue. 
While Trichet expressed concerns about the evolving situation, he called the specula-
tion about Greece having to leave the euro an “absurd hypothesis” and laid the burden 
of problem-solving at the door of governments. No help from the ECB could be ex-
pected, was his clear message: “No government, no state can expect any special 
treatment from us” (Trichet 2010). However, this proved to be wishful thinking. The 
sovereign debt crisis quickly escalated and began to affect the transmission of mone-
tary policy – and the ECB itself forced to intervene only weeks after the statement. 
Even before the ECB joined the IMF and the Commission as part of the so-called 
‘Troika’, Trichet had to backpedal: by accepting Greek Government Bonds as collat-
eral (despite their terrible ratings), the ECB did offer Greece the ‘special treatment’ it 
had been keen to avoid. However, neither this nor the half-hearted Greek bailout in 
April 2010 restored confidence. Investors were simply not convinced that the EU was 
both willing and able to prevent the crisis from spiraling out of control. As these finan-
cial market developments once again started to weigh on the global economy, interna-
tional pressure grew. The ECB was expected to take decisive action before the vulner-
able economy would take another, perhaps fatal, blow – no matter which taboos exist-
ed. SC member Jacques Cailloux of the Royal Bank of Scotland best summarized this 
line of thinking: “Rather you break the rule book than the euro area!”101 
That big taboo was, of course, the issue of ‘monetary financing.’ Article 123(1) TFEU 
prohibits the ECB from directly purchasing governments’ debt to finance their budg-
ets.102 Consequently, proponents argued that the ECB could simply buy government 
bonds in secondary markets. In the end, this is what the Governing Council after con-
troversial discussions agreed to do with its Securities Market Programme (SMP). From 
May 2010 onwards, the ECB bought about €220 billion of PIIGS government bonds 
(Micossi 2015: 13-15). The purchases, however, were limited, temporary, and steri-
lized, meaning that for every single euro spent on government bonds under the SMP 
the ECB withdrew one euro through other means. Therefore, the program did not in-
crease the monetary base like the QE policies of other central banks did (Fawley & 
Neely 2013: 72). The SMP thus aimed not at providing monetary stimulus, but to re-
store the functioning of the monetary policy transmission mechanism by providing 
liquidity to markets in panic.  
                                              
101 “Trichet May Rewrite ECB Rule Book to Tame Greek Risk”, Bloomberg, 4 May 2010. 
102 “Overdraft facilities or any other type of credit facility with the European Central Bank or with the central 
banks of the Member States (hereinafter referred to as ‘national central banks’) in favour of Union institutions, 
bodies, offices or agencies, central governments, regional, local or other public authorities, other bodies gov-
erned by public law, or public undertakings of Member States shall be prohibited, as shall the purchase directly 
from them by the European Central Bank or national central banks of debt instruments.” 
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So the ECB did not buy government bonds to create new money; and the ECB did not 
buy government bonds from governments. Yet the ECB did buy government bonds – 
and that was enough to infuriate monetary conservatives, particularly in Germany. 
Consequently, the SMP put an end to the ECB’s informal rule of keeping the world in 
the dark about disagreements within the ECB’s Governing Council (Kübler 2012: 33). 
Bundesbank president Axel Weber broke the ranks by saying that the SMP posed sig-
nificant stability risks and publicly insisted that he was “critical toward this part of the 
ECB council’s decision, even in this extraordinary situation” (Weber 2010). Weber 
and the second German member of Governing Council, the ECB’s chief economist 
Jürgen Stark, may have been the most prominent opponents of the SMP. But they were 
by no means the only ones. The German media was furious and accused the ECB of 
breaking the law, arguing that the SMP’s real purpose was to keep peripheral govern-
ment bonds marketable. And this, the argument went, would be a form of financial 
support for governments and clearly beyond what the bank is empowered to do under 
Article 123(1) TFEU (see Ruffert 2011: 1787 f.). Even if the SMP operations were 
technically legal, they were against the spirit of Maastricht as the Germans saw it.  
Initially, the SMP appeared to work some magic. It is, for instance, being credited with 
giving Spanish and Italian bonds some support throughout 2011 (Fawley & Neely 
2013: 72). Yet, it was clearly insufficient to stop government costs from diverging (see 
Figure 6.4 above). Over the medium-term, spreads continued to rise and the PIIGS 
governments lost their access to financial markets, one after another. Thus the SMP is 
usually evaluated as having had only a modest effect (Gibson et al. 2015). Politically, 
however, the program proved to be extremely consequential. Over the course of 2011, 
both German members of the ECB’s Governing Council left their posts in protest 
against the purchases (Eser & Schwaab 2016: 148). The resignation of Bundesbank 
president Axel Weber, who also withdrew his promising candidacy to become the next 
ECB president, was followed by Jürgen Stark giving up his post as the ECB’s chief 
economist only months later. In hindsight, the political divisions the SMP created 
would last much longer than its calming effect on financial markets did. 
Ending the Trichet era with a rate hike 
The second big upset of the 2010/11 period came shortly before Jean-Claude Trichet 
ended his eight-year reign over the ECB. Having taken over from Wim Duisenberg in 
2003, Trichet became the first ECB president to serve a full eight-year term. And he 
ended it very much in line with his reputation of “speaking French with a German ac-
cent”: by tightening policy. Even as the PIIGS’ public finances sent EU leaders to cri-
sis summit after crisis summit and forced the ECB to delve ever deeper into political 
terrain through its participation in the Troika, the recovery of 2010 and early 2011 
spurred relatively solid economic forecasts. By the beginning of 2011, then, a spike in 
commodity price inflation set the stage for the return of interest rate politics. Not un-
like the situation before Lehman fell, the ECB was once again facing a double menace: 
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energy and commodity prices drove up inflation numbers, while nervous financial 
markets threatened to throw the economy back into recession. And very much like in 
the summer of 2008, the ECB judged the inflation risks to be serious enough to war-
rant an increase of rates – despite much-debated downside risks. It was “like a déjà vu 
moment of the 2008 rate increase” (Brunnermeier et al. 2016: 326). 
The two rate hikes of April and July 2011 became the final moves of the Trichet era. 
However, it soon became quite clear that critics had had a point when they called the 
hikes premature, or even outright policy mistakes (e.g. see Krugman 2011a). The 
worst fears about the Euro crisis materialized in the second half of 2011, which saw 
stock prices as well as governments collapsing. By November 2011, the Euro crisis 
had swept the prime ministers of all PIIGS countries out of office.103 Nevertheless, 
Trichet managed to avoid the humiliation of having to take back the rate hikes in his 
last meeting as ECB president in October 2010.104 This job was left to his successor, 
Mario Draghi. In what in hindsight seems more than a coincidence, the first two meet-
ings chaired by Draghi in November and December resulted in the reversal of the two 
rate increases of 2011. This is why much of the financial press interpreted the change 
at the helm of the ECB as turning point for ECB policy. An editorial of the New York 
Times, for instance, celebrated Draghi’s first decision as “a radical change from the 
stance of the bank under Mr. Draghi’s predecessor, Jean-Claude Trichet, and a gutsy 
sign that Mr. Draghi is willing to defy inflation hawks in Germany and is rightly far 
more concerned about Europe’s relentless slide toward recession” (New York Times 
2011). 
Anglo-Saxon money printing, continued 
Perhaps the most important aspect of ECB policy in 2010 and 2011 is its complete dis-
connect to what other central banks did. Not only did all major banks but the ECB 
(and the Swedish Riksbank) ignore the uptick in inflation, keeping their rates at (or 
close to) zero. The Fed and the BoE even stepped up their bond purchases. The Fed 
launched a second QE program (QE2) in November 2010, announcing that it would 
add another $600 billion to the money supply by buying longer-term Treasury bonds. 
A bold step at the time, QE2 met fierce criticism not only in the US Republican Party 
but basically all around the world. While the Republicans warned of inflation at home, 
foreign officials accused the Fed of starting a currency war. Among those was the 
German Minister of Finance, Wolfgang Schäuble, but mostly officials from emerging 
                                              
103 Under the Troika agreements, technocrats like Mario Monti rose to power. It even saw an ECB policymaker 
lead a government, when Lucas Papademos (who had been the ECB’s Vice-President during the early years of 
the crisis), had a short stint as Prime Minister of Greece (from November 2011 until May 2012).  
104 The location of this last meeting marks another remarkable coincidence: twice a year the ECB holds its press 
conference not at its own headquarters but someplace else in the Eurozone. As chance would have it, Trichet’s 
last press conference (in which the ECB ignored calls for lowering rates) would be held nowhere else than at the 
regional office of the German Bundesbank in Berlin.  
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economies such as Brazil, China, or Korea – “the strange bedfellows of the great QE2 
debate” (Irwin 2013: 257).  
Importantly, QE2 was not without critics inside the Federal Reserve System either. 
Only a few days after the announcement New York Fed governor Kevin Warsh gave a 
speech – tellingly titled ‘Rejecting the Requiem.’ Warsh warned that the risks of unin-
tended consequences of unconventional policies increased with the size of the Fed’s 
balance sheet, and argued that the Fed should not be “the repair shop for broken fiscal, 
trade, or regulatory policies” (Warsh 2010). Such criticism at home and abroad not-
withstanding, the Fed under chairman Bernanke continued to push through its easing 
policy. In September 2011, it even stepped up the stimulus by changing $400 billion 
short-term Treasuries for longer-term bonds (‘Operation Twist’); all this while the 
ECB was tightening policy. 
The contrast between the ECB and the Bank of England was not as pronounced. The 
BoE only expanded its QE program further in October 2011, when a policy U-turn was 
also looming in Frankfurt. What is more, the UK monetary policy committee (MPC) 
debated raising rates when inflation rose in early 2011, just like the ECB’s committee 
did. The dilemma of facing both high inflation and high unemployment at the same 
time produced a classic clash between hawks and doves in the committee. Two exter-
nal members of the committee and their communications at the time illustrate just how 
wide the gap between the two camps was: Adam Posen (2010) gave a speech called 
‘The Case for Doing More’ and called for extending QE, while Andrew Sentance 
(2011) laid out ‘Ten Good Reasons to Tighten’. And Sentance was by no means alone. 
In the MPC’s February 2011 meeting, as many as three out of nine members even vot-
ed for a rate hike (see Irwin 2013: 252-3). Unlike in the ECB’s committee, however, 
those arguing in favor of tightening remained a minority. By 2017, consequently, the 
UK is still waiting to see the first increase of interest since the crisis started. 
Nods from the shadows 
For most of 2010 and 2011, the ECB’s Governing Council (GC) and its Shadow 
Council (SC) were on the same page. With interest rates a non-issue, the SC supported 
both the ECB’s initially tough stance against the Greeks (denying them special treat-
ment) and its U-turn once the situation worsened (SC 29.1.2010). In particular, the 
bond purchases under the SMP found the SC’s support. Remarkably, two SC members 
disagreed and called the bond purchases a big mistake – just like in the ‘real’ commit-
tee (SC 7.6.2010). As the sovereign debt crisis deepened throughout the second half of 
2011, however, a growing minority voiced concerns about the associated growth risks 
and expressed a bias toward lowering rates. In particular, the SC noticed that the ECB 
seemed grossly over-optimistic in comparison to other central banks. As SC member 
Jacques Cailloux put it: “The ECB’s new found confidence about the outlook seems 
yet again to be at odds with what almost every other central bank is currently witness-
141 
 
ing” (SC, 25.10.2010) – adding that when the ECB had last decoupled from its major 
trading partners in 2008, it did not go so well.  
 
Fig. 6.5: Deviation of Shadow Council Recommendations and Average Votes from 
ECB Interest Rate Decision, 2007-2013 
While rising price inflation also removed the SC’s bias toward lower rates in 2011, it 
did not go so far as to recommend any rate increases. The majority of the SC, like 
most commentators and the policy committees of other central banks considered it 
“unwise or even self-defeating” (SC, 31.1.2011) to raise interest rates at a time when 
the financial sector was in dire straits. Once the ECB started tightening, however, the 
SC generally supported a continuation of the tightening cycle, albeit more cautiously 
than the way the ECB did (SC, 4.7.2011). This is important to note because many 
commentators – usually enjoying the benefit of hindsight – portray the ECB’s decision 
to hike rates at the height of the sovereign debt crisis as the crazy mistake that killed 
the European economy (see Economist 2011b; Krugman 2011a, 2011b; Kang et al. 
2015). Once the further escalation of the crisis showed that the hikes had indeed been 
premature, however, the SC called for a quick and decisive change of course (SC 
4.10.2011). Its urge to cut rates would be ignored by the Trichet-ECB in October, but 
followed by the Draghi-ECB in November.  
Ideas: the overriding importance of moral hazard 
It is widely recognized that the ECB, the Fed, and the Bank of England moved in dif-
ferent directions during the period of 2010-11, with the ECB’s turn to tightening poli-
cy standing in stark contrast to the continued monetary support elsewhere. However, it 
is important to note that this period was a difficult one for central bankers and thus 
produced dissent within all monetary committees. There were individual policymakers 
inside both the Fed and the BoE who shared the ECB’s more optimistic views about 
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the recovery and, most importantly, its concerns about rising inflation. The monetary 
policy debates on both sides of the Atlantic were surprisingly similar. The majority 
view in Frankfurt, however, remained a minority position in the US and the UK. 
Hence the ‘great divide’.  
In terms of monetary beliefs, the years 2010 and 2011 can be seen as a continuation of 
the previous period. Even under the exceptional circumstances of the Euro crisis, 
which saw the ECB buy government bonds for the first time, it made sure not to in-
crease the supply of base money (by sterilizing any such purchases). The ECB under 
Trichet remained fearful about inflationary effects of balance sheet policies. And just 
like in 2008, it reacted to a rise in energy costs with rate hikes. This implies the ECB’s 
worry that higher headline inflation would drive up underlying inflation because of 
second-round effects: if firms and households adjusted their inflation expectations up-
wards in response to higher energy prices, they would adjust prices and wages accord-
ingly and thereby bring about a sustained increase in inflation. This focus on headline 
inflation, including volatile energy and food prices, and the associated concerns about 
second-round effects reveals a different way of thinking about expectations in Frank-
furt. While other central banks ‘saw through’ the temporary spike of energy costs, the 
ECB reacted to them, worried about their effect of expectations. As this proved to be a 
much criticized policy mistake, “the debate about the 2011 hike eventually resulted in 
a major rethinking about the way inflation expectations should be inferred by the cen-
tral bank” (Brunnermeier et al. 2016: 326). 
Another Ordoliberal idea took center stage when the Greek debt crisis spiraled out of 
control, namely the issue of moral hazard. A core concern of Ordoliberals is how to 
enforce ‘Haftung,’ which translates as ‘liability’ but implies ‘responsibility,’ too. This 
principle has been translated as “whoever stands to benefit [from an action] should 
bear the damage” (Eucken, cit. in Feld et al. 2015: 14). Or, in the words of Otmar Is-
sing (2016: 307): “The market can only work in the interest of society as a whole if the 
freedom of action is combined with liability for the consequences of this action.”105 
Thus liability and control need to go hand in hand, because the absence of liability in-
vites agents – or governments – to game the system. This line of reasoning has influ-
enced the design of EMU greatly, especially regarding the convergence criteria, the 
Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), and – most importantly – the ‘no bailout’-clause.  
Unsurprisingly, moral hazard issue dominated discussions of bailouts and the introduc-
tion of common safety measures such as the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) or 
Eurobonds. In May 2010, however, it also entered the monetary policy arena. Because 
monetary accommodation affects the borrowing costs of governments, critics feared 
that too much of it would let profligate governments off the hook. While this goes for 
any kind of monetary loosening, the moral hazard argument is obviously most relevant 
                                              
105 “Der Markt kann seine Rolle im Interesse der Gemeinschaft nur dann befriedigend erfüllen, wenn die Freiheit 
der Handlung mit der Haftung für die Folgen verbunden ist“ (author’s translation). 
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for the purchases of government bonds. As the SMP even implied that the ECB pur-
chased government bonds selectively rather than for the currency area as a whole, 
German critics were furious. In their eyes, the ECB allowed the Greek government to 
get away with murder – and thus invited everybody else to break the fiscal rules, too.  
Therefore many believe the ECB’s monetary conservatism in 2010 and 2011 to be 
linked to the broken taboo of buying government bonds. Having already infuriated the 
political and economic establishment of its biggest economy and triggered the resigna-
tion of two German officials from the Governing Council, the ECB under Trichet ap-
peared to appease the Germans by signalling its strong anti-inflation commitment. 
Thus, its bond purchases were sterilized and accompanied with a rate hike, which at 
that time “came in part as a reaction to the German criticism of the ECB” (Brun-
nermeier et al. 2016: 326).  
6.3 Too little, too late? The ECB’s catch-up policies 2012-2016 
When Mario Draghi took over as ECB President at the end of 2011, he inherited an 
economy in dire straits. And the worst was yet to come! In hindsight, however, the 
changeover from Trichet to Draghi marks a turnaround in ECB history. His arrival 
brought with it a plethora of new policies as well as very different leadership. I argue 
that a remarkable shift in economic ideas formed the undercurrent of these changes, 
which allowed Draghi to steer the ECB into new waters. Within the first half of his 
eight-year term, Draghi has arguably turned the ECB into a different institution; an 
institution which is much more open to economic stabilization with the means of mon-
etary policy than the ‘old’ ECB or its predecessor, the Bundesbank, had been. As big 
changes take time, however, the ECB’s “remarkable metamorphosis” (Davies 2015) 
was not accomplished overnight.  
The Draghi era began with a double whammy: the economy was headed for another 
recession, while the Euro’s very survival remained in question. The rate cut in his first 
meeting as ECB President symbolized a policy reversal much-welcomed by outlets 
like the New York Times, which hoped that the cut would set the stage for purchases of 
government bonds in order “to bring some stability to Europe” (New York Times 
2011). This was arguably the primary duty in 2012: the ECB had to first prevent a 
breakup of the Eurozone before it could reconsider the way it went about its core task 
of monetary policy. After a relatively calm beginning of 2012, the Euro crisis peaked 
once more in late spring. By the end of April the complete collapse of the Eurozone 
seemed a realistic scenario again and investors increasingly priced in a ‘redenomina-
tion’ risk premium for PIIGS government bonds, implying a certain probability that 
these states could be forced to leave the euro (Micossi 2015: 15). It was against this 
backdrop, that Mario Draghi spoke the three words that earned him the unofficial title 
of ‘savior of the Euro’. In an attempt to stop speculations about Eurozone break-up 
probabilities, which risked turning into a self-fulfilling prophecy, he delivered a pow-
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erful message at the Global Investment Conference in London on July 26: “Within our 
mandate, the ECB is ready to do whatever it takes to preserve the euro. And believe 
me, it will be enough” (Draghi 2012a). 
6.3.1 ‘Whatever it takes’: economic theory in court 
The ECB subsequently backed up the famous ‘whatever it takes’ remarks with the 
Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) program. With the OMT, the ECB’s crisis-
fighting clearly reached a new stage. While bond purchases under the SMP had been 
limited and temporary, they were potentially unlimited and open-ended under the 
OMT scheme. In return, the program introduced the conditionality the SMP had 
lacked. This means the ECB would potentially buy unlimited volumes of government 
bonds, but only in exchange for economic reforms. While these specifications are 
highly relevant, they have yet to be teste. Draghi’s announcement alone was enough to 
spectacularly reverse market developments. In one way, the policy thus proved to be a 
free lunch: the credible commitment to do ‘whatever it takes’ was sufficient to elimi-
nate the speculative equilibrium (Giavazzi et al. 2013). It seemed to show that credibly 
committing to purchase government bonds may actually be the best way to avoid mak-
ing purchases in the first place. Widely considered a crucial turning point in the crisis, 
the effectiveness of OMT is undisputed. Mario Draghi (2013a) himself claimed that 
“it’s really very hard not to state that OMT has been probably the most successful 
monetary policy measure undertaken in recent time”. The Financial Times agreed and 
consequently crowned Draghi as the Person of the Year 2012 for allegedly saving the 
Euro’.  
For all its success, however, the OMT failed to silence critics. Quite the opposite: if 
the SMP had created frustrations in Germany, the OMT provoked outright anger. As a 
result, the program even became the subject of legal confrontations in front of both the 
German Constitutional Court and the European Court of Justice. These courts, then, 
were to decide whether the OMT qualified as a monetary policy tool, designed to re-
pair the monetary transmission mechanism and thus covered by the ECB’s mandate – 
or whether it was actually a tool to improve governments’ budgets instead. Curiously, 
this conjured up a situation in which judges came to evaluate economic theories (Win-
kler 2014; de Grauwe 2014). The program would be considered legal if the courts fol-
lowed the ECB’s argument that peripheral sovereign bond prices reflected unwarrant-
ed concerns about the future of the Eurozone and therefore a completely speculative 
impairment of the monetary transmission mechanism. However, if these bond prices 
were considered to reflect underlying fundamentals, as the efficient market hypothesis 
holds, there would be no need to correct them. Indeed, in this view the ECB’s attempt 
to correct for market distortions was an attempt to artificially lower ‘correct’ market 
prices – and thus a source of distortions itself, (de Grauwe & Ji 2015: 743).  
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Ironically, these opposing positions were argued in front of the German court by two 
former German colleagues: Bundesbank President Weidmann and Jörg Asmussen, 
who had replaced Stark at the ECB Executive Board and thus presented the ECB posi-
tion. Curiously, the two men had not only cooperated well in their previous positions 
as high-ranking bureaucrats in Berlin; they had also studied together at the University 
of Bonn, supervised by Weidmann’s predecessor Axel Weber. While Asmussen shared 
the economic worldviews of Stark and Weber (Spiegel 2014), he believed that ex-
traordinary times required extraordinary measures and thus appeared much more 
pragmatic in his role at the ECB. Regarding his position in the OMT controversy, he 
said: “You have peacetime and then you have wartime. In peacetime, I’m on the Bun-
desbank line, but the situation was very different” (Asmussen, cit. in Spiegel 2014). 
Following this pragmatic approach, Asmussen was able to build bridges between 
Frankfurt and Berlin, and seemed the right person to make the ECB’s case in court. In 
his testimony in June 2013 he stated that “the OMT programme seeks only to reduce 
unwarranted interest rate spikes [and was] the necessary and appropriate step to elimi-
nate the disruption in the transmission of monetary policy” (Asmussen 2013, my em-
phasis). Weidmann, on the other hand, challenged the idea that divergent bond yields 
constituted a disruption of the transmission mechanism in need of correction. The 
German judges in Karlsruhe subscribed to Weidmann’s reading of economic theory 
and, consequently, declared the OMT illegal. However, in an unprecedented move it 
referred the case to the European Court of Justice (ECJ), asking for its opinion with 
regard to European law. 
In June 2015, the ECJ vindicated the ECB’s position as they found the OMT scheme 
in its original form as compliant with EU law – and referred the case back to Karls-
ruhe. Several German politicians and economists called on the German court not to be 
swayed by the ECJ verdict, which had made an “unfortunate error of judgment”, as 
Hans-Werner Sinn argued106 (FT 2015). The German Constitutional Court thus faced a 
situation in which a ruling in line with its previously expressed opinion could have 
brought back the Euro crisis and, potentially, unraveled EMU. Consequently, in mid-
2016 the German court finally backed down and accepted the ECJ’s verdict, thereby 
confirming its “well-earned reputation of the Dog that Barks but does not Bite” 
(Weiler 2009: 505). Whichever position one adopts regarding the OMT controversy, 
the legal odyssey underscored that the ECB’s mandate could be understood in very 
different ways. While critics continue to claim that the program ‘clearly’ oversteps the 
mandate, Draghi (2012b) famously held that “fulfilling our mandate sometimes re-
quires us to go beyond standard monetary policy tools.” 
It is also true that both the position of Germany’s Constitutional Court and the coun-
terargument put forth by the ECB and the ECJ do not bode well for the efficient mar-
                                              
106 “Mario Draghi vindicated as court backs ECB bond-buying plan”, Financial Times, 16 Jun 2015. 
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ket hypothesis. While the Germans argued that markets were ‘wrong’ to forget about 
country-specific risks between the start of the euro and the beginning of the Euro crisis 
(roughly 1999-2009), European institutions held that they were right then, but were 
acting irrationally from 2009 onwards. At first sight, the three different stages in Euro-
pean sovereign bond markets between 1995 and 2015 as depicted in Figure 2.3 (see p. 
31) appear to support this view. Surely, markets got it wrong at some point; either dur-
ing the Euro’s first decade or afterwards.  
Mark Blyth (2015: 81f.) offers a third perspective, however, according to which mar-
kets did not behave irrationally at any stage, but rather immorally. In what he calls 
‘The Mother of All Moral Hazard Trades,’ Blyth argues that European banks deliber-
ately bought peripheral sovereign bonds in huge amounts to reap the benefits offered 
by the small but significant differences in yield between core and peripheral bonds. As 
these banks were both excessively leveraged and too big to fail from a national per-
spective, they could count on their government to bail them out in case that trade 
would incur losses large enough to threaten their existence. According to this view, 
financial market actors had not forgotten about country-specific risks once the Euro 
arrived; they simply didn’t care. The problem, according to Blyth, was that each indi-
vidual bank could successfully play that game if it was too big to fail individually; if 
many or all banks played after the same logic, however, they became too big to bail 
collectively. And this dynamic threatened the very survival of the Eurozone, at least 
until Mario Draghi spoke his magic three words. 
6.3.2 A long time coming: Eurozone QE 
The OMT undeniably eliminated the most immediate threat for the Eurozone, but it 
did not end the recession. The euro had survived, but most of its member states re-
mained in a precarious state, economically and politically. To state it differently: while 
it overcame the risk of acute heart failure, this did not mean that the Eurozone’s chron-
ic diseases were cured as well. To the contrary, after the double dip recession of 
2008/09 and 2012, the Eurozone economy failed to recover reasonably swiftly. A brief 
look at economic fundamentals demonstrates this: after having moved more or less in 
tandem with the US and the UK throughout the first stage of the crisis, real GDP 
growth in the Eurozone fell behind after 2011 and never caught up (see Figure 6.6). At 
the same time, unemployment remained stubbornly high ever since the fall of Lehman 
and rose even further after 2011, in particular in the PIIGS countries. 
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Fig. 6.6: Real GDP Growth (bars, left axis) and unemployment (lines, right axis) in 
the Euro Area, the US and the UK, 2007-2016 
Over the following years, the ECB tried a variety of approaches to address the ongoing 
economic malaise: negative interest rates, forward guidance, and still more liquidity 
for banks. However, it would not add the ultimate weapon of QE to its armory until 
January 2015. While the BoE repeatedly extended its purchases, and the Fed went 
from QE2 to QE3, the ECB remained skeptical that QE indeed was what it took for the 
Eurozone to recover. All other tools had to be exhausted first. Regarding interest rates, 
the ECB finally broke through the 1 percent floor with a cut of 25 basis points in July 
2012. Further cuts of the same size would follow in May and November 2013, bring-
ing the ECB’s main refinancing rate to 0.25 percent (where the Fed’s rate had already 
remained for precisely 5 years). Throughout 2014, the ECB would then lower the rate 
even further than the Fed or BoE had ever gone: first to 0.15, then to 0.05 percent – 
and, rather symbolically, to 0.00 percent in early 2016. 
This closing in on the zero lower bound was matched with two other policies: a new 
communication policy and the introduction of negative interest rates for the ECB’s 
deposit facility. Forward Guidance implied that if rates could not go any lower now, 
the ECB could still promise low rates for tomorrow. This follows the rationale that 
actors’ expectations of future interest rates affect the choices they make today, includ-
ing the decisions on employment, production, and price-setting that monetary policy 
typically seeks to influence (ECB 2014). In the context of monetary stimulus, the theo-
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ry states that announcing rates to be ‘lower for longer’ raises inflation expectations and 
thereby lowers real interest rates (den Haan 2013: 9-15). The adoption of Forward 
Guidance then is perhaps the most obvious recognition of Woodford’s dictum that 
monetary policy works mainly through expectations (see chapter 4). Since the ECB 
followed in the footsteps of many other central banks,107 and the policy came at essen-
tially zero cost, adopting forward guidance was perhaps the ECB’s least controversial 
change. 
The opposite could be said for its negative interest rate policy, or NIRP. From June 
2014 onwards banks were charged a small fee if they drew on ECB liquidity simply to 
park it in their accounts with the central bank – instead of increasing lending. It goes 
without saying that this didn’t make the banks happy. While Draghi presented the pol-
icy coolly as additional support for lending to the real economy, opponents saw noth-
ing less than “the end of capitalism” (according to a headline of the German newspa-
per Die Welt, see Straubhaar 2014). Georg Fahrenschon, President of the German Sav-
ings Banks Association, accused the ECB of a creeping “expropriation of savers” and 
was joined by several prominent figures, particularly in Germany (for an overview see 
Bindseil et al. 2015: 3-5). The ECB took savers’ concerns very seriously and respond-
ed by publishing explainers and even YouTube-Videos with subtitles in different lan-
guages.108 Yet it did not back down from the policy. Instead, it went increasingly 
deeper into negative territory.  
Finally, loans to banks: by the end of 2011, some big European banks which held big 
amounts of Greek bonds looked almost as troubled as four years before, when they had 
realized just how worthless the mortgage backed securities in their balance sheets 
were. Another credit crunch was looming. In December, the ECB thus revived the 
LTRO tool to provide banks with unlimited liquidity once more. It announced a new 
round of unlimited lending, this time with even longer maturities (of three years) and 
even looser collateral requirements. With the new 3-year LTROs, widely perceived as 
a success, the ECB managed a considerable expansion of its balance sheet (Darracq-
Paries & De Santis 2013). On the surface, this program still kept the distinction be-
tween liquidity help for banks and monetary policy intact. And indeed, the banks 
parked most of the new liquidity in overnight deposits with the ECB. However, since 
banks also used some of that liquidity to purchase government bonds, authors like Wil-
lem Buiter and Ebrahim Rahbari (2012) speculated that this indirect support for gov-
ernment bonds may have been the real, albeit unofficial, purpose of the program. They 
therefore claimed that the new LTROs saw the ECB indirectly acting as a lender of 
last resort to governments (Buiter & Rahbari 2012; also see Wyplosz 2012). Following 
similar lines of reasoning, others have called LTRO ‘QE in disguise’ (Pisani-Ferry & 
                                              
107 The Fed started explicitly guiding expectations of future rates as early as 2008/09 and central banks in New 
Zealand or Norway even did so long before the financial crisis (den Haan 2013: 2). 
108 see https://www.ecb.europa.eu/explainers/tell-me-more/html/why-negative-interest-rate.en.html 
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Wolff 2012). However, the economic situation had to deteriorate further for ‘real QE’ 
to arrive. 
The threat of deflation: real or imagined? 
The advent of negative rates demonstrated that the ECB was neither afraid of unchart-
ed waters109 nor of protest from German banks and savers. But it certainly took excep-
tional circumstances to make such a radical innovation possible. Beginning in mid-
2012, inflation figures declined steadily and by 2014 deflation had replaced inflation 
as the central bank’s main concern – not only in Europe but worldwide (see Figure 6.7 
below). Again, much of this fluctuation in prices can be explained with developments 
in commodity markets (and extremely low oil prices in particular). Other contributing 
factors such as demography, economic inequality, the impact of years of austerity and 
corresponding losses in demand, or a general decline of productivity were discussed 
controversially and some went so far as to predict a long era of secular stagnation (see 
Summers 2014; Gordon 2016).  
Yet no matter what causes prices to fall, it is impossible for central bankers to ignore 
such developments. The fear of a deflationary spiral – when expectations of falling 
prices lead people to postpone investments and purchases, thereby producing further 
falls in prices and economic activity – thus started to dominate monetary policy de-
bates from 2013 onwards. Arguably, deflations also bring about very different politics 
than inflations (Blyth 2007). As deflationary situations resemble a multi-person pris-
oner’s dilemma – individually rational behavior leads to a situation that is collectively 
disastrous – they require a state response (and thus empower central bankers as agents 
of the state). Furthermore, there is no trade-off between price stability and supporting 
growth any more, not even in the short run. In such a situation, monetary policy de-
bates then focus on the question of how to fight deflation rather than on the direction 
of policy. Everything points towards accommodation! 
                                              
109 The policy had previously only been adopted by central banks of smaller economies such as Denmark, Swe-
den, and Switzerland.  
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Fig. 6.7: HICP inflation rates in the Euro Area, the US and the UK, 2007-2016 
Against this backdrop it is noteworthy that the ECB preferred the uncharted waters of 
negative interest rates over the QE policies others had already implemented success-
fully. Expanding the money supply through bond purchases remained such a toxic sub-
ject in Europe that even negative rates appeared the lesser of two evils. Perhaps even 
more remarkable is the fact that the ECB’s balance sheet was actually shrinking after 
Draghi’s controversial ‘whatever it takes’ remarks. As unlimited purchases under the 
OMT scheme remained only a theoretical possibility and banks increasingly repaid 
loans made in previous rounds of credit easing (LTROs), the total value of the ECB’s 
balance sheet fell from around 270 percent of its pre-crisis level in July 2012 to a mere 
177 percent in September 2014 (see Fig. 6.8 below). This is worth restating: in a year 
like 2013 marked by negative growth, record-breaking unemployment rates as well as 
inflation rates below the ECB’s target, the central bank’s balance sheet was shrinking 
rather than expanding.  
Throughout 2014, however, inflation rates fell further and outright deflation became a 
real threat for the Eurozone. As all of the ECB’s attempts to stimulate economic activi-
ty and keep inflation rates from falling further had failed, its shrinking balance sheet 
increasingly came under attack. In response, the ECB communicated the goal of mov-
ing the balance sheet back “towards the dimensions it had at the beginning of 2012” 
(Draghi 2014c). However, the Governing Council was still not ready to reach for the 
big bazooka (QE) to achieve this. Instead, it first tried another round of LTROs, but 
with a new twist. The 2014 version was Targeted (thus called TLTRO), in the sense 
that it made the provision of liquidity to banks conditional on how much they lent to 
firms and households. As banks had mostly stuffed propped up their balance sheets or 
used the liquidity to buy government bonds (thus the term ‘QE in disguise’), this round 
was designed to finally stimulate lending (Merler 2014). A new plan to buy private 
assets – ironically, the notorious mortgage backed securities that had caused the finan-
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cial crisis to escalate in 2008 – accompanied the TLTROs. Yet both moves proved not 
to be enough. 
The QE design challenge: boosting animal spirits while containing moral hazard 
As 2014 came to a close, the ECB had tried almost everything to push up prices and 
growth. Yet inflation kept falling. In this situation, QE was the only option left. As in 
the controversial OMT matter, Mario Draghi paved the way by foreshadowing the pol-
icy turn in a speech. ‘Whatever it takes’ became ‘what we must’. On 21 November 
2014, he told an audience of bankers in Frankfurt that “We will do what we must to 
raise inflation and inflation expectations as fast as possible”, emphasizing that the 
ECB stood ready to alter “the size, pace and composition of our purchases” (Draghi 
2014d). Most commentators agreed that Eurozone QE was indeed a necessity, but they 
remained unsure whether Draghi would be able to overcome German opposition. In 
anticipation of the final battle over QE, Governing Council politics started heating up 
to levels not seen before. In the words of the Commerzbank’s chief economist Jörg 
Krämer, a prominent ECB watcher and Shadow Council member: “There’s an enor-
mous conflict within the Governing Council on what the ECB should do […] Clearly, 
it’s Draghi against Weidmann once again. In the end, Draghi will get his way and we 
will see quantitative easing next year.”110 
He was right. Weidmann had repeatedly made his opposition clear in the media, sug-
gesting that there were no significant risks of a deflation spiral in the euro zone and 
being an independent central bank focused on price stability required “not falling into 
the trap of ‘This time is different.’” (Wall Street Journal, 7 Oct 2014). This left Draghi 
with a clear choice: to move ahead without the consent of some members of the Gov-
erning Council or wait for unanimity that was unlikely to ever arrive. In the press con-
ference of its December 2014 meeting, Draghi made his preference clear: “You asked 
whether we need to have unanimity to proceed on QE, or can we have a majority? I 
think we don’t need to have unanimity!” (Draghi 2014e) 
When energy prices fell further at the beginning of 2015, this added to deflation fears 
and made Eurozone QE a near certainty in the eyes of the markets – even before the 
program was officially announced on January 22nd. Strategists of BNP Paribas, for 
instance, wrote in early January: “Amid mounting evidence that the measures taken by 
the ECB to date have not yielded the desired results, quantitative easing, in the shape 
of outright buying of government bonds by the ECB, is looking more and more like a 
done deal.”111 QE appeared inevitable, but the program’s design was a matter of tough 
negotiations. In the end, the ECB’s QE program turned out to differ from other poli-
cies in important ways: while the ECB bought only very limited amounts of bonds un-
der the SMP and has yet to spend a single euro under the OMT program, QE finally 
                                              
110 “ECB Clash Resumes as Draghi Spars With Weidmann on Stimulus”, Bloomberg, 12 Oct 2014.  
111 “Stocks Close Sharply Higher on Prospects of ECB Stimulus”, Wall Street Journal, 8 Jan 2015.  
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saw the ECB boosting the money supply through unsterilized purchases of government 
bonds on a large scale. The program also differed from all previous policies in that it 
was explicitly designed to raise inflation and economic activity – and not to repair the 
normal transmission mechanism. With monthly purchases of €60 billion, it was also 
bigger than markets had expected. It was the ‘big bazooka’! 
 
Fig. 6.8: Value of Assets: ECB, Fed and BoE, 2007-2016 (1 Jan 2007=100) 
However, QE could not arrive without concessions to the Bundesbank. Since the bond 
purchases were to be carried out by the national central banks (NCBs) rather than the 
ECB itself, the Bundesbank had demanded that NCBs only purchase their own gov-
ernment’s debt. Under the ECB’s usual risk-sharing arrangements national central 
banks share losses in proportion to the capital key (see Table 3.1) – meaning that the 
Bundesbank would have had to take on roughly 25 percent of any losses in cases of a 
default or debt restructuring (as in Greece). Driven by concerns about moral hazard 
and potential losses for German taxpayers, the Bundesbank succeeded in avoiding the 
ordinary risk-sharing scheme for 80 percent of the overall purchases to be made. Risk-
sharing in line with the capital key would only apply to the remaining 20 percent of 
purchases. As this established the principles of national liability and responsibility for 
most bond purchases, there were clearly distinguishable ordoliberal fingerprints on the 
ECB’s QE package. 
The program thus created a precedent for the ECB that some argued would both limit 
its effectiveness and risked creating further divisions among member states. The Econ-
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omist (2015a) therefore called it QE “on German terms”. Reflecting on the program’s 
limitations posed by limited risk-sharing, longtime ECB watcher David Marsh (2015) 
concluded: “The Bundesbank’s overt veto power exposes the limits of Draghi’s cele-
brated yet never-tested July 2012 declaration that the ECB would ‘do whatever it 
takes’ to shore up the single currency.” Draghi’s own statements suggest, however, 
that he regarded the limited risk-sharing scheme as rather irrelevant and thus a price 
worth paying to prevent German economists running amok (and also allowing the 
Bundesbank to save some face in front of the German public). What arguably mattered 
much more to him was the size of the program, which was bigger than expected. This 
suggests that the ECB took animal spirits very seriously, hoping that a surprise on the 
upside would lead to correspondingly strong announcement effects.  
QE did have beneficial effects on credit conditions, particularly in credit-starved coun-
tries such as Italy. However, it did not lift inflation back to the ECB’s target of ‘below, 
but close to, 2 percent’ within the following year. Consequently, the ECB further in-
creased monetary accommodation at a number of occasions: it pushed the rate for its 
deposit facility further into negative territory, extended the duration of the QE program 
and, in March 2016, also increased its size from €60bn to €80bn per month. Finally, it 
also launched another of liquidity operations for banks which rewarded increased lend-
ing (TLTRO2). Needless to say, none of these further steps to provide monetary ac-
commodation were uncontroversial and the old dividing lines persisted.  
By the beginning of 2017, however, there seemed to be new light at the end of the tun-
nel. The ECB reached its inflation target for the first time in over four years and the 
economic recovery of the Eurozone appeared surprisingly resilient in a time of serious 
political risks. All this led Draghi to declare victory against the threat of deflation in 
the ECB’s press conference of March 2017, when he stated that “there is no longer that 
sense of urgency in taking further actions” (Draghi 2017). As a consequence, the Eu-
ropean debates finally shifted toward the question of when to end the era of unconven-
tional monetary policy and raise rates – again years after such discussions began in in 
the US or the UK. 
Meanwhile in America: a final boost and the arduous return to normal 
The experience of the Fed and the BoE from 2012-16 differed significantly from the 
European situation. Both left interest rates at their record lows and delivered another 
large stimulus through QE in 2012 which boosted their balance sheets to new record 
highs. By mid-2014, both central banks’ assets amounted to more than 500 percent of 
what they had been before the crisis. At that point the ECB’s balance sheet was down 
to just 180 percent of its 2007 level (see Figure 6.8 above). Importantly, these third 
rounds of QE came long before deflation and secular stagnation became the talk of the 
town. What is more, they came at a time when both the US and the UK experienced a 
recovery, albeit a modest one: unemployment numbers started to decline slowly from 
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their post-crisis highs and both economies were experiencing some sort of growth 
(2.3% in the US; 1.2% in the UK) in 2012, while the Eurozone economy was shrinking 
again. Thus, the divide between European and Anglo-Saxon monetary policy even in-
tensified throughout 2012 and 2013, especially in terms of their balance sheet policies. 
While both the Fed and the BoE oversaw economies in much better shape, they still 
did a lot more to help the recovery. 
Again, their willingness to pull more rabbits out of the hat did not go without criticism. 
This goes particularly for the Fed, which made its QE-3 open-ended in nature (thus the 
program’s nickname: ‘QE-Infinity’). Its focus on bringing unemployment down at al-
most any cost, one observer suggested, could be called ‘the reverse Volcker moment’ 
(El-Erian 2012); while Paul Volcker had conquered inflation at the cost of soaring un-
employment in the 1980s, the Fed now seemed to reverse this ranking of objectives.112 
Interestingly, El-Erian remarks that this spectacular reversal may have been helped by 
a particular theory of inflation: “many feel it is virtually impossible for the US to expe-
rience high inflation in the context of such large spare capacity” (ibid). High unem-
ployment equals no upward pressure on wages equals no inflation risks, may have 
been the thinking behind the Fed’s QE-Infinity, according to El-Erian.  
Following their respective third QE-programs the recovery gained traction and unem-
ployment came down in both the US and the UK. The recovery allowed the Fed and 
the BoE to finally end their asset purchases and turn towards ‘normalization’: raising 
rates again. Reflecting on their experiences, the UK newspaper Telegraph (2014) ran 
the headline “QE is over” in October 2014 – half a year before the ECB would buy the 
first bonds under its own QE-scheme. And while the unwinding of their extraordinary 
measures and the return to higher interest rates turned out to be a very tricky task, 
these were problems ECB policymakers would arguably have loved to have in 2014.  
In the meantime, political events such as the UK’s Brexit vote or political attacks on 
the Fed by the new US Presidency have given these institutions new headaches which 
go beyond the scope of this study. Yet, for the period under consideration, both central 
banks have continuously acted faster and provided their economies with significantly 
more monetary accommodation than the ECB did. This goes for unconventional poli-
cies in particular. Preliminary evidence suggests that these policies worked well by 
lowering real interest rates (see Figure 6.9) and thus alleviating some the pain associ-
ated with the Great Recession. In comparison, the ECB long failed to support the 
economy by lowering real interest rates (nominal interest rates minus inflation). In 
fact, throughout 2010 and 2011 the policy stance even tightened, which contributed to 
a double dip recession in the Eurozone. In comparison, the ECB moved extremely 
                                              
112 Behind the Fed’s focus on unemployment, El-Erian admits, was the legitimate concern that persisting job-
lessness among the young and long-term unemployed would create a lost generation – and thus embed cyclical 
unemployment in the structure of the economy (El-Erian 2012). 
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slowly and cautiously, and only managed to bring long-term real interest rates down 
after Mario Draghi took over from Jean-Claude Trichet. 
 
Fig. 6.9: 10-year real interest rates for the Euro Area, the US and the UK, 2004-2014 
(Source: Ubide 2014: 198) 
Shadow Council: urging the ECB to move faster 
The ECB’s Shadow Council (SC) consistently recommended that the ECB follow the 
example of its Anglo-Saxon counterparts, much earlier than it did.113 With near-
unanimity, it urged the ECB to cut rates to zero in early 2012 and to accompany rate 
cuts with further unconventional measures – even though there was often much less 
agreement on the unconventional tool of choice (e.g. see SC, 5.2.2013). When the SC 
recommended the adoption of new tools, however, the ECB would often follow suit, 
albeit with a significant delay. Examples include its adoption of Forward Guidance, 
negative deposit rates, the provision of unlimited liquidity for up to five years includ-
ing incentives for banks to lend to the real economy (following the UK example of 
‘funding for lending’), and, of course, QE (see SC 2.7.2012; SC 29.4.2013; SC 
4.6.2013).  
                                              
113 As the ECB Shadow Council changed its meeting schedule from monthly to quarterly in 2014 (while the ECB 
changed from 12 to 8 meetings a year), the resulting gaps in recommendations do not allow for a further contin-
uation of the figures 4.3 and 4.5. However, as the ECB narrowed in on the zero lower bound during the period of 
2012-16, the focus of the SC also changed towards discussions of the desirability and effectiveness of unconven-
tional tools. 
156 
 
In line with the overall assessment of the SC as hawkish and more activist than the 
ECB when it comes to conventional interest rates policy (see Neuenkirch & Siklos 
2015), the shadow committee also consistently urged the ECB to do more in terms of 
unconventional policy. While the ECB would in the end adopt almost all the measures 
recommended by the SC, it would typically do so on a smaller scale and, crucially, 
only much later. This time lag is of particular relevance because timing matters enor-
mously for the impact of monetary policies on the economy. In other words: there is 
only so much central bankers can do to make up for lost time. 
6.4 Not just what, but when: sticky ideas and the importance of timing 
By 2016 the ECB had clearly become the central bank with the most accommodative 
policies. While its peers slowly moved toward exiting their extraordinary measures, 
the ECB was doubling down. As FT commentator Gavyn Davies (2015) put it, “show-
ing all the zeal of a late convert, the Governing Council is now playing catch up, with 
a vengeance.” And after some time it saw its efforts bear fruit, in particular when cred-
it conditions improved for the crisis-stricken countries of the periphery. Proponents 
even go so far as to claim that the ECB’s QE program “worked wonders: the fact that 
investors now pay Rome to borrow from them suggests that if the Eurozone had done 
QE at the same time as the Fed and the Bank of England, the sovereign debt crisis 
need never have happened” (Sandbu 2015b).  
Instead of asking why the ECB did so little it may thus be more appropriate to ask why 
it took so long to adopt the aggressive measures of its peers. Yet too late can mean too 
little, because timing is crucial for the effectiveness of monetary policies. Since the 
impact of policies depends on how they are transmitted through the financial system, 
changing market conditions can either hamper or facilitate the developments central 
bankers aim for. In other words: what works today will not necessarily work tomor-
row!  
Regarding the impact of interest rate decisions, for instance, Kang et al. (2015) provide 
an estimate of how the rate decisions of the Fed and the ECB after 2007 influenced 
market conditions. They show that the proactive and radical Fed moves in 2007 and 
2008 had stimulating effects on stock markets (see Figure 6.10). On the contrary, “for 
the slower-moving ECB, the market reaction was, on average, negative throughout” 
(Kang et al. 2015: 6). The ECB appeared ‘behind the curve’ as its rate cuts were per-
ceived merely as reactions to deteriorating conditions rather than strong signals of 
monetary loosening. Accordingly they failed to affect financial conditions in the way 
the Fed did – both during the early loosening cycle after Lehman (2007-09) and its 
continuation after the 2011 rate hikes. In addition to coming very late, the ECB’s rate 
decisions were also accompanied by musings about risks of higher inflation (implying 
a certain probability that the central bank might undo these cuts in the near future). 
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Sending such mixed signals, the ECB’s late cuts did little to support the economic re-
covery (ibid: 4-5).  
 
Fig. 6.10: Stock market reactions to interest rate reductions by ECB and Fed, 2007-14 
(Source: Kang et al. 2014: 6) 
A similar argument has been made for the impact of Eurozone QE. As QE came to 
Europe with a delay of almost seven years, leading figures like Larry Summers ex-
pected it to be less successful than the US programs were. The main reason for the dif-
ferential impact is that QE is supposed to work by lowering long-term interest rates – 
as it successfully did when the Fed first adopted the policy in 2008. In 2015, however, 
these rates were already very low in Europe and the impact of QE through this channel 
therefore limited. Furthermore, Summers held that QE in the US worked best when it 
came as a surprise instead of being widely anticipated (as it was in the case of Euro-
zone QE). This mirrors the insight that QE policies tend to influence market conditions 
more at announcement than when they are actually implemented. In sum, “there is 
every reason to expect QE will be less impactful in Europe”,114 partly because it came 
too late.  
What took them so long?  
Contrasting the different stages of ECB policies after the crisis, I agree with the char-
acterization of Gavyn Davies that the ECB under Mario Draghi is indeed ‘playing 
catch up with a vengeance’. Clearly, the two policies which arguably changed the ECB 
forever (OMT and QE) arrived with Draghi. Both programs also embody sharply dif-
ferent beliefs about how the economy works. In particular, they build upon the im-
portance of animal spirits. This is perhaps most obvious in the case of OMT and the 
Draghi’s fabled ‘whatever it takes’, which economists like Nobel Laureate Joseph 
Stiglitz has called a ‘confidence trick’. With only three words – and without spending 
a single Euro – Draghi succeeded in spectacularly reversing market sentiment, which 
                                              
114 “Larry Summers warns QE is no panacea for Europe”, Financial Times, 22 Jan 2015.  
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in the eyes of many saved the Euro. A similar focus on improving animal spirits to 
achieve monetary policy goals can be seen in the ECB’s success with exceeding mar-
ket expectations regarding the size of its QE program. Understanding financial markets 
as driven by human sentiment rather than as an aggregation of perfectly rational ex-
pectations, Draghi pushed for a bigger than expected stimulus to send a strong signal 
that the ECB would indeed deliver whatever it took. 
Beyond these pivotal decisions, Draghi’s speeches reveal that his core economic be-
liefs are influenced by the New Keynesian approach which dominates Anglo-Saxon 
economics in academia and central banking practice – while the arguments by ECB 
hawks like Jens Weidmann and Yves Mersch appear much more influenced by the 
Austrian school of economics and its German branch, Ordoliberalism (see Davies 
2014c). Not only does Draghi attach more importance to the size of the central bank’s 
balance sheet and developments in core rather than headline inflation; the ECB Presi-
dent also appeared more focused on aggregate demand and unemployment problems 
than any of his predecessors at the ECB. Arguably he expressed this shift most clearly 
in his 2014 Jackson Hole speech (for which he reportedly sought advice from the 
Fed’s Vice chair Stanley Fisher, who had been his supervisor at MIT in the 1970s):  
“On the demand side, monetary policy can and should play a central role, 
which currently means an accommodative monetary policy for an extended 
period of time. […] Demand side policies are not only justified by the signifi-
cant cyclical component in unemployment. They are also relevant because, 
given prevailing uncertainty, they help insure against the risk that a weak 
economy is contributing to hysteresis effects. Indeed, while in normal condi-
tions uncertainty would imply a higher degree of caution for fear of over-
shooting, at present the situation is different. The risks of 'doing too little'—
i.e. that cyclical unemployment becomes structural—outweigh those of 'doing 
too much'—that is, excessive upward wage and price pressures.” (Draghi 
2014f, my emphasis) 
In this view, monetary policy “can and should” help to provide more demand in order 
to prevent temporary and cyclical unemployment after the crisis from turning into a 
structural problem (called hysteresis effect). In other words: monetary policy can have 
a lasting effect on employment growth and should therefore be used more actively. 
What Draghi considered possible shaped what he deemed desirable (Steinmo 2003). 
It is hard to overstate the ideational shift at the ECB’s top that occurred when Draghi 
took over from Trichet. Yet this did not turn the ECB’s policies around immediately. It 
is important to note that monetary policy actually tightened during Draghi’s first year 
at the helm. For much of 2012 the ECB’s balance sheet was shrinking and real interest 
rates were rising across the Eurozone. This underlines that it took Draghi a long time 
to convince his fellow policymakers in the Governing Council. After all, the ECB 
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makes monetary policy in a committee setting, in which the President is only the first 
among equals. He oversees the preparation of decisions and may enjoy some agenda-
setting power as chair of committee meetings (see Chapter 3). Yet his vote counts as 
much as anybody else’s on the Governing Council. Changing the ECB’s stance thus 
requires patiently forging a consensus through careful argument and central bank di-
plomacy.  
Economic ideas are sticky, especially when they are as deeply embedded institutional-
ly as in the case of monetary conservatism at the European Central Bank. Proponents 
of a more activist monetary policy stance within the Eurosystem had to overcome the 
skepticism, and sometimes open opposition, of their colleagues trained in the Bundes-
bank tradition. As this prevented the ECB from tearing up its rulebook and embark on 
monetary experiments in uncharted waters as quickly as other central banks did, Euro-
pean monetary policy remained behind the curve for most of the post-crisis years. This 
has not only proven consequential for Europe’s economic and political landscape, 
where long years of recession have turned cyclical unemployment into structural prob-
lems – with all the fragmentation and radicalization of politics this entailed. As shown 
above, the long wait has also limited the contribution the ECB’s monetary policies 
could make in stabilizing the Eurozone economy over the past decade. Yet, as green 
shoots are beginning to appear in the Eurozone economy in early 2017, optimists have 
reason to remain hopeful that the ECB’s conversion came late, but not too late.   
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7. HOW THE WORLD WORKS: 
CLASHING IDEAS AND THEIR POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE 
 “So this is a period of uncertainty and so you have good people sitting in that room,  
smart people, trying to figure it out. And it shouldn’t be surprising at all that  
all of these smart people have different ways of thinking about this.” 
Charles Plosser, 30 January 2015   
Central bankers have different ideas about how the (economic) world works. This 
alone might have surprised many before the financial crisis hit, given that central 
bankers were usually thought of as a global family, or even a clan (Marcussen 2009). 
After gaining their Economics PhDs at elite universities and perhaps some additional 
experience in the financial sector, these timid technocrats would typically cultivate 
their highly specialized knowledge through many exchanges in tightly-knit networks. 
Through these interactions, they established a broad consensus about the technicalities 
of monetary policymaking – something ordinary mortals had no way (or wish) of 
comprehending – and consequently governments around the globe granted them aston-
ishing levels of autonomy to manage their currencies.  
In the challenging ‘new normal’ of monetary policy after the crisis, however, central 
bankers regularly (and publicly) revealed that they can and do disagree. Quite funda-
mental differences in thinking have resurfaced. This dissertation thus argues that these 
different ways of thinking about the economy influence the policy choices central 
bankers make – in particular during crises. Facing situations they had never seen be-
fore, their economic beliefs provided central bankers with guidance when they could 
no longer rely on past experience. And given their large degree of autonomy as well as 
their ever-increasing list of responsibilities after the crisis, this had far-reaching impli-
cations for economic policy. 
Recognizing these differences in economic thinking helps us to understand the ECB’s 
lagged response to the Great Recession as well as the level of conflict and the dividing 
lines within the Eurosystem. My survey data suggests that the ECB was caught in the 
middle between an orthodox core and a more revisionist periphery. More specifically, 
economists in Northern European central banks differ from their colleagues in South-
ern Europe (as well as Anglo-American institutions). Northern European economists 
are both more skeptical about what contribution monetary policy can make to stabilize 
the economy and more concerned about inflationary risks associated with unconven-
tional policies. They are less optimistic about what they can do and, at the same time, 
more concerned about trying to do too much. And as beliefs about what is possible 
“critically shape what is desirable” (Steinmo 2003: 209), Northern European central 
bankers are much more conservative and more reluctant to experiment than central 
bankers elsewhere. 
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Trying to find some middle ground between the divergent beliefs and preferences of 
its member institutions, the ECB remained closer to previous orthodoxy in its response 
to the Great Recession than the Federal Reserve or the Bank of England, which quick-
ly tore up their rulebooks. Inside the Eurosystem, proponents of activist monetary pol-
icy (and balance sheet policies in particular) had to overcome enormous resistance 
from within before they could follow the examples set by other central banks. This is 
why ECB monetary policy remained relatively conservative for a very long time. This 
is why it first did too little to support the economy, and only changed its orthodox 
stance very late.  
While much of the public and academic debates focused on battles between the ECB 
and the Bundesbank – or Draghi vs. Weidmann – my survey data suggests a more nu-
anced picture. Since Germany does not occupy a veto position in ECB policymaking 
(as it arguably does in other EU policymaking institutions) German central bankers 
have to convince their fellow policymakers in the Eurosystem to make a difference. 
Otherwise they are simply outvoted in the Governing Council, as they repeatedly have 
been throughout the crisis. This is why I argue that the ECB is constrained by German-
style thinking rather than by German interests. German power in the ECB, to the ex-
tent that it exists, is primarily rooted in Lukes’ third face of power, namely the power 
to shape perceptions, cognitions and preferences (Lukes 2004: 28).  
Put simply, monetary orthodoxy prevailed, not ‘Germany’. This does not only mean 
that conservative economic ideas are endorsed by many German central bankers and 
politicians; it means that these ideas are shared by other people, too. And this includes, 
most importantly, central bankers beyond German borders. My survey data suggests 
that central bank economists from Northern European institutions both within the Eu-
rosystem (e.g. Austria, Belgium, Finland, Luxemburg) and beyond (e.g. Sweden, 
Switzerland) hold similar economic beliefs as their Bundesbank colleagues. Since a 
single country cannot veto policies in a committee of ‘one man, one vote’, it is essen-
tial for Bundesbank officials to find like-minded policymakers in other institutions. 
And because they often do, they successfully kept the ECB from pursuing more ex-
pansionary policies before 2014. 
This underscores the argument made by Brunnermeier et al. (2016) that the battle for 
the Euro indeed is a battle of ideas. Rather than focusing on one particular macroeco-
nomic worldview, these authors wisely speak of northern and southern theories (in 
plural) and forcefully argue that economic traditions are not written in stone. In line 
with this, I observe that big labels such as ‘Keynesianism’ or ‘Ordoliberalism’ do not 
take us very far in understanding concrete monetary policy outcomes. Given the prom-
inence of such economic paradigms in the literature, this point requires qualification. It 
is true that many of the ‘orthodox’ positions identified in this thesis could be labelled 
as ‘Ordoliberal’. This goes for the skepticism about monetary activism to stabilize the 
163 
 
economy, worries about inflationary risks of money growth at the zero lower bound, 
and, particularly, concerns about moral hazard. Yet it is also true that Ordoliberalism is 
compatible with a lot of standard economic analysis. Consequently, economists in my 
survey who identified with Ordoliberalism also identified with Keynesianism or Neo-
classical Economics. More generally, rather than representing different ends of a spec-
trum, adherents of different paradigms appeared surprisingly close regarding several 
survey questions on their more specific economic beliefs. They did differ, but in de-
gree rather than in kind. 
This is why I argue that the influence of ideas on monetary policy is best understood in 
terms of the concrete beliefs of ‘what works’ rather than in terms of paradigms. I thus 
operationalize economic ideas as causal beliefs, implying probabilistic arguments that 
connect causes and effects in the economy. In terms of the distinction made by typolo-
gies in Campbell (1998) or Schmidt (2008), my study focuses on the cognitive rather 
than the normative dimension of ideas. Regarding the level of generality, this empha-
sizes the policy dimension of ideas (ideas supporting particular policy solutions) rather 
than the broader dimensions of programs/paradigms or even philosophies/worldviews 
(see Schmidt 2008: 306-9). Such cognitive ideas offer clues as to what effects a partic-
ular policy is likely to have, which enables policymakers to reduce uncertainty in the 
decision-making process and thus makes consensus-building possible. 
When agents engage in policy debates, however, cognitive ideas are often linked to 
normative ones. This is because ideas are most persuasive when conveyed with moral 
force: “Knowing how things work best is more compelling when fused to a notion of 
how things should be” (Seabrooke & Wigan 2016: 357). While my analysis focuses on 
the role of cognitive ideas in decision-making processes among elites (coordinative 
discourse), we can observe the mix of the cognitive and normative in central bankers’ 
communicative discourses with the public.115 Mario Draghi delivered one illustrative 
example in 2016: 
“In the course of the last few years some commentators were cautioning that 
our policies would cause runaway inflation. They didn’t. Others warned that 
we were exposing ourselves to heavy losses from expanding our balance 
sheet and accepting lower-quality collateral. In fact we haven’t had a single 
loss. Then those same authorities claimed that our policies were illegal. The 
European Court of Justice disagreed. Now they warn us about the side-
effects and risks of what we’re doing.  
But what I never hear them discuss is the risks of doing nothing. What 
would that mean for our price stability mandate, and therefore for growth 
and jobs, and eventually, for the future of our monetary union? Those are, to 
                                              
115 For the distinction between coordinative and communicative discourse, see Schmidt (2008). 
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my mind, the real risks we have to be concerned about. And the path our 
monetary policy is taking is, in that sense, the path of risk reduction.” 
(Draghi 2016b, his emphasis) 
Here Draghi clearly linked his belief that monetary policy can make a contribution to 
stabilize the economy to the moral obligation to alleviate economic hardship and pre-
serve the Euro. Speaking at the New Year’s Reception of the Deutsche Börse Group in 
Eschborn – the heartland of monetary orthodoxy – Draghi attempted to frame expan-
sionary monetary policy in a legitimate context by turning to moral arguments. 
The orthodox camp followed similar discursive strategies. A common thread connect-
ing the speeches of German central bankers throughout the crisis is the concern that 
the ECB’s expansionary policies might let underserving spendthrift governments off 
the hook. While this argument is usually phrased as a forward-looking concern about 
the moral hazard implications of such a policy, there is a distinct moralistic undertone 
to it. In its starkest form, Ordoliberal criticism holds that the ECB prevents financial 
markets from giving profligate governments the punishment they deserve. Against this 
backdrop, the Economist (2015b) quotes the former Italian Prime Minister Mario 
Monti as claiming that “in Germany economics is seen as a branch of moral philoso-
phy”. This link to normative aspects suggests that European central bankers – despite 
their independence – are well aware of the importance of public support for their ideas 
and policies. They realize that their interpretations of how the economy works and the 
policy implications that follow from that will be particularly effective when shared by 
a broader population (Widmaier et al. 2007: 749). Thus, ideas are most powerful when 
linked to moral authority (Seabrooke & Wigan 2016). 
Whose ideas matter, why, and how? 
Yet it is one thing to claim that ideas matter and quite another to specify why they 
matter, how they matter – and whose ideas they are in the first place. First, why did 
ideas matter for ECB policymaking during the crisis? Here, my argument rests on the 
well-established insight that ideas affect real-world outcomes most directly when un-
certainty is high (see Blyth 2002; 2006; 2010; Best 2008).116 It is widely recognized 
that economic crises shake up existing orders and make far-reaching changes possible. 
Materialist analyses tend to treat crises as exogenous shocks which alter the conditions 
for strategic interaction. I follow the more constructivist reading proposed by Wid-
maier et al. (2007), which holds that even exogenous shocks must be endogenously 
interpreted. In fact, unsettling crisis times alter ‘material’ incentives precisely because 
they are interpreted differently by agents (ibid: 749). Mark Blyth makes this case most 
forcefully: “Ideas [...] are important because without having ideas as to how the world 
is put together, it would be cognitively impossible for agents to act in that world in any 
                                              
116 Importantly, this does not imply that ideas do not matter in normal times. Rather, it means that ideas matter in 
different ways during periods of relative stability (see Blyth 2002: 27-35). 
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meaningful sense, particularly in situations of Knightian uncertainty that occur during 
the periodic breakdown of capitalist economies (Blyth 2002: 32).  
Importantly, the concept of Knightian uncertainty is more than just an academic con-
cept, imposed ex-post by the social scientist. Central bankers themselves frequently 
make reference to it. In late 2008, ECB President Trichet repeatedly stated that “a use-
ful − albeit not the only − way to characterise recent events is to employ the concept of 
non-measurable risk, or ‘Knightian’ uncertainty” (Trichet 2008c: 169). In fact, central 
bankers as macroeconomists have devoted much time (and ink) to the role of uncer-
tainty in central banking more generally. Even in times considered as ‘normal’, uncer-
tainty influences monetary policymaking, because central bankers’ knowledge about 
the monetary transmission mechanism is necessarily limited. How exactly fluctuations 
in the money supply influence the behavior of economic agents – and thereby prices – 
is not only unknowable; it also changes over time. Against this backdrop, Alan Green-
span stressed that “uncertainty is not just an important feature of the monetary policy 
landscape; it is the defining characteristic of that landscape” (Greenspan 2003). This is 
why “in monetary matters above all, credere (belief) matters” (Blyth 2015: 143). And 
this may be the main reason why so many political science analyses of central banking 
emphasize the role of ideas (e.g. McNamara 1998; Verdun 1999; Marcussen 2000; 
Bell 2004). 
Maastricht does not come with an instruction sheet 
Ideas usually do not float around freely and make a difference by themselves, inde-
pendent of those who hold them. Ideas matter for policy if they influence the mindset 
of individuals in position of authority. To be sure, the more an idea convincingly 
speaks to the (perceived) problems of its time, the more likely it is to influence those 
with the power to make collectively binding decisions. Therefore the power of ideas is 
certainly related to their content. Yet, unless they are endorsed (or at least accepted) by 
policymakers, ideas are obviously unlikely to matter for the policy choices they make. 
This line of reasoning places interpretive agents – here: central bankers trying to make 
sense of a world on fire – at the center of analysis (similarly: Bell 2011).  
Yet this focus on policymakers is only justified if they enjoy the freedom to act on 
their beliefs. Conversely, if we regard policymakers as constrained by powerful politi-
cians, societal interests, with their hands tied by very specific rules about what they 
ought to do, then it arguably makes little difference who these people are and what 
they think. Curiously, this is how the role of central bankers is often understood. Dele-
gation theory predicts that governments grant policymakers autonomy only if they 
commit to binding rules about how to use their powers. A narrow mandate is the flip-
side of central bank independence. In the most extreme form, then, central bankers are 
reducible to a specific reaction function, a policy rule that mechanically adjust the 
money supply in response to incoming economic data. The human factor is zero. Or, in 
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the words of Paul Volcker (2007): “Without art, without judgment and discretion, 
there would be no need for central bankers at all.” 
In reality, central bankers have not been replaced by pre-defined policy rules, but en-
joy discretionary powers to varying degrees. The ECB holds a special status in this 
regard as well. As the world’s only supranational central bank – a central bank without 
a state – the ECB is governed not by national law but by an international treaty. As this 
treaty is practically impossible to modify, the ECB’s enormous independence is basi-
cally set in stone. This is why the ECB is routinely described as world’s most inde-
pendent central bank. Much less attention is given to the fact that, due to its treaty-
based mandate, the ECB is also the least constrained central bank in the world. Obvi-
ously, this runs counter to the most basic predictions of delegation theory, according to 
which the more independence governments give to an agency, the more they will want 
to make sure it doesn’t abuse its powers – and therefore limit them strictly. 
As the ECB’s mandate is enshrined in international law, it is necessarily an incomplete 
contract. Because it has to stand the test of time international law needs to be couched 
in much more general terms than national law. It cannot be amended to reflect chang-
ing conditions. It requires flexibility. Contrary to all its rhetoric about following a clear 
and strictly defined mission, then, the ECB’s treaty-based mandate contains a lot of 
flexibility. And the Euro’s founding fathers such as Otmar Issing were well aware of 
this peculiarity of the ECB’s mandate:  
“The powers of the central bank, including its monetary policy instru-
ments, are normally laid down quite clearly. […] This is not so, howev-
er, in the case of the ECB. The Treaty contains relatively few provi-
sions, which are, moreover, couched in very general terms.” (Issing 
2008: 118-9)  
As the crisis has shown, these general terms of the Maastricht Treaty can be interpret-
ed in very different ways. Consequently different central bankers – as well as different 
courts – have offered astonishingly diverse opinions about what the ECB’s mandate 
actually consists of. Their treaty-based mandate thus makes ECB policymakers practi-
cally untouchable and, at the same time, leaves them enormous leeway to interpret 
what they should do and how they should go about it. If conditions change, the ECB 
has the freedom to reinterpret its own mandate – and it has clearly done so during the 
crisis.  
Three channels of ideational change: persuasion, appointment, and leadership 
The act of re-interpreting Maastricht is consequential because, to state the obvious, 
doing so allows for policy change without treaty change. Two policies signal that a 
quite radical reinterpretation of the ECB’s mandate has taken place under Mario 
Draghi’s reign. First, ‘whatever it takes’ and the OMT created the basis for the ECB to 
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function as a lender of last resort (LOLR) to governments – a role previous ECB lead-
ers tried hard to avoid. Second, the QE program of 2015 demonstrates a newfound 
concern about developments beyond consumer price inflation. Instead of being uncon-
cerned with inflation rates close to zero, the new ECB management took the threat of 
deflation very seriously, and increasingly stressed the risks of doing nothing for “jobs 
and growth and, eventually, for the future of our monetary union” (Draghi 2016b). In 
other words, it showed concerns not only for price stability, but for supporting the 
general economic policies in the Union, too.  
While much of my dissertation focuses on the absence of change at the ECB – namely 
its reluctance to reach for unconventional policies more quickly – its belated conver-
sion demands an explanation, too. After all, few would doubt that the ECB in 2017 
looks very different compared to ten years before – despite following exactly the same 
mandate. In the words of Alan Greenspan (2014), the ECB “has effectively thrown off 
all the Maastricht Treaty restrictions that bound the bank to the model of the Deutsche 
Bundesbank.” How did this happen?  
An approach focused on interpretive agents – here: independent and largely uncon-
strained central bankers – points to two rather obvious ways in which ideational 
change may induce policy change: persuasion and appointment. Central bankers can 
either be convinced by new ideas or replaced by other central bankers with different 
views. My analysis of how ECB decisions are prepared (see chapter 3) leads to a third 
path for change: it suggests that the significance of economic ideas can change when 
informal policymaking procedures are altered. If certain groups of agents find them-
selves sidelined by new rules and routines of decision-making, the significance of the 
ideas they hold is reduced as well. All three channels of ideational change – persua-
sion, appointment, and leadership – certainly interact and may all be at play at the 
same time. Their relative importance varies, however. A brief reiteration of policy-
making during the ECB’s first three presidencies illustrates the point.  
During the Duisenberg era, monetary policymaking was practically sourced out to 
chief economist Otmar Issing for a number of reasons. First, he personalized the Bun-
desbank’s credibility, which the ECB was eager to borrow by signaling as much conti-
nuity as possible – institutionally as well as in matters of leading personnel. Second, 
most European central banks had previously shadowed the Bundesbank’s rate deci-
sions and therefore little experience in making policy independently. Thus, they placed 
a lot of faith – and power – in Issing. Third, Issing led the most important departments 
for monetary policymaking (DG-Economics in particular). There units effectively held 
a monopoly over data and models of the Eurozone economy, which they were only 
developing at that time (see Cecchetti and Schoenholtz 2008: 13). Fourth, and perhaps 
most importantly, Issing possessed a high degree of professional authority due to “his 
outstanding professional and academic qualifications and powers of persuasion” (Ti-
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etmeyer 2007: 63, my emphasis). He was not only a well-respected academic econo-
mist and seasoned policymaker, but also a particularly outspoken man of strong con-
victions who frequently sought intellectual debates with staff and fellow policymakers. 
Finally, the ECB’s first chief economist was also unusually close to his staff and left 
behind a legacy that would last much longer than his term at the bank. He established 
close working relationship with all staff under his responsibility, providing them with 
direct feedback on their work and having regular informal interactions with them as 
well. As most of these staff economists were relatively inexperienced (Issing 2008: 
72), they learned the craft of practical monetary policymaking in the ECB’s early days 
under Issing’s supervision. And as they rose through the ranks, so would Issing’s intel-
lectual legacy. 
When Trichet took over from Duisenberg, he and other members of the Executive 
Board became more involved in monetary policy issues. For instance, Trichet estab-
lished staff briefings for the entire Executive Board as a regular routine before Gov-
erning Council meetings. This had previously been a private affair between Issing and 
his team, who had merely provided other board members with written reports. Now, 
Issing’s economists117 were to report to the entire board, and Trichet reportedly “want-
ed to know everything”. While this change in leadership first diminished Issing’s au-
tonomy to set the agenda, the regular interactions between staff economists and the 
Executive Board it brought about would also guarantee a lasting influence of Issing’s 
ideas through his disciples. Furthermore, Trichet himself “began to be seen as more 
German than the Germans” (James 2012: 394), which is why this change in decision-
making procedures did not provoke a change in the ECB’s policy change. Another 
factor for continuity was the appointment of Jürgen Stark as Issing’s replacement. Just 
like Issing, Stark had been the Bundesbank’s chief economist before making the move 
to the ECB, and promised more of the same. While he did not have his predecessor’s 
natural authority, he followed similar ideas and thus became the new face of ECB or-
thodoxy. When the extraordinary conditions of the crisis induced Trichet to take a 
more pragmatic turn, Stark consequently resigned in opposition. 
However, Trichet’s pragmatism pales in comparison to the changes Mario Draghi’s 
presidency brought. While Trichet’s SMP may have paved the way, the cornerstones 
of the ECB’s late yet remarkable metamorphosis – OMT and QE – clearly arrived with 
Draghi. The ECB’s new turn under Draghi points to decisive changes through all three 
channels of ideational change. In terms of appointment, Draghi himself clearly dif-
fered greatly from his predecessor. While Trichet was a long-time civil servant, Draghi 
was trained as an academic who gained his doctorate degree at the MIT and taught at 
several Italian universities before joining the Italian treasury. Other prominent new 
appointments, e.g. those of Peter Praet and Benoit Coeuré as Executive Board mem-
                                              
117 While managers of units in DG-Economics were not the only ones to appear in these briefings, they were and 
remain by far the most important units in the preparation of monetary policy decisions. 
169 
 
bers or Frank Smets as Director General of DG-Economics, suggest a strengthened 
role for pragmatic and unorthodox central bankers.  
Due to his academic credentials and strong ties to prominent US central bankers, 
Draghi arguably commanded great persuasive powers as well. While he was fiercely 
attacked at home for changing the ECB, he drew authority from the support he enjoyed 
within the international central banking community. Finally, Draghi adopted a sharply 
different leadership style which helped to further moderate the influence of orthodox 
ideas in ECB policymaking. Regarding his leadership within the Governing Council, 
Draghi appeared much less focused on consensus-building. While Trichet worked tire-
lessly to bring the Governing Council to a shared view, Draghi required only solid ma-
jorities. This arguably reduced the significance of extreme positions, such as the or-
thodox views often associated with German central bankers. In this respect, Briancon 
(2015) quotes a former Governing Council member as saying that Draghi’s greatest 
accomplishment was that “he declared the ECB’s independence from Germany.” Re-
garding his leadership inside the ECB, Draghi also relied less on in-house expertise 
than his predecessors, drawing much more on advice from externals. He cut the time 
and attention given to staff briefings, which arguably curbed the influence of orthodox 
ideas held by staff economists within DG-Economics (see chapter 3.3).  
A focus on interpretive agents surely invites speculative counterfactuals regarding 
what other potential ECB leaders might have done. For instance, it is hard to imagine 
the ‘old ECB’ under Trichet and Stark or Issing signing up to the ECB’s current poli-
cies – not to speak of an ECB led by Axel Weber, who long seemed the Trichet’s most 
likely successor (Economist 2011a). How former ECB officials publicly criticize cur-
rent policies speaks volumes on this possibility (e.g. Issing 2011b; Stark 2014, 2015). 
Yet the strong focus on the ECB President in much of the media might overstate his 
powers. After all, the Governing Council contains 21 voting members, which is why 
no president can bring far-reaching changes about single-handedly. For instance, We-
ber withdrew his candidacy as Trichet’s successor precisely because he realized that 
his orthodox ideas where not shared by the majority of his colleagues in the commit-
tee. Moreover, Draghi did not simply have it his way once he took office. During his 
first years, the ECB’s monetary policy stance (as measured by real long-term interest 
rates) actually tightened. Proponents of more activist policies had to overcome strong 
resistance of orthodox central bankers within the Eurosystem first before the ECB’s 
belated conversion could occur.  
The role of interpretive agents within institutional analysis 
Reflecting on the first 100 years of the Fed, the former president of the Federal Re-
serve Bank of Cleveland, Jerry L. Jordan, found them deeply influenced by central 
bankers’ ideas: “For the past century, the economic theories of prominent personalities 
in the central bank’s policymaking bodies have been the dominant factors giving us 
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the very mixed results we have witnessed.” (Jordan 2014: 213-4). In line with my ap-
proach, this characterizes the role of central bankers’ as “collective puzzlement on so-
ciety’s behalf” (Heclo 1974: 375). The above shows that an approach that places inter-
pretive agents at the heart of the analysis can help explain both change and stability in 
monetary policymaking. As policy ideas tend to be sticky, they shed light on periods 
of stability and processes of (too) slow adjustment. By drawing attention to processes 
of persuasion, the appointment of new policymakers with different ideas, or changed 
practices of decision-making under new leadership, an approach focused on policy-
makers’ ideas can cope with change as well. 
Yet, ideas are certainly not all that matters. Economic interests and institutional con-
straints certainly play a role in ECB policymaking. For instance, the tacit consent of 
the German government was crucial for the effectiveness of Draghi’s path-breaking 
OMT program. Additionally, several economists interviewed for this project men-
tioned that the weight given to economists’ arguments in decision-making within the 
Eurosystem often reflects the power of their country of origin. Simply stated, every-
body listens when the French and, particularly, the Germans speak. Their powerful 
constituencies give their words additional weight.  
More broadly, the insight that our beliefs about what is possible influences what we 
deem desirable can also work in reverse: what we consider desirable may shape our 
beliefs about what is possible.  For instance, the continuing influence of Ordoliberal 
thought in German policy debates mirrors its particularly close fit with what Germa-
ny’s economy needs. As Blyth (2015: 141-43) shows, the Ordoliberal instruction sheet 
is particularly well-designed to shape European policies in line with Germany’s eco-
nomic interests. Ordoliberal ideas become synonymous with the national interest and it 
is unclear what comes first. In this way, many of Germany’s policy positions during 
the Euro crisis can be interpreted as both following Ordoliberal ideas and their naked 
self-interest.  
I argue that the situation under examination here, however, carries different character-
istics. I analyze decision-making among a closed circle of macroeconomic experts – 
central bank governors and their staff economists – under conditions of extreme uncer-
tainty. These agents, whose specific connections to their home settings are unclear 
(partly because they are institutionally bound to not seek advice from their home con-
stituencies and forced to adopt a ‘Euro area rhetoric’ in policy debates), were under 
pressure to deliver suitable policy responses to the worst economic crisis in genera-
tions. In such a situation, I argue, policymakers are likely to resort to their beliefs 
about ‘what works’ in order to deliver policies that work. 
Similarly, when I argue that the Maastricht Treaty constrains ECB policymakers to a 
lesser degree than commonly assumed, I do not claim that they are completely uncon-
strained. As Bell (2011) points out, recognizing that agents matter does not necessarily 
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rule out engaging with institutional analysis, unless one adopts a particularly determin-
istic view of how institutions shape agents’ behavior.  
Yet the above shows that the ECB’s recent decisions neither invariably reflect the 
preferences of economically dominant agents (or countries) nor a single interpretation 
of its mandate. Therefore additional factors must be at play. I thus argue that any full 
account of how the ECB makes choices within the constraints it faces must examine 
how central bankers perceive of economic problems and solutions. And this is a func-
tion of their core beliefs about the economy. Unfortunately, many studies neglect this 
human factor in central banking. Economics analyses of central bank behavior in par-
ticular tend to model central bank behavior as a reflection of their mandates, measured 
by detailed indices of central bank independence.  
If we are to understand the relationship between agents and institutions, I argue, we 
need to carefully consider the room for discretion these institutions allow for. This is 
particularly tricky in the case of a vaguely phrased international treaty, which is sup-
posed to guide a central bank’s policies for decades – and thus through inevitably 
changing conditions without ever being amended itself. The ECB’s mandate had in the 
past been regarded as particularly strict mandate, confining it to fight inflation single-
mindedly. Arguably this was the widely shared interpretation of the Maastricht Treaty 
at the time of its negotiation, rather than an ‘objective’ reading of what the law actual-
ly said. This reading of Maastricht mirrored the prevailing monetary consensus from 
the 1980s up until the crisis. This means that it was this orthodox consensus before the 
crisis rather than the ECB’s mandate which kept it from doing more. Breaking the rule 
book thus implied breaking the orthodox majority, not the law. 
The case for a multifaceted approach to empirical research on ideas 
Methodologically speaking, the main novelty this dissertation introduces is my attempt 
to quantify ideas based on an elite survey. The intuition behind this is rather simple: if 
we want to know what people think, why don’t we simply ask them? Another quantita-
tive approach to measuring ideas implies making use of recent developments in auto-
mated content analysis, which allows for identifying ideational variables within large 
bodies of textual data (e.g. central bankers’ speeches or central bank working papers). 
Yet while data created following such quantitatively-oriented empirical strategies ar-
guably contains fewer subjective elements than, say, interviewing or participant obser-
vation techniques, there are certainly drawbacks associated with them.  
First, ideas are fuzzy concepts, hard to define and even harder to measure. Turning 
observations into numbers does not circumvent this problem, even though numbers 
sometimes lead us to falsely infer a higher degree of objectivity. On the upside, a 
standardized data collection forces the researcher to devote a lot of time and efforts on 
the operationalization of ideational variables before confronting empirical realities. On 
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the downside, this comes at the expense of flexibility. For instance, there was no way 
for me to change the wording of my belief items during the data collection stage with-
out running the risk of invalidating the entire dataset. Second, depending on the re-
search question at hand, quantitative indicators of beliefs may not tell us much. While 
they may point to more or less interesting correlations, they do not provide us with a 
causal story about how the observed variable affects real-world outcomes. In this dis-
sertation, for instance, the quantitative analysis of my survey data may provide hints 
about which ideas matter (see chapter 5). Yet this alone cannot tell us whose ideas 
matter, when and how. To fully understand the role ideas played for the ECB’s actual 
policy choices, one needs to understand an organization’s decision-making procedures 
(see chapter 3) as well as the specific circumstances surrounding the decisions of in-
terest (chapter 6). 
This calls for embedding quantitative analysis within broader research designs, using 
statistical as well as interpretive methods to examine the same research question. It 
may lend an argument more credibility if the quantitative and the qualitative elements 
of the analysis speak to each other. By mixing methods I hope to contribute to a more 
multifaceted approach to ideational research, going beyond the narrative and interpre-
tive methods that dominate the field. As the bulk of our profession appears to strongly 
prioritize quantitative analysis, I hope that introducing more quantitative approaches to 
the study of ideas may gain ideational arguments more attention within mainstream 
debates. 
What way ahead for European Monetary Union? 
At the time of writing (March 2017), the Eurozone appears more stable than for most 
of the past decade. However, there are good reasons to curb one’s enthusiasm. After 
all, the Euro crisis has already seen several periods of relative calm which were all-
too-soon followed by a new escalation. Going forward, then, one way to conclude this 
dissertation is to ask what, if anything, the results presented here may tell us about the 
future of the Euro. Is the escalation of Governing Council politics primarily a concern 
for the sustainability of collegial decision-making within the ECB? Will the wounds 
incurred by this harsh battle of ideas heal in due time or have they caused lasting dam-
age? More positively, does the ECB’s belated conversion signal a turn for more 
growth-friendly Eurozone policies, and will this lead to an accelerating recovery? 
One key finding of my dissertation is the astonishing amount of disagreement among 
central bankers about how the economy works. One may argue that this lack of a con-
sensus view merely reflects the uncertainties created by the crisis. Yet, several of my 
interviewees within the Eurosystem were unsurprised by the patterns found in the sur-
vey data, particularly regarding the differences between different Eurosystem institu-
tions. This was more or less the pattern they expected to see, based on their frequent 
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interactions with my survey subjects in their daily work.118 Otmar Issing, for instance, 
said that in his opinion the ECB faced two main challenges at the start of the Euro. “It 
passed the first test – namely, to manage a smooth transition to a completely new, 
common currency – with flying colors. The second challenge consisted in establishing 
a common understanding of monetary policy across the different cultures in Europe. 
This challenge remains and appears more substantial than ever before.”119 
What does this persistence of different beliefs tell us about the future of European 
Monetary Union (EMU)? After all, practically any account of EMU creation in the 
academic literature (e.g. McNamara 1998; Dyson & Featherstone 1999) as well as re-
flections by policymakers (Issing 2008) emphasized how important the emergence of a 
monetary consensus was for EMU to be realized in the first place. In this light, the ab-
sence of consensus may be cause for concern. Amy Verdun reflected on this challenge 
already in the Euro’s early days: “EMU will lead to further revival of the EU if there 
remains a clear consensus and widespread support for common ideas on the objectives 
of economic and monetary policy. By contrast, EMU may end up posing a serious risk 
to the integration process if governments, the ECB, societal actors, and public opinion 
disagree about the aims of monetary policy and EMU's design” (Verdun 2000a: 108). 
Arguably, the latter scenario describes the current situation rather well.  
However, such concerns are not confined to the Eurosystem alone. After all, the broad 
monetary consensus of the 1980s and 1990s did not only pave the way to monetary 
union in Europe; it was also crucial for the rise of central bank independence around 
the globe. As almost everyone agreed on the goals of this technically complex policy, 
proponents argued that societies would achieve better results if they left the implemen-
tation of this task to independent experts instead of letting shortsighted politicians in-
terfere. Thus, “once the consensus about the goals of monetary policy breaks down, 
the notion of central bank independence becomes harder to defend on democratic 
grounds” (Münchau 2017). When central bankers openly disagree and even engage in 
public disputes, monetary policy is increasingly perceived as monetary politics – and 
public trust in the impartiality of powerful, unelected technocrats evaporates. Central 
bankers then risk losing the only thing they value even more than stable prices: their 
independence. 
 
  
                                              
118 Interview (31), (32), (33) 
119 Personal communication with Otmar Issing, 31 Jan 2017. 
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Shadow Council Minutes  
[accessible via Handesblatt Archive]:  
 
31.01.2008: Summary Minutes  
30.01.2009: ECB Shadow Council Urges ECB to Cut Rates and to Spell Out Plan B 
27.04.2009: ECB Shadow Council discusses the scope for going below one percent and need 
for outright quantitative easing 
01.05.2009: ECB Shadow Council sees no reason to set a rate floor of 1% 
29.05.2009: ECB Shadow Council says rates are not appropriate 
29.01.2010: Shadow ECB Council Supports Tough Stance on Greece But Urges ECB Not to 
Stoke the Fire 
07.06.2010: Shadow ECB Council supports decision to buy bonds against critics from within 
the Governing Council 
25.10.2010: Shadow ECB Council: Is it time to move toward the exit or should the ECB ra-
ther loosen policy further to prevent the euro from soaring higher? 
31.01.2011: Shadow ECB Council Sees ECB Stuck Between a Rock and a Hard Place 
04.07.2011: Council recommends cautious tightening of European monetary policy 
04.10.2011: Council Urges ECB to Act Quickly and Decisively 
02.07.2012: Council sees ECB’s options reduced to a largely symbolic rate cut 
05.02.2013: Council urges ECB to act more aggressively  
29.04.2013: Council urges ECB to cut rates aggressively 
04.06.2013: Members vote for another rate cut 
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List of interviews used in thesis: 
 
Interview (02) with ECB Economist, 18 Aug 2014 in Frankfurt 
Interview (06) with ECB Economist, 6 Jan 2015 in Frankfurt 
Interview (07) with ECB Economist, 6 Jan 2015 in Frankfurt 
Interview (08) with former Bundesbank Manager, 6 Jan 2015 in Frankfurt  
Interview (10) with Journalist / ECB Correspondent, 7 Jan 2015 in Frankfurt 
Interview (13) with ECB Economist, 9 Jan 2015 in Frankfurt 
Interview (14) with Bundesbank Manager, 21 Sep 2015 in Frankfurt 
Interview (15) with ECB Economist, 22 Sep 2015 in Frankfurt 
Interview (16) with ECB Economist, 22 Sep 2015 in Frankfurt 
Interview (17) with Bundesbank Economist, 23 Sep 2015 in Frankfurt 
Interview (18) with ECB Manager, 23 Sep 2015 in Frankfurt 
Interview (19) with ECB Manager, 24 Sep 2015 in Frankfurt 
Interview (20) with ECB Senior Economist, 25 Sep 2015 in Frankfurt 
Interview (21) with ECB Manager, 29 Sep 2015 in Frankfurt 
Interview (22) with ECB Manager, 29 Sep 2015 in Frankfurt 
Interview (23) with ECB Manager, 30 Sep 2015 in Frankfurt 
Interview (24) with ECB Manager, 2 Dec 2015 in Frankfurt 
Interview (31) with ECB Senior Economist, 18 Jan 2017 in Frankfurt 
Interview (32) with Bundesbank Manager, 19 Jan 2017 in Frankfurt 
Interview (33) with former ECB Policymaker, 24 Jan 2017 in Frankfurt 
 
Interview with Otmar Issing, 31 Jan 2017 in Frankfurt* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*as several statements made by the interviewee unambiguously revealed his identity, he agreed to 
being identified as having made the statements used here 
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IV 
 
Thank you for your participation in this survey! It will take you about 6 minutes to complete it. 
The survey is part of a dissertation project at the European University Institute, supervised by Prof. 
Sven Steinmo and supported by Prof. Richard Portes. 
As recent developments have challenged the intellectual framework for monetary policy formation, I 
investigate how central bankers working in such an uncertain and changing environment perceive 
the economy.  
The survey contains three parts: 
1. I shall first ask you to convey some information regarding your personal background (origin, 
education, work experience). 
2. The second part of the survey then asks for your opinion regarding some general statements 
about how the economy works. 
3. Finally, I will ask you about your opinion regarding some recent reform proposals and how 
you relate your work to certain intellectual frameworks. 
1) Personal background: origin, education, and work experience 
1. What is your gender? 
☐ Female     ☐ Male 
2. What is your age? 
☐ 29 or younger 
☐ 30-39 
☐ 40-49 
☐ 50-59 
☐ 60 or older 
3. Which country were you born in? 
Please state: ______________________________________________  
4. In which country did you spent most of your childhood and youth (until age 18)? 
Please state: ______________________________________________  
5. Would you describe yourself as someone who tries to avoid risks (risk-averse) or as someone 
who is willing to take risks (risk-prone)? 
Please indicate on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means “risk-averse” and 10 means “risk-prone”. 
risk-averse                  risk-
prone 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
6. Please indicate the highest level of education you have completed: 
☐ doctoral degree 
☐ master’s degree 
☐ bachelor’s degree 
☐ secondary school degree 
7. At which institution did you complete your highest level of education? 
Please state name and place: ________________________________________________  
V 
 
8. In which academic discipline did you complete your highest level of education?  
☐ Economics 
☐ Business & Accounting 
☐ Law 
☐ Mathematics  
☐ Political and Social Sciences 
☐ Administrative Sciences 
☐ Natural Sciences 
☐ other, please specify: _______________________________  
9. To which academic field did you devote the most time during your education (all degrees)? 
☐ Economics 
☐ Business & Accounting 
☐ Law 
☐ Mathematics 
☐ Political & Social Sciences 
☐ Administrative Sciences 
☐ Natural Sciences 
☐ other, please specify: _______________________________  
10. How many years have you worked in the following sectors? 
Please round to the nearest whole number. 
          years Central banks  
          years Ministries and other government agencies 
          years Financial firms 
          years Non-financial firms 
          years Universities and other research institutions  
          years Other 
11. Please state the central bank of current (or most recent) employment: 
___________________________________________________________ 
 
12. How many years have you worked for the central bank of current (or most recent) employ-
ment?  
Please round to the nearest whole number. 
           years  
13. In which area do you work? 
☐ Executive / Policy committee 
☐ Economics / Monetary Analysis 
☐ Financial Stability 
☐ International 
☐ Markets 
☐ Research 
☐ Other, please specify: ____________________________  
VI 
 
2) Perceptions of the economy 
Next, I would like to ask you to consider the following eight statements about economic 
relationships and indicate your level of agreement with them. 
 
14. To what extent do you agree with the following statements?  
Please answer on a scale from -3 to 3, where -3 means “disagree completely” and  
3 means “agree completely”. 
         disagree            agree        no 
       completely       completely             answer 
 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3     
Inflation is primarily a monetary phenome-
non. 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐    ☐ 
Human beings make mistakes because they 
perceive monetary values in nominal and not 
in real terms. 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐    ☐ 
Downward rigidities of prices and wages are 
relevant for the purposes of monetary policy 
formation. 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐    ☐ 
Monetary policy effects on output or em-
ployment growth are only transitory. 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐    ☐ 
Monetary policy cannot reliably target asset 
prices. 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐    ☐ 
When interest rates are stuck at their lower 
bound, M1 growth is not inflationary. 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐    ☐ 
Agents do not err systematically in their ex-
pectations of future developments. 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐    ☐ 
There can be no price stability without finan-
cial stability. 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐    ☐ 
 
  
VII 
 
3) Reform proposals and intellectual frameworks 
Coming to a close, I would like to ask whether recent events have changed your perceptions and 
whether you think that they warrant reforms of monetary policy frameworks. 
15. To what extent do you agree with the following statements?  
Please answer on a scale from -3 to 3, where -3 means “disagree completely” and 3 means “agree 
completely”. 
         disagree            agree                     no 
       completely      completely             answer 
 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3     
The events since 2007 have changed how I 
perceive the economy. 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐    ☐ 
Given recent experiences with the lower 
bound, central banks should have inflation 
targets higher than 2%. 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐    ☐ 
Central bank should have nominal-GDP tar-
gets. 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐    ☐ 
Financial stability concerns should be taken 
into account for monetary policy decisions. 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐    ☐ 
Central banks should focus on core inflation 
instead of broader measures of inflation. 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐    ☐ 
My final question focuses on intellectual frameworks (sometimes called paradigms): 
16. Would you consider any of the following intellectual frameworks to be of particular 
relevance for your work? 
More than one category may be chosen. 
If you choose more than one, please rank them accordingly, starting with the most important. 
☐ Monetarism 
☐ Neoclassical economics 
☐ Keynesianism 
☐ Ordoliberalism 
☐ Public choice / institutional economics 
☐ Supply side economics 
Thank you very much for your participation! 
If you are interested in receiving aggregated results, please enter your email address below:  
__________________________________________________ 
If you would like to provide feedback on the survey and / or add some additional thoughts to 
your responses, please do so below: 
__________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________
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IX 
 
 Contacts Responses Rate 
Australia: Reserve Bank of Australia 47 8 17,0% 
Austria: Österreichische Nationalbank 64 17 26,6% 
Belgium: Banque nationale de Belgique 51 7 13,7% 
Canada: Bank of Canada / Banque du Canada 178 18 10,1% 
Cyprus: Kentriki Trapeza tis Kyprou 13 2 15,4% 
Czech Republic: Česká národní banka 65 14 21,5% 
Estonia: Eesti Pank 36 9 25,0% 
European Central Bank 256 46 18,0% 
Finland: Suomen Pankki 44 12 27,3% 
France: Banque de France 76 21 27,6% 
Germany: Deutsche Bundesbank 149 17 11,4% 
Greece: Bank of Greece 35 8 22,9% 
Ireland: Central Bank of Ireland 41 7 17,1% 
Italy: Banca d'Italia 179 48 26,8% 
Kyrgyzstan: National Bank of the Kyrgyz Republic 15 4 26,7% 
Latvia: Latvijas Banka 52 9 17,3% 
Lithuania: Lietuvos Bankas 20 6 30,0% 
Luxemburg: Banque Centrale du Luxembourg 20 4 20,0% 
Malta: Bank Ċentrali ta’ Malta 12 2 16,7% 
Netherlands: De Nederlandsche Bank 60 18 30,0% 
New Zealand: Reserve Bank of New Zealand 35 6 17,1% 
Poland: Narodowy Bank Polski 63 12 19,0% 
Portugal: Banco de Portugal 63 10 15,9% 
Slovakia: Národná banka Slovenska 24 3 12,5% 
Slovenia: Banka Slovenije 16 3 18,8% 
Spain: Banco de España 79 20 25,3% 
Sweden: Sveriges Riksbank 45 7 15,6% 
Switzerland: Schweizerische Nationalbank 76 11 14,5% 
UK: Bank of England 100 12 12,0% 
US: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 322 23 7,1% 
US: Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta 31 1 3,2% 
US: Federal Reserve Bank of Boston 26 3 11,5% 
US: Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago 58 5 8,6% 
US: Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland 37 3 8,1% 
US: Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas 43 7 16,3% 
US: Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City 28 2 7,1% 
US: Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis 17 1 5,9% 
US: Federal Reserve Bank of New York 73 5 6,8% 
US: Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia 25 2 8,0% 
US: Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond 20 4 20,0% 
US: Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco 35 1 2,9% 
US: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 28 4 14,3% 
 2657 422 15,9% 
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Gender: 
 
Age groups: 
 
Affiliation with working areas: 
 
Years of work experience in different sectors 
 
Total 
Euro-
system 
Federal 
Reserve 
Anglo-
Saxon§ 
ESCB+ Other 
Central banks 11,56 12,20 10,88 9,57 11,48 9,17 
Ministries and other 
government agencies 
1,23 1,38 1,41 0,44 0,56 1,80 
Financial firms 0,86 0,94 0,98 0,38 1,09 0,25 
Non-financial firms 0,47 0,53 0,20 0,14 0,64 1,18 
Universities and  
research institutions 
4,03 3,98 4,54 1,64 6,23 4,69 
Central bank of current 
employment 
10,57 11,10 10,33 8,84 10,09 8,44 
§ Australia, Canada, New Zealand, United Kingdom 
+ Czech Republic, Poland, Sweden 
* Kyrgyzstan, Switzerland  
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XIII 
 
Beliefs about the economy 
Inflation is primarily a monetary phe-
nomenon.  
Mean SD N 
TOTAL  0,83 1,62 412 
EUROSYSTEM  0,76 1,66 261 
FED SYSTEM  1,16 1,56 58 
ANGLO-SAXON  0,93 1,58 43 
OTHER   0,70 1,52 47 
 
 
Human beings make mistakes because 
they perceive monetary values in nom-
inal and not in real terms. 
Mean SD N 
TOTAL  1,06 1,43 412 
EUROSYSTEM  1,00 1,44 258 
FED SYSTEM  0,98 1,52 60 
ANGLO-SAXON  1,18 1,17 44 
OTHER   1,30 1,49 47 
 
 
Downward rigidities of prices and 
wages are relevant for the purposes of 
monetary policy formation. 
Mean SD N 
TOTAL  2,09 1,08 413 
EUROSYSTEM  2,10 0,99 261 
FED SYSTEM  2,25 0,85 57 
ANGLO-SAXON  2,05 1,26 44 
OTHER   1,79 1,52 48 
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XIV 
 
Monetary policy effects on output or 
employment growth are only transito-
ry. 
Mean SD N 
TOTAL  0,93 1,72 417 
EUROSYSTEM  0,99 1,70 264 
FED SYSTEM  0,53 1,85 60 
ANGLO-SAXON  0,59 1,73 44 
OTHER   1,50 1,53 46 
 
 
Monetary policy cannot reliably target 
asset prices. 
Mean SD N 
TOTAL  0,97 1,66 413 
EUROSYSTEM  0,93 1,63 260 
FED SYSTEM  0,85 1,56 59 
ANGLO-SAXON  1,30 1,71 44 
OTHER   1,06 1,88 47 
 
 
When interest rates are stuck at their 
lower bound, M1 growth is not infla-
tionary. 
Mean SD N 
TOTAL  0,52 1,73 366 
EUROSYSTEM  0,49 1,75 228 
FED SYSTEM  1,00 1,44 54 
ANGLO-SAXON  0,50 1,77 40 
OTHER   0,10 1,88 41 
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XV 
 
Agents do not err systematically in 
their expectations of future develop-
ments. 
Mean SD N 
TOTAL  -0,43 1,75 409 
EUROSYSTEM  -0,35 1,78 259 
FED SYSTEM  -0,36 1,79 59 
ANGLO-SAXON  -0,84 1,51 44 
OTHER   -0,52 1,77 44 
 
 
 
There can be no price stability without 
financial stability. 
Mean SD N 
TOTAL  0,98 1,74 407 
EUROSYSTEM  1,12 1,69 256 
FED SYSTEM  0,36 1,73 56 
ANGLO-SAXON  0,32 1,76 44 
OTHER   1,50 1,65 48 
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XVI 
 
Policy reform proposals 
Given recent experiences with the low-
er bound, central banks should have 
inflation targets higher than 2%. 
Mean SD N 
TOTAL  -0,28 1,82 410 
EUROSYSTEM  -0,38 1,75 259 
FED SYSTEM  0,31 1,74 59 
ANGLO-SAXON  0,05 1,93 44 
OTHER   -0,62 2,00 45 
 
Central bank should have nominal-
GDP targets. 
Mean SD N 
TOTAL  -0,73 1,59 397 
EUROSYSTEM  -0,65 1,61 249 
FED SYSTEM  -0,40 1,45 58 
ANGLO-SAXON  -0,90 1,53 42 
OTHER   -1,29 1,58 45 
 
Central banks should focus on core 
inflation instead of broader measures 
of inflation. 
Mean SD N 
TOTAL  0,47 1,66 409 
EUROSYSTEM  0,47 1,63 258 
FED SYSTEM  0,78 1,57 59 
ANGLO-SAXON  0,59 1,83 44 
OTHER   -0,20 1,69 45 
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